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PREFACE 
Memory colour: ljllite li teml/y, Th e ('010111' of' {/II olljn / (/s iT is l'ernemlwl'erl, which, 
p erhaps nOT sl/lpl'isin~/y, is (~t'en mrhl'1' (Iitti>I'I'lIt/iwl/ /h e (( (' 1//(// c%ur jll'esmteti. 
(Rehe r, 19X5, p.429) 
Colour is deri verl.fi'm/l rh£' ph£'nol/ll'l1(/1 e.l{/II ' I'il ' I1 (, I' of s/llfflCi' inFo/'lll((fiol1 (/t th.e 
picTOrial register. Ho\ovever the c{/f('gorimri(}/1 or m lolll's il//o (/1'/ il'l/('I"/1(II cololll' space is 
also connected wirh inrellectufll o/1(/lingllisTic r/('v l'iojll1/ enl. So, SOtlU ' developmental 
and cross-cultural variability in c%rn(lming is ine vit(/hle. 
(Davidoff. 1991, p.170) 
Police confirmed Dagger W (/S n(){ consiill'f'I'd d{//1g ('/"0 liS . I)//r IIrg ed rh e puhlic to 
contact them (//uinot to attempt r() OPIJro(/ch hi111. He is descl'il)ed (IS 51i. lOin and ww' 
wearing a navy coat, trousers (lnd shoes, red re e shirr and white socks. 
(Another paedophile slips out. Yorkshire Post, 26th Septemher J996, p.l) 
VI 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis r~porls a s~ri~s of sludies in which lh~ accuracy and developm~nt of 
memory for colour was ~xall1ined. Tn Expl'l"iments 1-:\ the ahility of seven year olds, 
nine year olds and adulls lo r~call piclur~-colour umler incidental and intentional 
conditions was investigated. In Experiment J, elll:oding condition inrIuel1l:ed rt:call, 
with intentional recall for colour heller lhan incidel1lal r~call, though in Expeliments 2 
and 3 the affect of encoding condition was less consistent. TIKreasing exposure time of 
stimuli had Ill) affect Ull Illenwry for colour, altllllugh incrl~asing the numher of stimuli 
did reduce recall accuracy. Participant age alll'l·l~d culour r~call. In g~n~ral, adults 
recalled more than the seven and nin~ year llids. The results of EXpeliml:nts 1-3 failed 
to satisfy Hasher and Zacks' (1979) automaticity criteria. 
Pre-schoolers' ahility to use a non-verhal m~ll1ury aid to heir them r~call colour was 
examined in Experimel1l4. Recall for clliom was good in this study, and th~ provision 
of a colour chart led to incr~asl:d ll1l:nwry fl)r l·uluur. The results oi" Experiment 5 
confirmed that children can rell1emh~r Oh.il~ct colour, esp~cially wh~n r~call cues are 
provided. In Experiment 6, the memory of fOlll", six and nine year nlds, and a group 
of adults was tested for a story lold in conjunction wilh a model room. The colour 
recall of all groups approached ceiling lewis. ThL~ rl:sults of Experiments 4 to () did not 
support the findings of s~veral r~s~archers who have condlld~d that memory for 
colour is a particularly poor aspect or rl'l"all. 
In Expeliments 7 and 8, recall for the colours oi" ohjects us~d in a s~ri~s of simple tasks 
was examined. Recall for the colour of ilems which had he~n directly manipulated was 
good, however few participants recall~d th~ culullI"s or any periph~ral il~ms. Although 
age differences were ohserved in Experim ents (l-X, th~ overall rate of recall for the 
incidental colour ini"lll"lllation presented in Experimellts 4-X was gOllli, this contrasted 
with the level of colour rec~lIl ohserv~d in Experiml~ nls 1-1. Thus tllL~r~ was an intluence 
Vll 
or stimuli type on rec;.111 ror colour, wi th the culuur or the three dimension:!1 ohjects used 
in Expeliments 4-H heing hetter recalbJ than the pictures used in the earlier expelimenL<;. 
The results of Experiments J - I-{ are discussed w ith rekrence 1\) prev iuus eyewitness 
research, and III the uevdopment l) f memory I'm co illur. 
VIII 
1.0 General introduction 
One of the charactelistics that separates the plimates from other animals is the presence 
of colour vision (Davidoff, 1991). A large proportion of the human brain is devoted 
solely to the process of seeing, and a great deal of research has examined the 
mechanisms which underpin this process (Frisby, 1979), but although research has 
clmified many of the processes behind the biological basis of colour vision, far less is 
known about what happens to the colours once they register in the visual cortex. The 
central theme of this thesis is an examination of what happens to these coloured 
images after perception occurs, in other words: when we see colours, what is it that 
we remember? 
This thesis focuses on colour memory from two different, though complementary, 
perspectives. The initial focus of the experiments (Experiments 1-3) is on the 
theoretical basis of colour memory, and as such there is an attempt to look at colour 
memory in isolation (as far as this was possible) to investigate how a variety of 
encoding conditions effect recall for colour. Experiment 4 was designed to investigate 
whether memory for colour could be improved by the provision of a non-verbal prop. 
The main focus of the thesis (Experiments 5-8), however, is an examination of colour 
memory from an applied perspective, to discover how everyday colour memory 
operates. The particular applied perspective that this thesis takes is that of eyewitness 
memory. Colour is particularly impOltant in this field because of its typical cenu'ality to 
many descriptions of climinal events (e.g. the colour of a getaway car, hair colour, or 
eye colour of a potential suspect; Baddeley, 1993; Christianson & Loftus, 1(91). 
There is little overlap between the work of researchers who have investigated colour 
memory and those who have focused on eyewitness recall, however one unifying 
feature is that both have taken a developmental approach. Research into both colour 
1 
memory (summmised in Section 4 of the Introduction) and eyewitness recall (Section 
3) has been characterised by the wide range of age groups tested: from pre-schooJers 
(Davidoff & Mitchell, 1993; Howe, Courage & Bryant-Brown, 1993) and older 
children (Hale & Piper, 1973; Rudy & Goodman, 1991), through to college students 
and the elderly (Park & Puglisi, 1985; Yarmey, 1993). This thesis involves an 
examination of the colour memory of children and adults from theoretical and applied 
(i.e. eyewitness) perspectives. 
The assessment of memory using naturalistic stimuli and in ecologically valid settings 
results in far superior performance than memory assessed in other ways (DeLoache, 
1980). Memory for natural stimuli and settings is thought to be supelior because of the 
larger number of connections with the child's knowleclge base they provide (Chi & 
Koeske, 1983). Research related to children's general memory and their recall for 
more naturalistic phenomena is summmised in Sections 1 and 2 of the Introduction, 
respectively. 
1.1 Introduction to research into children's memory 
Memory, the capacity for encoding, storage ancl retrieval of information, has been 
characterised as a series of interconnected components, with the fragile limited-
capacity short telm memory feeding into the more robust long term memory which has 
an unlimited capacity (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Broadbent, 1958). This transfer 
from short- to long-term memory can occur through a conscious attempt at learning 
information through processes such as rehearsal or organisation, or through less 
perceptible routes, such as automaticity (see discussion of Hasher & Zacks , 1979; see 
p. 54, below). More recent conceptions of memory structure have added a sensory 
element, through which stimulation passes before moving on to short term memory, 
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and a working memory module responsible for performing a number of operations 
including re trieval, computation and response selection (Brainerd , 198~ ; Case, 1985) 
and which may improve with age (Swanson, 1996). However, working memory is 
treated by some theorists as analogous to short term memory (e.g. Flavell, Miller & 
Miller, 1993, p. 231). 
Memory processes across the developmental range have been sllIdied with two main 
methods: recall and recognition. In recall, the participant is asked to produce an item or 
a set of items from memory , such as a li st of words learned in the laboratory 
(Ornstein , Naus & Liberty, 1975), or a specitic event, for example an interaction with 
an unfamiliar adult (Goodman & Reed, 1986). Recall may be cued, where the 
participant is asked a series of specific questions, or the participant may be given no 
help to remember information , this is known as free recall. The second method, 
recognition, requires the participant to indicate whether a stimulus has been seen 
before , for example whether a picture was part of a previously-learned series of 
pictures (Brown & Campione , 1972), or if a 'criminal' is present in a line-up 
(Kohnken & Maass, 1988; Wells, Rydell & Seelau, 1993). 
Laboratory studies of cognitive development 
A consistent finding in developmental psychology is the presence of age differences in 
cognitive abilities (Kail, 1990). One explanation for the performance differences 
observed between children of different ages on similar tasks is that working memory 
capacity grows with maturation, increasing in steps which are proportional to age 
(Pascual-Leone, .1987). Although the idea that physical maturation is associated with 
increased processing capacity is intuitively plausible, the presence of too many 
confounding factors, like the effect of schooling on performance, may make this 
notion too simplistic. An alternative view to this model has heen proposed by Case 
(1985). Case argued that what de tennines capacity are functi onal changes which occur 
as children learn to handle information more efficiently. Experience of carrying out 
processes (such as mnemonic strategies) leads to these processes becoming automatic, 
and as they do so, they free processing, or operating, space for other processes. 
However, these two ideas may be difficult to differentiate be tween in terms of 
experimental results; in practice changes in both structural and functional memory 
capacity may exert effects on task perfonnance. 
Performance on a memory task is , of course, not sole ly depende nt on memory 
capacity. Recall is also mediated by the ways in which information is stored and 
retrieved, or in other words, by the strategies that are employed to overcome some of 
the limitations caused by limited cognitive capacity (Flavell et a[. , 1993). Strategy use 
is one factor which may be at least partly responsible for the age-related differences 
observed in a range of memory tasks from story recall (Nelson, 19X6a) to problem 
solving (Siegler, 1986). A number of researchers have examined strategy use in 
children (e.g. Bower, Clark, Lesgold & Winzenz, 1969; Ceci & Bronfe nbrenner, 
1985; Cuvo, 1975; Flavell, Beach & Chinsky, 1966; Kobasigawa, 1974; Ornste in , 
NallS & Stone, 1977). 
Naturalistic investigations of cognitive development 
On the basis of the laboratory-based research referred to above, fi ve years is the age at 
which metacognitive abilities seem to appear and lead to the development and 
application of strategies to improve memory. However data from studies of strategy 
llse as an aid to eve ry day memory indicate a diffe rent pattern of development of 
strategy use, starting earlier than the age suggested by laboratory studies. Although 
age differences still persist in the amount and sophistication of the strategies that 
children know (Flavell, Friedlichs & Hoyt, 1970), researchers have demonstrated the 
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presence of several rudimentary strategies in children as young as two or three years 
old, including looking and pointing at the location of hidden objects (DeLoache, 
Cassidy & Brown, 1985; Wellman, Ritter & Flavell, 1975), and grouping (DeLoache 
& Todd, 1988). 
Providing children with a recognisable context to remember items may make a 
difference to performance. Istomina (1975; replicated by Rogoff & Mistry, 1990) 
tested children aged between three and seven years in one of two conditions, either 
learning a list of words, or leaming the same list of words as a shopping list to 'buy' 
from a toy shop. Recall was better in the latter condition, especially for younger 
children, and in this condition children of all ages were observed attempting to use 
different memory strategies. Istomina concluded that perfOImance was improved in the 
more meaningful task as it gave children a clear idea of the goal that had to he 
achieved. The type of task and the way in which it is presented clearly affects memory 
performance, it the goal of a study is comprehensible and realistic it may improve 
performance over a similar task which is less clearly defined; any study of strategy use 
in children, especially younger ones, may require similarly meaningful situations 
which 'make sense' to children and so allow them to apply the strategies which they 
use daily. 
The study of strategies has led to two conclusions. First, even very young children 
have some idea of how to go about the process of remembering. Second, the 
laboratory study of children's cognitive development (e.g. Flavell et ai., 1966) may 
have led to underestimates of the extent to which children can remember infOimation in 
the real world (e.g. DeLoache & Todd, 1988). Indeed Perlmutter (1984, p. 253) has 
noted that, "while most experimental memory tasks test for deliberate, short-term 
retention of discrete stimuli (e.g. word lists), most everyday use of memory involves 
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nondeliberate, long-term retention of complex events." Only by using a methodology 
which takes into account the context of a task, will it be possible to assess the 
competence of children's problem-solving ability (e.g. Paris, Newman & Jacobs, 
1985; Rogoff & Mistry, 1990). The closer the match between expetimental stimuli and 
events or conditions with which a child may ordinatily have to cope, the more likely 
the experiment's results will give an accurate picture of children's cognitive abilities. 
1.2. Research into Children's MemoT)l: Ecological Issues 
In the previous section, research was reviewed which indicated that researchers 
examining children's memory have concerned themselves with discovering the basic 
mechanisms which underlie memory development, particularly the abilities that 
children are able to draw upon in specific situations. Though often narrow in focus, 
the traditional approach has given us a clear picture of the development of various 
memory abilities. In doing so this approach has provided a platform from which it has 
been possible to further consider the relationship between children's memory abilities 
and their everyday lives. Though there have been calls for research into cognitive 
development to be conducted under more 'naturalistic' and comprehensible conditions 
(Donaldson, 1978; Perlmutter, 1980a), until recently few investigators had examined 
everyday memory. These researchers have questioned the appropriateness of 
laboratory-based tasks as tests of children's true 'everyday ' cognitive abilities. 
As mentioned above, the most salient finding from naturalistic studies is that children 
often perform better in their everyday activities than they do in laboratory-based 
memory tasks (DeLoache, 1980; Goodman , Rudy, Bottoms & Aman, 1990; Nelson 
& Ross, 1980; Paris, Newman & Jacobs, 1985). The differences in performance 
observed in these laboratory experiments compared to those of more naturalistic 
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studies have been interpreted as a difficulty children have in unders tanding novel or 
abstract tasks which prevents them from performing to the bes t of their ability 
(Donaldson, 1978). Rogoff and Mis try (J990) also suggested that a child ' s 
performance will suffer if the task is one which lies beyond the scope of his or her 
previous expeliences (see also Nelson, 1986a). 
Stimulus characteristics 
In a number of studies, researchers have found that the relevance of stimuli or event" 
to an individual will affect children's memory accuracy. For example, Baker-Ward, 
Hess and Flannagan (l990) and Rudy and Goodman (1991) ohserved that children 
had better memory for actions that they had themselves perfolm ed than those they had 
only observed be ing performed. In addition, several investigators have suggested that 
activities, especially those related to goals and which are interesting to participants, are 
reca lled bette r than other types of event information hy both children (Goodman , 
Rudy, BOLLoms & Aman, 1990; Hamond & Fivush, 1991; Pillemer, 1992) and adults 
(Backman, Nilsson & Chalom, 1986). These findings support the idea that memory is 
the product of meaningful activity (Zinchenko, 1983). 
Problems of naturalistic research 
One di sadvantage of naturalistic research 111 companson to more ex per imental 
investigations is the problem of extraneous, uncontrolled, valiahles (Seelau & Wells, 
1995). A tightly controlled ex peliment where a single variahle is manipulated may be 
very different from real-life eyewitness events where several valiables may confound 
each other. Where one, lab-based, study found that high stress led to lower 
eyewitness accuracy (Deffenbacher, 1983), another study, based on recall of an actual 
shooting, showed the reverse pattern: those who reported the highest levels of stress 
were actually the most accurate (Yuille & Cut<;hall, J 986). Seelau and Wells presumed 
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that this positive cOlTelation resulted from a natural confound: eyewitnesses who had 
the best view were closest to the shooting, and therefore more stressed than those 
further away. However, the realism of the events that are used in eyewitness 
experiments is also directly relevant to the kind of conclusions that can he drawn. As 
Lepore (1991) has nOled, ecological validity does not refer solely to the form of the 
stimulus (e.g. a story as opposed to a live event), but also to the content of the 
stimulus (e.g. a bag-snatching incident as opposed to a fairy-tale; see also Oschner & 
Zaragoza, 1988, cited in Goodman et ai., 1990). 
Recognition of the importance of context and prior experience in leaming and memory 
has led to a trend towards more cognitive developmental research being undertaken 
outside the laboratory in more comprehensible, naturalistic settings. Among the 
research areas which have employed naturalistic methods in carrying out 
developmental research are those investigating autobiographical memories and 
eyewitness testimony. As will be seen in the review of colour research below (see pp. 
24-65), most of the investigator~ who have studied colour memory have used 
laboratory-based tasks. 
Autobiographical memory 
Systematic investigation of the development of autobiographic memory has arisen 
largely because of the move towards conducting more naturalistic research (e.g. 
DeLoache & Brown, 1979, cited in DeLoache, 1992; Perlmutter, 1980h). Over the 
last decade the number of studies of children 's individual memories has increased 
sharply (Boyer, Barron & Farrar, 1994; Clubb, Nida, Men·it & Ornstein, 1991; 
Pillemer, 1992). 
One of the problems researchers have faced in assessing the autobiographic memories 
of pre-schoolers in particular is that their memories are not 'socially accessible', that 
is, young children have difficulty in verbally sharing their recollections on demand 
(Pillemer & White, 1989). The poor free recall of pre-schoolers for salient event", has 
been conspicuous in many studies (e.g. Goodman, Aman & Hirschman, 1987 ; 
Ornstein, Gordon & Larus, 1992). However in studies where they were later asked 
direct questions, age differences were either diminished (Goodman & Reed, 1986; 
Zaragoza, 1987), or disappeared completely (Marin et aI., 1979). The finding that 
objective questions benefit children's recall has been replicated by several other studies 
(e.g. Ceci, Ross & Toglia, 1987; Todd & Perlmutter, 1980; though see Cohen & 
Hamick, 1980, where age differences persisted). Other researchers have observed that 
even three year olds are able to provide accurate information about a previously 
experienced event (Fivush, Gray & Fromhoff, 1987; Todd & Perlmutter, 198(), 
especially when verbal demands are reduced (Myers, Clifton & Clarkson, 1987). In 
an expel;ment to assess the effects of val;ous types of cue on recall , Smith, Ratner and 
Hobart (L987) tested kindergarteners ' recall of a day-making exerci se. Recall was 
tested after two weeks under one of three conditions: action (remak.ing the day), object 
cueing (giving a verbal descliption of items lIsed), or verhal reca ll with no cues. Smith 
et al. found that children's recall was better in the action condition than in either of the 
other conditions. This finding has implications for conceptions of the memory of 
young children: given the light conditions, such as being allowed to act out an event, 
children may recall a more complete version of occulTences than if tested with other 
methods, such as verbal recall. 
On the evidence of several studies of autobiographical memory, it appears that when 
given help, children as young as three years (or even younger, see Bauer, 1996) can 
provide accurate descriptions of individual events which they have personally 
expelienced. Methods of improving the recall of children with verhal and non-verbal 
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techniques are discussed in Chapter 1, Section 3 (see p. 19). 
Schema theory 
Within the framework of schema theory, several researchers have examined the effects 
of repeated experience of similar events or infolmation on the recall of children. SClipt 
and schema theories (e.g. Bartlett, 1932; Schank & Abelson, 1977) have been widely 
utilised as explanations for many aspects of story (Davidson & Jergovic , 1996) and 
event memory (e.g. Baker-Ward et aI., 1990; Bower, Black & TUl1ler, 1979; Fivush 
& Slackman, 1986; Ratner, Smith & Padgett, 1990). As part of this, repeated 
experiences (e.g. getting ready for bed, having a bath, going to school) are organised 
into hypothetical cognitive structures termed scripts or schema, which are used in 
comprehension and recall. These organisational processes are not restricted to one parl 
of the lifespan and are as frequent in pre-schoolers as they are in adults (e.g. Catellani, 
1991; Hudson, 1986; Nelson, 1986b). 
Memory is seen by schema theorists (e.g. Bartlett, 1932; Bransford & Franks, 1971) 
as a reconstructive process, rather than a straightforward output of previously stored 
data; when we recall infonnation, we make inferences. Such inferences are typical of 
memory processes, and are as spontaneous as they are unintentional. Blades and 
Banham (1990) found that pre-schooiers had comprehensive schema for 
environmental information. In one condition children were shown a realistic layout of 
a model kitchen, which did not include a cooker. The children were asked to 
remember the positions of the items of furniture and were tested on this a day late r. 
Blades and Banham found that over half the four year olds included a cooker in their 
reconstruction of the model kitchen, indicating that children have a good idea, or 
schema, for what a typical kitchen layout should be like. 
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SClipt and schema theories have heen intluential in a range of research into everyday 
memory, including the role prior experience plays in the interpretation of events 
(Nelson & Gruendel, 1986; Schank & Abelson, 1977), children 's eyewitness recall 
(Fivush, Kuebli & Clubb, 1992; Smith, 1986; Zaragoza, Dahlgren & Muench, 1992), 
memory development (Nelson, 1986b), and for research into the effects of 
'knowledge bases' on the learning and memory development of children (e.g. Chi & 
Koeske, 1983; Lindberg, 1980). Drawing on schema theory, other researchers have 
also examined children's memory for scenes (e.g. Axia & Caravaggi, 1987; Mandler 
& Stein, 1974), and have concluded that from three or four years of age, children have 
the ability to build up a mental picture of what they think a particular environment 
should look like. This is important from the perspective of eyewitness testimony, and 
in particular recall for the colours of objects in particular situations: preconceptions 
ahout what colours items should he may have a significant effect on what is actually 
recalled (see pp. 45-49, below). 
How children learn about their environment is of interest not only from the perspective 
of cognitive theory, but also from a practical perspective as it provides an idea of how 
memory develops in the 'real world' (Blades, in press). A variety of environments has 
been used to investigate wayfinding ahilities, including individual rooms (Lihen, 
Moore & Golbeck, 1982) and buildings (Garling, Book, Lindherg & Nilsson, 1981), 
a school (Cousins, Siegel & Maxwell, 1983), an urban area (Darvizeh & Spencer, 
1984) and a university campus (Cornell, Heth & Alberts, 1994). 
There is strong support for testing children under such naturalistic conditions. Cornell 
and Hay (1984) tested two large groups of five and eight year nlds under one of three 
encoding conditions. In one condition the children went on a guided walk along a 
route, in another condition children saw a videotape of the same route, in the final 
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condition children saw a sequence of slides which were taken along the route. Cornell 
and Hay found that both younger and older children made significantly fewer 
navigational errors when retracing the route if they had walked along it than in either 
of the other conditions. 
Differences between memory for real-life and videotaped events are not restricted to 
studies examining environmental recall. In an eyewitness study, King (unpublished, 
cited in Goodman et aI., 1987), found that children who saw a real-life event recalled 
more information and were less suggestible than children who had seen a videotaped 
version of the same event. 
Rea li stic investigations of children's eyew itness memory are a relatively recent 
phenomenon (see Goodman, 1984). However there has been an increase in the 
amount of research which has tested children's memory for live events, especially 
relating to situations relevant to. eyewitness recall (Goodman et ai., 1990). In the next 
section of the thesis, I shall outline some of these topics. 
1.3. Children's Eyewitness Memory 
Investigations of children's eyewitness memory have a long hi story, going back to 
shortly after the tum of the century (Muscio, 1915 ; Stem 1910, Varendonck, 1911 ; 
Whipple, 1911, 1912). The predominant view of these researchers was that children 
made poor witnesses (see Goodman, 1984). More recently , changing legal 
assumptions about the admissibility and reliability of children's evidence have had a 
signiticant bearing on the increasingly important role played by children in the climinal 
justice system (see Dent & Flin, 1992; Goodman & Bottoms, 1993; Zaragoza, 
Graham, Hall & Ben-Porath, 1995). In this section of the thesis I will summarise 
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some of the reasons behind these changes, and argue that many of these changes have 
been dl;ven by psychological research. 
Several factors have had an impact on the shift towards more pro-child legal 
procedures. These factors include a recognition of the number of crimes actually 
witnessed by children (Mathias, Mertin & Murray, L995), an increase in the profile of 
child abuse (Fincham, Beach, Moore & Diener, J994; Pilkington & Kremer, 1995), 
and an improved understanding of the cognitive abilities of children especially in 
relation to situations about which they may be asked to testify (Johnson, J99~). As 
children may often be important witnesses, or even, as in the case of child abuse, the 
only witnesses, this has necessitated changes in attitudes towards children in the 
witness box. These factors have all had consequences both in terms of a 
transformation of attitudes towards young witnesses and in legislative changes in the 
treatment of children in the courtroom (Myers, 1996). Nevertheless some researchers 
have found that child witnesses are still perceived as being less credible than adult 
witnesses by mock jurors (Nightingale, 1993; Ross, Dunning, Toglia & Ceci, 1990). 
Children are likely to be witness to many events of interest to the legal system (Berton 
& Stabb, 1996), these events range from road traffic accidents (Sheehy & Chapman, 
1982), to murders (Burman & Allenmeares, 1994; Pynoos & Eth, J984). One 
American survey (Richters, 1993) found that a quarter of all assaults occur in or near 
to residences where children may be present. Children's exposure to violence in the 
community has been the subject of an increasing amount of research (Martinez & 
Richters, 199~; Richters & Martinez, 1993); researchers have also examined the 
occurrence of post-traumatic stress disorder in children, including witnesses of 
disasters (Lonigan, Shannon, Taylor, Finch & Sallee, 1994; Shannon, Lonigan, 
Finch & Taylor, 1994), and in victims of abuse (AnTIsworth & Holaday, 1993; Wolf, 
Sas & Wekerle, 1994). 
The growth in public awareness of the prohlem of child abuse has occurred partly 
because of well-publicised investigations into abuse allegations such as the Frank 
Beck Affair (Foster, 199~), and into the treatment of reports of abuse (e.g. Cleveland 
child abuse enquiry, Butler-Sloss, 1988). The number of reports of child abuse is of 
great concern: in the USA in 1994 there were ~ . 1 million reports of suspected child 
maltreatment (National Center for Child Abuse and Neglect, 1995). Reports of abuse 
increased rapidly in the 1980s, the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children recorded an eight-fold rise in recorded cases of sexual abuse in the UK 
between 198~ and 1987 (NSPCC, 1989). The fact that this increase was accompanied 
by only a 17% rise in the number of prosecutions has implications for the study of 
child testimony: either children are prone to making false accusations , or their accurate 
reports of abuse are ignored. 
The increased presence of children in the court-room over the last decade has 
necessitated a re-evaluation of the role of the testimony of minors. This re-evaluation 
is part of an attempt to improve the reliability and admissihility of their evidence, and 
has led to a review of the legal barriers which have often prevented young witnesses 
from giving evidence in court (Myers, 1996; Turtle & Wells, 1987). Less than two 
decades after people began to re-examine their 'common-sense ' notions of children's 
memories and their performance in the court-room (e.g. Cohen & Harnick, 1980; 
Dale, Loftus & Rathbun , 1978; Marin et al., J 979), the legal system is now at the 
stage where children, some as young as three or four years of age, are permitted to 
give evidence in courts of law (Gray, 199~ in Ceci & Bruck, 1993b). Several 
provisions have been made to help child witnesses give statements (reviewed in Perry 
& WIightsman, 1991), including the use of video evidence (Davies & Westcott, 1992; 
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Home Office, 1992; Swim, Borgida & McCoy, 1993), giving testimony via live TV 
links (Lindsay, Ross, Lea & Carr, 1995; Wynn Davies, 1996), in special closed, in 
camera, court sessions (Flin, Bull , Boon & Knox, 1992b), or from behind barriers 
which shield them from the accused (Lindsay et al., 1995). Researchers have also 
examined the effect of support persons (Greenstock & Pipe, 1996; Morgan & 
Williams, 1993; Moston, 1992), interviewer status (Goodman, Sharma, Thomas & 
Considine, 1995) and non-verbal prompts on recall (O'Callaghan & D' Arcy, 1989; 
Pipe, Gee & Wilson, 1993, see below). 
The recognition that children are often likely to be witnesses has been foLlowed closely 
by an increase in the amount of research which has investigated many aspects of their 
memory and behaviour. 
Factors influencing eyewitness recall 
Age 
Age differences 111 recall have been investigated by a number of eyewitness 
researchers, including changes across school age (Geiselman, Saywitz & Bornstein, 
1993; Johnson & Foley, 1984), and adulthood (Yarmey, 1993), however relatively 
few studies have involved direct comparisons between the performance of children 
and adults (though see Cassel, Roebers & Bjorklund, 1996; Goodman & Reed, 
1986). Experimenters have also investigated the eyewitness perfOlmance of the elderly 
(List, 1986; Scogin, Calhoon & D' Errico, 1994; Yamley, 1993), and of pre-schoolers 
(Howe et al ., 1993; Leichtman & Ceci, 1995; Whittaker, 1986). Researchers have 
also assessed the recall of children with disabilities, including a comparison of the 
eyewitness accounts of deaf and hearing children (Porter, Yuille & Bent, 1995), and 
an analysis of the recall of pre-school children with developmental delays (Dent, 1992; 
Perlman, Ericson, Esses & Isaacs, 1994) and with leaming difficulties (Dent, 1992). 
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In an analysis of almost 800 alleged victims of child sexual abuse (Doris, 1993, cited 
by Ceci & Bruck, 1993a), noted that nearly 40% of the cases were accounted for by 
children aged 6 years and under. In general, the findings of some eyewitness 
experiments have mirrored the findings of other cognitive tasks (see Section 1, 
above), wi th the perfonnance of children improving up to the age 10 or 12 at which 
point levels approaching those of adults are attained. In most respects, sllch as 
answering specific (Cohen & Harnick, 198()) or misleading questions (Ackil & 
Zaragoza, 1995; Payne, Toglia & Anastasi, 1994), younger children are outperfOlmed 
by older children and adults. In some areas however, the performance of young 
children matches that of older children and adults. A consistent finding of eyewitness 
studies has been that young children's free recall of events, though less 
comprehensive, is at least as accurate as that of older individuals (e.g. Goodman & 
Reed, 1986; Marin et aI., 1979). Brooks and Siegal (1991, p. 87) concluded, "[a]ge is 
not an overwhelming detelminant of memory but interacts with children's knowledge 
base and task factors to influence the reconstruction of event.;;." 
Problems with recaJl are not, however, restricted to children. Adults may make 
unreliable witnesses (Loftus & Palmer, 1974, though see Bekerian & Bowers, 1983), 
to the extent that mistaken eyewitness identification has been identified as the single 
most important factor leading to false convictions (Rattner, 1988). The effect of age on 
recall will be examined throughout this thesis. 
Stimuli 
Val;ous stimuli have been explored in the examination of eyewitness recall, including 
stories (Ceci, Ross & Toglia, 1987), cartoons (Dale et (I/., 1978), slides (List, 1986; 
Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Pezdek & Roe, 1995), films (Cohen & Harnick, 1980; King 
& Yuille, 1987; Milne, Bull, Koehnken & Memon, 1994), games (Brainerd & Reyna, 
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1995; Goodman & Reed, 1986), puppet shows (Ling, 1989) and real-life ewnts 
(Marin et aI., 1979; Ornstein, Gordon & Lams, 1992; Rudy & Goodman, 1991). 
However several researchers have cIiticised some stimuli as being so trivial in nature 
that they can have little relevance to the kinds of things that children will be asked 
about in the courtroom (Battermanfaunce & Goodman, 1993). In a court-room, child 
witnesses will not be asked to recall details of a slide show or a cartoon, but are likely 
to be asked to describe complex events. The recall of participants for sllch complex 
event') will be examined in Experiments 5, 7 and 8. 
Delay 
Researchers have tested children's eyewitness recall after a variety of delays. These 
delays have ranged from periods as brief as five or ten minutes (e.g. Marin et a/., 
1979; Memon & Vartoukian, 1996) or a few days (Rudy & Goodman , 1991) to 
several months (Bruck, Ceci, Francoeur & Barr, 1995; Flin, Boon, Knox & Bull , 
1992a) and longer (Huffman, Crossman & Ceci, 1996; Poole & White, 1993). 
]n general, the longer the delay before questioning, the greater the deficits in recall. 
For example, Poole and White (1993) observed no differences in recall between the 
recall of children and adults after an immediate interview, but after a two-year delay, 
as a proportion of their total recall, adults made less than half the elTors that children 
did. Flin et aL. (1992) also found that the memory of six and nine year olds decreased 
over a five month delay. Over the same period, adults' recall of accurate information 
was unaffected. This research has a bearing on a large numher of criminal cases, since 
witnesses are often required to testify some considerable time after the original event 
occurred. In this thesis, the effect of two periods of delay will he compared: five 
minutes, which is the same as that used by several researchers who have investigated 
colour recall (see p. 59), and 24 hours , which matches the delay used by some 
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eyewitness researchers. 
Central versus peripheral information 
The issue of what types of information witnesses will remember has been investigated 
by a number of researchers (e.g. Cassel et at., 1996; Memon & Vartoukian, 1996; 
Rudy & Goodman, 1991). For example, Rudy and Goodman found that the recall of 
children for the room in which they played games was poorer than for either their 
memory of the person they played with or the activities in which they took part. The 
type of information remembered is an important determinant of what is recalled, and 
both Cassel et ai. and Memon and Vartoukian observed that 'central' information, that 
is, detai Is which were important parts of an event, such as actions or the people 
involved, were remembered hetter than peripheral information . Me mon and 
Varwukian tested the recall of rive and seven year olds for an event in which an actor 
played a ilute before having an argument with a second person. Peripheral details, 
such as the colour of a confederate's shoes were recalled with less accuracy than the 
instrument the actor played. Recall for central and peripheral information will be 
examined in Experiments 7 and 8. 
Typicality effects and eyewitness recall 
In an earlier section, the intluence of prior knowledge, or schema, on recall was 
discussed. Schema theory also has implications for eyewitness testimony (Ceci et ai., 
1987; Loftus & Davies, 1984; Zaragoza, 1987) . Similar to when erroneous 
information is suggested to them (see Ceci & Bruck, 1993h; Warren & McGough, 
J 996), the recall of eyewitnesses may also be affected by their ideas (or schema) about 
what happens dllling typical Climes (Holst & Pezdek, 1992), or other events (Plice & 
Goodman, 199() , or their stereotypes about the characteIistics of particular individuals 
(Leichtman & Ceci, 1995). Stereotypes about the colours of particular objects may 
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have an affect on recall; in Appendix A adults were asked to outline their stereotypes 
of a number of ilems, as a resource for other expeJiments. 
Use of props 
In addition to examining the effects of different methods of interviewing witnesses, 
researchers have considered other, non-verbal, procedures for enhancing recall (e.g. 
Blackmore, Pratt & Dewsbury, 1995; Salmon, Bidrose & Pipe, 1995 ; Smith, 1986; 
Wilkinson, 1988). Although some researchers have used a combination of methods 
(Gee & Pipe, 1995), researchers into non-verbal memory aids can generally be 
divided into two distinct groups: those who have examined the effect of props on 
recall, and the rest who have focus ed on other non-verbal memory cues like 
environmental reinstatement and valious questioning techniques. 
Props are essentially physical cues which mimic some aspect or a situation, they may 
be specific to a particular environment, such as a model of a particular scene of Clime 
or room (O'Callaghan & D' Arcy, 1989; Plice & Goodman, 1990), or be more general 
in nature, Stich as anatomically correct dolls (Boat & Everson, 1993 ; Goodman & 
Aman, 1990; Skinner, 1996). After props, the principal memory cue used by 
researchers has been that of context or environmental reinstatement, in which 
witnesses are retumed to the location where they oliginally experienced a particular 
event. This environmental reinstatement may occur either physically (Smith & Vela, 
1992; Wilkinson, 1988) or mentally, by the use of projective memory techniques 
similar to those suggested by Dietze and Thomson (1993) or Geiselman and Padilla 
(1988) for use in interviews. Beguin and Costennans (1994) al so found odours can be 
powerful retrieval cues for autobiographical memories, and as such they can also be 
characterised as non-verbal memory aids. The usefulness of a valiety of non-verbal 
memory aids have been investigated with participants across the age range, however 
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special attention has been given to the memory performance of children, espedally 
young ones (Whittaker, 1986), when presented with such items. 
Several researchers have investigated the effect of environmental reinstatement on 
recall (Dietze & Thomson, 1993; Pynoos & Nader, 1989; Smith & Vela, 1992; 
Wilkinson, 1988). In a typical reinstatement experiment, participants witness or 
participate in an event (Smith & Vela, 1992; Wilkinson, J 988) , and later return to 
where the event was experienced or to a different location. Recall is compared for any 
facilitatory effects of reinstatement. Context reinstatement has a facilitative effect on 
reinstatement both with adults (Smith, 1979; Smith, J986; Smith & Vela, 1992) and, 
especially, children. Wilkinson found recall of children in the 'In context' condition of 
an expellment was almost twice that of the 'Out of context' children. However, such 
effects were not found by Pipe and Wilson (J 994) or O'Callaghan and 0' Arcy (1989, 
below; see also Hertel, Anooshian & Ashhronk, J9S6 with adults). Nevertheless, 
context reinstatement appears to be a useful recall cue, especially for pre-schoolers. 
Context reinstatement will be used throughout this thesis, but is specifically 
investigated in Experiment 5. 
The majority of recent research into the effectiveness of props has heen conducted 
with children. Children may be linguistically limited, and this may act as a han'ier to 
reliable testimony (Goodman, Bottoms, Herscovici & Shaver, 19X9; Saywitz, 
Nathanson & Snyder, 1993). As outlined above, a consistent finding in memory 
research has been that younger children (i.e. those below seven years) have relatively 
impoverished free recall compared to that of older children and adults (FJin et ai., 
1992a; Marin et (/1., (979). This may be due to a lack of sufficient and appropriate 
language terms to turn their memories into words. Non-verbal memory aids may 
encourage children to remember, or retrieve, information and/or facilitate the 
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communication of information by reducing the verbal skills required to convey given 
information, thus enabling children to demonstrate knowledge in excess of their 
language abilities by recreating or clarifying what they have seen (Smith, Ratner & 
Hobart, 1987). Younger children may need to be explicitly directed to use such 
memory aids (Kobasigawa, 1974), although Ratner and Myers (1980) found two year 
olds could use related picture cues without prompting. There is also evidence that the 
provision of props improves the communicative competency of young witnesses 
(Goodman et ai., 1989; Saywitz et a/., 1993). If the usefulness of props is detetmined 
by language level, they may be of limited use for older children and adults who have 
greater linguistic skills (Smith et aI., 1987) or who can 'intemalise' the information 
provided by the prop (van der Veer, 1994). 
The use of props may be preferable to direct questioning, but there may he a trade-off 
between the need to give children as much support as possible for their statements, 
while at the same time ensuring that they report only what they saw, without 
embellishment. Props can be a productive way of supporting the recall of information 
(Getz, Goldman & Corsini, 1984), but it is necessary to ascertain whether they deliver 
increased recall at the expense of accuracy. 
Wilkins, Dockrell and McShane (1991) tested three and four year olds for their recall 
of an episode in which a clown came into their nursery . Recall was tested a week later. 
Following free recall in which the children mentioned little information but were 
accurate, each age group was split into either a verhal prompt or a prop group in which 
children were given a model of their nursery and asked to show what happened when 
the clown visited. Verbal prompts led to modest improvements in the amount recalled 
hy hoth ages though were more effective for the older children. The prop improved 
recall markedly regardless of participant age. The three year olds in the prop condition 
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reported as many items as the four year olds in the verbal prompts condition. Similar 
facilitatory effects were observed by Price and Goodman (1990) who aided the recall 
of two and a half, four, and five and a half year olds by providing them with a model 
of a room in which they had played repeatedly with a wizard. 
The use of model props was also investigated by O'Callaghan and D' Arcy (1989) who 
examined their effects on the recall of a ShOlt film by a group of four year olds. After a 
30 minute delay, children's memory was tested under one of four interviewing 
conditions: free recall, free recall with props (model replicas of the setting, characters 
and objects depicted in the film), questioning (a selies of short-answer questions), and 
questioning with props. O'Callaghan and D' Arcy found effects for prop use and 
question type when the quantity of data (i.e. all information , regardless of factual 
correctness) was assessed. As expected, the least useful technique was free recall, 
though the addition of props did lead to better performance. Direct questions also 
produced more data than free recall, and again the presence of props improved 
perfonnance. However the use of props with direct questioning caused no decrease in 
accuracy compared to direct questioning without props, but when they were used with 
free recall, accuracy was reduced by up to 50%. 
In a series of experiments investigating the effects of different props on recall, Pipe et 
ai. (1993) and Pipe and Wilson (1989) tested children ' s memories of an interaction 
with a magician. They found that objects taken from the interaction were more 
effective than the equivalent verbal labels of these; children in the object-cue group 
recalled more information correctly than those in the verbal-cue group. Props had no 
effect on accuracy, and objects which were only related to the originally experienced 
ohjects also improved recall, though this latter finding was not supported hy Salmon et 
01. (1995) . Pipe et al. concluded that props "may not only be useful , they may also be 
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a safe means of facilitating recall" (p. 37). These results demonstrate the usefulness of 
physical cues in promoting recall, especially in compalison to verbal cues. 
In short, there are a number of non-verbal memory aids which exist; the main methods 
are the provision of props and environmental reinstatement. Although both methods 
seem to increase the amount of infOlmation recalled, this improvement may be at the 
expense of accuracy. The usefulness of a prop as an aid to colour recall will be 
examined in Experiment 4, and in Experiment 5, the comparative effects of 
environmental reinstatement and props shall be investigat~d. A chart, to facilitate recall 
for colour, will be used in Expeliment ~t 
Conclusions on children's eyewitness mem01:V 
Although the tield of child eyewitness memory has made great advances over the last 
decade, especially in the areas of interviewing and non-verbal memory aids, there is 
still a basic problem with mllch of the research: children are often examined in 
isolation. In other words, although eyewitness researchers may investigate a range of 
ages of children, there is rarely any attempt to include adults in their studies, which 
causes problems when trying to get a broad view of development of a particular 
characteristic across the lifespan. The difficulty researchers have had in doing this is 
clear, though perhaps not spelt out: what interests a five year old child may not be 
what interests an adult. This fact has led researchers to treat children and adults, not as 
points along a continuum, but often as two completely separate entities. It is also 
difficult to make comparisons between child and adult research because of the 
difference in the stimulus materials used, such as the stories (Ceci et at., 1987), 
cartoons (Dale et al., 1978), and games (Brainerd & Reyna, 1995; Goodman & Reed, 
1986) used in expeliment"i with children, compared to the line-ups (McAllister, Dale & 
Keay, 1993), mugshots (Lindsay, Nosworthy, Martin & Martynuck, 1994), and live 
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events used to test the recall of adults for events. In consequence, some researchers 
have investigated the eyewitness memory of children, and other researchers have 
investigated the eyewitness memory of adults. Rather [ewer have examined recall 
across the developmental range using similar tasks. 
A major omission in eyewitness research has been any investigation of memory for 
colour. This is a striking oversight given the importance colour infOImation may play 
in event recall (Baddeley, 1993). Colour has been mentioned in a small number of 
studies, however this has often been in the form of ' filler ' questions (e.g. Parker, 
Haverfield & Baker-Thomas, 1986). In the following section I will give an overview 
of the work of researchers who have investigated the phenomenon of colour recall , 
and as part of this I will also examine the very small amount of eyewitness research 
which has refeITed to this topic. 
1.4. Colour Research 
Colour has been a feature of a number of empirical studies . Below is a summary of 
some of the work of researchers who have focused on colour, though as will become 
clear, few of them have looked at issues which are of direct relevance to a 
developmental study of colour memory. 
Previous colour research in psychology 
Psychologis ts have approached the phenomenon of colour from a numbe r of 
directions. They have investigated the link between hair colour and attractiveness 
(Rich & Cash, 1993), the effect of baseball colour on hitting rates (Monis, Zimmer, 
Piper & Mayhew, 1994), the phenomenon of colour inte rference (with the Stroop 
task, La Heij , He1aha & Vandenhof, 1993), colour and emotion, lIsing the Rorschach 
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inkblot test (Stevens, Edwards, Hunter & Bridgman, 1993), the effect of coloured 
props on recall (Leont'ev, 1932, in van der Veer, 1994, see introduction to Chapter 
5), and philosophical issues relating to the use of colour (Menzies & Price, 1(93). 
Several investigators have also looked at the effects of the colour coding of 
infollllalion in electronic displays. The effect of having red signifying urgent warnings 
or threatc;;, green as a positive indicator, and amber representing less urgent warnings 
has been investigated in aircraft cockpits (Widdel & Post, 1992), on maps and charts 
(Hopkin, 1992), and with relation to rear lights on cars (Cameron, 1995). 
Although some aspects of the colour experience have generated much research (e.g. 
colour vision, colour preferences and colour naming; see helow), comparatively few 
researchers have investigated the phenomenon of colour memory. Before examining 
the research on colour memory I will summarise some of the findings of researchers in 
other related areas. 
Colour and psychophysics 
One of the most resean;hed psychophysiological fields is that of colour vision. 
Psychophysiological research has clarified which parts of the central nervous system 
are responsible for the perception and decoding of colour (Zeki, 1980), as well as how 
these areas may be organised (Land, 1977). The primacy of red, green, yellow and 
blue over other colours was supported by examining the physiology of the monkey 
visual system (DeValois & DeValois, 1975; DeValois & Jacobs, 1(68), and other 
researchers found "fundamental neural response categories" underpinning the 
perception of primary colours (Kay, Berlin & Merrifield, 1(91). These 
neurophysiological studies supported earlier studies which had examined the ease of 
memorability of different colours (Collins, 1932; Hamwi & Landis, 1955). Both 
Collins, and Hamwi and Landis found that there were larger effects for individual 
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colours than for particular observers, which suggested to them that there was a link 
between semantics and physiology. 
Other researchers have strengthened the link between semantics and physiology. 
Colour can improve object recognition in normal and low vision (Wunn, Legge, 
Isenberg & Luebker, 1993) and has a positive intluence on attention (Pfendler & 
Widdel, 1986). As colour can improve discrimination, Widdel and Pfendler (1993) 
hypothesised that colour will also improve spatial performance on electronic displays. 
Results showed that performance on spatial tasks improved when the stimuli had 
highly saturated (deep, intense) colours than when of low saturation (pale, 'washed 
out', less intense) hues or were achromatic (shades of grey, from black to white). 
Widdel and Pfendler (1993) concluded that this was because highly saturated colours 
increased the discliminability of those features relevant for perceiving spatial relations. 
Colour research and language 
Some of the research that has been conducted on colour has been cross-cultural in nat-
ure. This stems primalily from Sapir and Whorf's hypotheses on linguistic relativity 
(e.g. WhorL 1956). Colour has been used to examine linguistic relativity largely 
because each colour is relatively irreducible, corresponding to a single point in the 
colour space (Shepard, 1992). Researchers have examined the extent to which 
perception and/or memory of colours varies according to the number of colour terms 
in particular languages, and how these terms divide the colour spectrum (Gellatly, 
1995). 
On the basis of the results of a large-scale anthropological study which used Munsell 
colour chips as stimuli, Berlin and Kay (1969) argued against linguistic relativity. 
Rather than language detelmining perception, they concluded that the basic colour 
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names of all languages are drawn from a set of 11 basic or 'focal' colour lenTIS (black, 
white, red, orange, yellow, brown, green, blue, pink, purple and grey). Berlin and 
Kay defined focal colours as those which have meanings that are not predictable from 
the meaning of its parts (unlike bluish or lemon-coloured), are not part of a wider 
range of colours (unlike vermilion, which is a type of red), are not applied to only a 
small class of objects (unlike brunette), and which are in frequent and everyday use 
(unlike puce and mauve) . Berlin and Kay (1969) concluded that there was a 
progression of the appearance of language terms both anthropologically and 
developmentally: if a language possesses a term further along the hierarchy, then it 
should also possess all the terms earlier in the hierarchy (see Figure 1.4.1). For 
example, all languages that have a tenTI denoting ' red' in the colour space should also 
possess terms for ' black' and 'white ' (or 'dark' and 'light'), and so on along the 
hierarchy. 
~ ~ ~~reen Black ~~ecD/' White ~ Yellow yellowJ~ [Purple] ~ ~lu~~rBrow;l~ Pink Gre~ /' ~ ~ O~~ Grey 
Figure 1.4.1. The Berlin & Kay hierarchy for basic colour terms. 
Berlin and Kay (1969) found the 'best examples' of basic colour terms were the same 
across languages. Although such a shicl categorisation has heen ctiticised hy Sahlins 
(1976), the cross-cultural research of a numher of researchers (Davies, Corbett, 
McGurk & Jerrett, 1994; Dougherty, J 978 ; Sivik & Taft, 1994) has provided little 
corroboration for the idea of linguislic relativity. Rather, they support the idea that 
there is an innate structuring of the continuous colour space into discrete regions, as 
hypothesised hy Berlin and Kay. Berlin and Kay al so ex pected children's 
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development of colour terms to progress in the same order along their hierarchy 
(Davies et aL.; though see Bartlett, 1978 for an altemative view). 
Heider (1971, 1972a, 1972b) revised and extended Berlin and Kay 's (1969) theory. 
She stated explicitly what had been implicit in their theory: that focal colours have a 
neurophysiological basis. In her paper she cited the work of the psychophysiologists 
DeValois and Jacobs (1968) who had identified a series of cells in monkeys which 
fired at an increased rate in the presence of light of a particular wavelength. Lights 
from complementary spectral regions (yellow as opposed to blue, or red as opposed to 
green) decreased the amount of firing below the basal rate . DeValois and Jacobs 
concluded that the relative strengths of these complementary states led to perceived 
hue. Both Kay and McDaniel (1978) and Bornstein (1975) noted that there was a strict 
relation between these response states. the structure and function of the visual system, 
and the meanings of colour words. Kay and McDaniel commented that "In the case of 
color at least. rather than language detennining pen;eption (d. Sapir and Wharf), it is 
perception that detelmines language" (p. 610). 
Heider (1971) and Dale (1969) found that, similarly to Berlin and Kay 's (1969) and 
Lenneberg and Roberts' (1956) cross-cultural research, children used colour names 
for the same areas of the colour space as adults. Dale asked three and four year olds to 
match and then recognise 14 Munsell chips. Dale observed that there was a greater 
error on recognition than matching because of the delay. but additionally because of 
the increased influence of colour stereotypes, with children choosing colours which 
were more like their 's tereotypical' ideas of colours than those with which they were 
originally presented. More recently, Davidoff (1991) has suggested that memory for 
colours may be mediated in ways predicted by the Sapir-Whorl' hypothesis and related 
to the ease with which thl:: colours can be verbally communicated (Brown & 
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Lenneberg, 1954). For example, samples within the orange-yellow range will be 
harder to remember beyond the time span of pictorial memory if a language has a 
limited colour-name vocabulary for that range. This could also apply to children: if 
they do not know particular colours they may be less likely to remember them see 
Experiment 8). 
Colour naming 
Colour naming has been studied from several perspectives. Applied researchers have 
developed artificial colour vocabularies for the technical specification of colour (e.g. 
Munsell chips). Cross-cuILural researchers have been concerned with differences in the 
colour vocabulaties of different languages, as well as in regulalities in the evolution of 
these colour lexicons (e.g. Berlin & Kay, 1%9, ahove). Developmental psychologis ts 
have studied the development of colour-naming ability in young children (e.g. 
Bornstein, 1985; Davidoff & Mitchell, 1993; Johnson , 1995). Researchers from 
several fields (e.g. cognitive neuropsychology, Kay & McDani e l, 1978; 
anthropology, Heider, 1971) have also looked at how the naming of colours is related 
to memory for colours. 
One of the earliest examinations of colour naming was the Stroop tes t. Stroop (1935; 
replicated by Seifert & Johnson, 1994) found it took far longer for participants to 
name the ink colour of words that read a different colour name than to name colour 
patches or single-colour lists of colour names. Although the functional cause of the 
ink-word interference remains unclear (Davidoff, 1991), this experiment generated 
further research into colour naming (Camphell, J 993; Fradley, 199(); La Heij et ai., 
1993). 
Brown and Lenneberg (1954) tested the colour recognition of adults. They found that 
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codability (the degree of individual consensus, anaJogolis to Berlin and Kay's use of 
'focality') was positively related to recognition accuracy. In a later cross-cultural 
study, Heider (1971) compared codability for focal and non-focal colours and found 
that focal colours had much higher codability scores than non-focal colours. These 
findings were also supported by the results of a later study by Heider (Heider & 
Olivier, 1972) with Polynesian islanders who spoke the language Dani . Despite 
having only two colour tenTIs, the Dani speakers perceived and conceptualised colours 
in exactly the same way as speakers of languages with more basic colour terms. 
Heider's evidence, taken together with that of Berlin and Kay (1969), Davies et al. 
(1994), DeValois and Jacobs (1968) and Kay and McDanid (1978), led these 
researchers to suggest that in all languages, focal colours have the hest codability 
scores, regardless of whether participants actually speak a language having names for 
these focal colours. 
Although Heider (1971) found adults remembered the focal colours most accurately in 
a recognition task, she was unsure whether children would perform similarly, given 
that they did not know the full range of colour terms. Heider hypothesised that like 
adults, young children find focal colours more 'salient' than non-focal colours, and it 
is for these areas of the colour space that children learn to apply their first colour 
names. In a series of experiments with pre-schoolers, Heider found that when asked 
to choose a colour from an atTay, the attention of three year olds was more attracted to 
focal than non focal colours. Four year olds were also better able to match focal than 
nonfocal colours, and when they en·ed in matching nonfocal colours, they were more 
likely to choose a colour closer to the focal colour than was the original I. In these 
expeliments, young children may have chosen and matched focal colours because they 
had already learned focal colours as the core meanings for these terms, however 
lit has been argued that such colour stereotype errors may lead to systematic hiases ill eyewitness 
testimony (see Belli , 1988, below) 
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Heider deemed this interpretation unlikely given Berlin and Kay's (1969) cross-
cultural data: focal colours were matched better regardless of the presence of 
appropIiate telms in a language. 
In a delayed recognition task for single Munsell chips, Heider (1972) observed 
significant variation in naming and memory perfonTIance between Polynesian islanders 
and participants from the United States. Although her results still supported the idea of 
focal colours, Heider theorised that the most likely explanation for this variation was 
that participants will be more likely to confuse colours to which they gave the same 
name than those to which they gave different names. As the Dani only had two colour 
tenTIS (which cOITespomled approximately to 'light' and 'dark') this was more likely to 
occur with them than with the US participants. Given these results, it would have been 
interesting if Heider had conducted a developmental study of colour naming, 
unfortunately she did not, restricting herself to separate investigations of adults and 
pre-schoolers only. 
According to Lucy and Schweder (1979) there was a bias in Heider's methodology 
which made focal colours more salient. When this was eliminated by modifying the 
array of colour chips Heider used, the superior memorability of focal colours 
disappeared. Lucy and Schweder also found that a third of participants recalled more 
non-focal than focal colours. In a paper which was highly critical of Berlin and Kay's 
theory and methodology, Saunders (1995) criticised the use of the Munsell Color 
Chart as a model of the colour space, arguing against the logic of using laboratory-
derived data to represent the real world . In Saunders' words 'It is like a computer 
playing Mozart's Requiem, and claiming it to he the only true rendition' (p. 26). 
Heider concluded that her results were probably linked to underlying factors, most 
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likely the physiology of colour vision. She proposed that the correlation of 
memorability with communicability (as Brown & Lenneberg, J954; Brown, J979; 
Steftlre, Castilo Vales & Morley, 1966) arose because where a name exists in a 
language for a universally-salient colour, it will be specific enough not to require 
visual storage. Lantz and Stefflre (1964) argued that this may be due to the fact that 
verbal codes for some colours are specific enough to bypass visual storage entirely 
(e.g. 'British racing green'). This observation was supported by Collins (l932) who 
asked participants to reproduce particular shades of red. green. blue and yellow after a 
short delay. Collins found blue and yellow were easily leamed but red and green were 
recalled with more difficulty: different colours appeared to have different 
memorabilities. However in a subsequent expeliment. Collins found a different green 
was remembered far better, this suggested all wavelengths of the spectrum are not 
equal in memorability. 
Problems with naming colours have been observed in some individuals with dyslexia 
(Denckla, 1972a; Denckla & Rudel, 1974), though other researchers have found no 
differences in colour naming between individuals with dyslexia and age-matched 
controls (Nicolson & Fawcett, 1994). Denckla (l972b) concluded that colour naming 
is independent of socio-economic, cultural amI educational level. However other 
research has cast these assumptions into doubt. at least with children of pre-school 
age. Simmons (1989) observed the colour-matching ability of people with aphasia was 
as good as that of nOlmal controls, and that colour memory was only mildly impaired. 
Recall for colour and shape 
Some evidence exists for the separate processing of colour and shape, possibly due to 
parallel processing channels (DeValois & DeValois, 1975). Colour and shape must 
combine at some stage, otherwise we would not be aware of objects heing 
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incongruously coloured (Perlmutter, 1980b; though this may not apply to young 
children: see e.g. three year olds in Davidoff & Mitchell, 1993, below). However 
colour may not be part of the actual pictorial encoding of objects, and may be stored as 
part of an associative network of attributes (Seymour, 1979). Evidence for this comes 
from TeLinde & Paivio (1979) who found retrieval of an object colour-name was 
actually quicker for words rather than from their pictures. 
If colour affects the processing of objects, then this should be retlected in object 
naming latencies (Hanna & Remington, 1996). Ostergaard and Davidoff (1985) found 
colour pictures of common fruit and vegetables produced significantly faster responses 
than black and white versions (perhaps not surprisingly; because we live in a coloured 
world). They also detected a unidirectional facilitation effect - colour facilitated object 
naming, but not vice versa. Ostergaard and Davidoff also noted that while colour did 
not affect recognition performance, naming was aided by colour information: 
normally-coloured stimuli were named significantly faster than either black and white 
or unusually-coloured stimuli. Ostergaard and Davidoff suggested that coloured 
objects are named faster than achromatic ones because objects are internally 
represented as a seIies of attributes, one of which is colour. As colour can be accessed 
either directly by the physical colour input or by some categorical form of it (such as 
colour name retrieval), colour may therefore prime object names. The fact that colour 
facilitated object naming but not recognition led Ostergaard and Davidoff to assume 
that there was some recombination of object identification and name retlieval. 
Until about two years of age, children appear to be unable to learn colours, leading 
some parents (most notably Charles Darwin, cited hy Davidoff & Mitchell, 1993) to 
believe that their children are colour blind. Normally developing children can name a 
variety of objects before they can reliably apply four primary colours correctly, and 
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Castner (l940, in Denckla, 1972b) observed that only 61 % of five year olds could 
name more than four colours. However, children ' s colour naming ahility may have 
improved since Castner' s time (possibly because of the increased emphasis on colour 
in modern-day children's toys or specific education; Davidoff, 1991), and Shatz, 
Behrend, Gelman and Ebeling (1996) found that two-and-a-half year-olds who had 
attended a pre-school group for four or five months could choose specific colours out 
of an an·ay correctly. Bornstein (1985) concluded that developmental difficulties in 
colour naming are not due to any perceptual failing (there is evidence thal children as 
young as one week old can discriminate between colours, Adams, 19X9). Rather, 
although young children can produce colour terms when asked, they are not ahle to 
match these terms to the appropriate colours (Smith, 1984). 
However, Soja (1994) found that two year olds who did not know colour words 
succeeded on a colour task where they had to form associations between tht!mselves 
and object.;; (keys, hair brushes, etc.) of a parliclilar colour. Childr~n who knt!w 
colour names did better on a colour task than those who did not, though those children 
with no colour knowledge still performed better than chance. Soja concluded that 
children who did not know colour words were able to represent colour as part of their 
representation of an object but not independe ntly of an object In a similar study, 
Bernasek and Haude (1993) tested slightly older children, and found differences 
between the sexes on a colour naming, with girls performing better. 
Colour preferences 
Surveys of colour preferences have been conducted by a number of researchers. Some 
researchers have focused on the preference for colours associated wi th particular 
objects (Belli, 1988) or faces (Frost, 1994; Rich & Cash, 1993), others have 
investigated the affective value of single colours (Dorcus, 1932). Dorcus used Munsell 
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chips to investigate the colour preferences and associations of several groups: 
children, young adults, 'psychopathics'. and a group of the elderly. Dorclls observed 
that women were "more concerned with dress in relation to color than with any other 
one thing .... The responses of the aged and the children were rather restricted and 
stereotyped ... [it is] quite evident that they are relatively lacking in imaginative 
associations" (p. 432). 
Eysenck (1941. cited by Saito, 1994) suggested there was a general order of 
preference for hues, with blue as most popular. through red, green, purple and 
orange, to yellow which ranked last. Eysenck found no cross-cultural difference in the 
preference for colours, however this was not supported by Saito's comparative study 
of colour preferences in South East Asia who found that white was most popular, 
followed by blue, green and purple. 
Developmental colour research 
Several researchers have investigated the colour memory of children. and found that 
from as early as a few weeks colours can be discriminated (Bushnell, McCutcheon, 
Sinclair & Tweedlie, 1984; Catherwood, 1993). Bushnell et al. (1984) investigated 
delayed recognition memory for colour in one and two month old infants after a delay 
of a day to see whether colour and fonu were stored independently and could produce 
'additivity' effects. He noted a greater response to a coloured shape stimulus varying 
from the familiar on two dimensions rather than one. Colour was retained hetter than 
shape information, in contrast to Cohen (1973) who found that after a brief 
familiarisation, both colour and shape information were retained after a delay of 15 
minutes, but only shape information was remembered after 24 hours. However, 
Cohen tested five month olds, and colour may just be a more salient dimension than 
shape for the one and two month olds tested by Bushnell et al. Catherwood (1993) 
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and Fagen (1984) also investigated the memory of very young children for colour. 
Fagen found infants stored information about the colour of a mobile for 24 hours, 
though one week later they only remembered general information ahout the mobile and 
had forgotten colour. Nevertheless, Fagen felt his data "reaffirmed the belief that 
perception of stimulus colour is a basic and early developing (perhaps innate) human 
characteristic" (p. 440). 
Perlmutter (1980b) and Perlmutter and Myers (1976) investigated semantic elaboration 
and interpretation in pre-schoolers and college students . Participants were shown line 
drawings of familiar objects, half presented achromatically (i.e. black and white), the 
other half chromatically, and given instructions to remember their colours. Perlmutter 
and Myers found over a third of the children could not successfully recall object-
colour. Children remembered colour information specific to certain objects, but this 
knowledge intruded upon recall of achromatically-presented stimuli: they were more 
likely to 'remember' an image of a red apple rather than the correct black-and-white 
item. Thus young children had ideas, or colour-schema, ahout the kinds of colours 
particular objects should be (e.g. bananas should be yellow, not hlue). This finding 
supports previous research in other areas of schema development (e.g. Blades & 
Banham, 1990; Catellani, 1991). The adults in Perlm ulter' s study also performed 
badly when recalling achromatically-presented items, especially if these items had 
particular colours strongly associated with them. Therefore, recognition judgements in 
an intentional colour memory task were affected by pre-experimentally acquired 
semantic colour infollnation. This supported Perlmutter's view that if young children 
and adults share common knowledge about stimuli (such as their typical colours) they 
are likely to engage in similar processing of them. Perlmutter found that recognition 
was better for stimuli that were consistent with participants ' previolls experiences 
(such as a picture of a red apple, rather than an achromatic one), and suggested that 
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mental representations of objects used in making recognition judgements contained 
both episodic and semantic infolluation about the stimuli. Research by Johnson (1995) 
supports such a hypothesi s. In her study, she found that when participants were 
presented with a random series of objects coloured either typically, atypically, or 
achromatically, there was an increase in the time participants took to name pictures 
when they were coloured atypically. 
Similarly to Perlmutter (1980b), Davidoff and Mitche ll (1993) also noted that young 
children, despite being effective at matching one colour stimulus with another and 
possessing a good vocabulary of colour terms, had difficulty picking the appropriate 
coloured picture when presented with two s timuli , one of which was the correct 
colour. Three year olds were able to judge that bananas are yellow and not hlue on a 
purely verbal task, as they verbally associated the word ' banana' with the word 
'yellow ', yet were unable to choose the yellow banana as the correctly coloured one 
from drawings. 
Davidoff and Mitchell hypothesised that object-colour knowledge was stored in both 
verbal and non-verhal codes (see Paivio, 1971), and that children struggled to generate 
mental templates with appropIiate colour detail to compare against the incoming colour 
stimulus (i.e. the stimulus picture altematives). Davidoff and Mitchell (like Bomstein, 
1985 and Luzatti & Davidoff, 1994) made a di stinction hetween naming colours, 
naming objects and naming the colours of ohjects. All the children tested in Davidoff 
and Mitchell 's studies were able to name colours; that they pe rfonned poorly on tes ts 
of naming the colours of objects may have been due to the greater importance of 
learning the names of objects than colours, which makes shape cues more salient for 
the child. According to Davidoff and Mitchell , children ' s ahility to learn object colours 
will improve with age from improvements in cognitive capacity and/or an increase in 
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stored visual object-colour information. They concluded that despite an ability to 
combine colour with shape, "3-4 year olds can't be expected to have an accurate 
automatic judgement for the familiarity of object-colour if it is stored pIimarily as a 
verbal association and not as coloured mental templates" (Davidoff & Mitchell., p. 134; 
but see Allen, 1984, who found that colours and colour names were encoded in 
similar ways by adult participants). Davidoff and Mitchell also inferred that since 
colour and shape information can be separately selected they may decay at different 
rates. 
Davidoff and Mitchell's (1993) results were replicated in a later stucly by Mitchell, 
Davidoff and Brown (1996, Experiment I) . However in a second study they 
examined the effect of asking children to name the incorrect colour of an ohject when 
given correct and incorrect alternatives either visually or verbally. This procedural 
change was suggested by Campbell's (1993) research , in which he found that pre-
schoolers were drawn to incorrectly-coloured objects because of their salience, which 
he termed their 'attentional magnetism '. When Mi tchell et {Ii. tested this possi bility 
they found that there was little difference in accuracy between the visual and verbal 
conditions, therefore failing to support their proposed model (Davidoff & Mitchell, 
1993) in which information presented verbally should lead to greater accuracy than 
visually-presented infonnation. Mitchell et {Ii. concluded that the differences observed 
in Davidoff and Mitchell and in their Experiment J (1996) were due to the salience of 
the incongruously-coloured pictures; pre-school participants were surprised at the 
irregular conjunctions of particular colours and forms and pointed to the incorrect 
objects impulsively. When this phenomenon was controlled and pre-schoolers asked 
to point to the wrongly-coloured item (ExpeIiment 2), the proposed supeliority of the 
verbal condition disappeared. 
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In summary. several researchers have investigated the memory of children for colours. 
These researchers have found that children can discliminate between objects on the 
basis of colour from an early age (Bushnell. 19S4; Catherwood. 1993; Fagen. 1984) 
and by the time they reach pre-school age. children have as much difficulty as adults in 
confusing their stereotypical ideas about the colours particular objects should be 
(Perlmutter. 1980b). The results of some studies imply that colours, objects. and 
object-colours are all encoded in different ways (Davidoff & Mitchell. 1993). 
Although the findings of Allen (1984) and Campbell (1993) do not support Davidoff 
and Mitchell's theory, if there is a dissociation between recall for object and recall for 
object colour this would confinn their position (Luzzatli & Davidoff, 1994). 
Stimulus form 
The appearance of a viewed object may have an effect on the memorability of its 
colour. Beyond a participant's initial decision to look at a particular stimulus, his or 
her tendency to keep looking at the stimulus may also playa large part in detennining 
how much information is acquired about the incidental components of it. Hale and 
Piper (1973, Expetiment 1) examined the reca ll of eight and 12 year olds for pairs of 
adjacent black and white line drawings of furniture and animals, and for geometric 
shapes whose central and incidental components were shape and colour, respectively. 
Colour was deemed to be incidental to all participants, since children attended 
primarily to stimuli shape (an observation also made by Corah, 1970; see p. 41, 
below). Hale and Piper felt that the "measurement of leaming that is truly incidental 
requires that the stimulus component defined as incidental be a feature to which 
subjects would not naturally direct the majotity of their attention." (p. 328). 
Hale and Piper (1973, ExpeIiment 1) gave participants an array of six stimuli, either 
pairs of objects (animals paired with pieces of fumiture) or coloured shapes, for five 
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seconds before turning it face down. Participants were then shown a ' cue card' 
containing only the central component (animal or white shape) and asked to point to 
the position in the alTay that the stimulus had occupied. The same (shuflled) stimuli 
were used for 11 further trials. Following this central learning phase, incidental 
learning was examined by testing recall of object colour or furniture associated with 
animals. Hale and Piper found that recall was better for central than incidental 
components and there was an age effect for cenLra l information. There were no 
developmental differences in incidental memory for pictures, but twelve year olds 
recalled more incidental information than the eight year olds in the coloured shapes 
condition. Thus the re was a s ignificant relationship be tween performance on central 
and incidental information for the coloured shapes condition. 
Hale and Piper (1973) considered that these results could have three ex planations, 
which they tested with a number of new stimuli (Experiment 2; see Figure 1.4.2) 
using the same procedure and age groups. The types of material shown in their 
Experiment 1 differed in spatial separation of central amI incidental components: 
animal and object pictures were separate, distinct e lements while shape and colour 
were contained within a single stimulus unit. In Experiment 2, Hale and Piper tes ted 
whether this had an effect on recall by using stimuli with shape-colour separated. A 
second group of children saw stimuli with coloured backgrounds, with shapes 
outlined in black2. Recall of the componenL<; of these stimuli was compared to stimuli 
in which the features were integrated in the sense that colours and shapes form ed a 
unitary stimulus, that is, both incidental and central components could he seen as 
integral parts of a whole (coloured shape). In a fourth condition (not pic tured) colour 
was matched with pictures of animals, to ensure that the results of Experiment 1 were 
not simply attributable to the uniqueness of geometric figures as stimuli , or of colour 
2the object (central) ami colour (incidental) components formed a fi gure-ground relationship and so, 
com:eptuaJly, were independent entities 
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(i) 
(ii ) 
(iii) 
Figure 1.4.2. Examples of stimuli used by Hale & Piper: (i) Coloured 
shape, (ii) coloured background, and (iii) shape-colour separated. 
as an incidental cue. Memory for these three new types of stimuli was compared to 
recall of coloured shape and pairs of pictured objects, as used in ExpeIiment L 
CenU'a1 recall was better than incidental and the only other effect was that of task. 
Recall for coloured shapes was best, followed by picture recall, then coloured 
background, shape-colour separated and animal-colour separated. Central and 
incidental coloured shapes information was recalled beller than central or incidental 
infOimation from any of the other groups (with the exception of the 12 year olds in the 
central component of the pictures task). The coloured shapes condition was the only 
task in which developmental differences existed in incidental learning. To summarise, 
Hale and Piper found that stimuli whose components were contained within a single 
unit (such as coloured shapes) were functionally different from other types of stimuli 
often employed to measure incidental learning. The major factor that determined this 
was degree of integration rather than spatial co-ordination of central and incidental 
elements. The results Hale and Piper found when colour and shape formed a single 
unit (e.g. a red triangle) were not found when the colours served as a hackground for 
the shapes (e.g. a triangle on a red background), that is, differences he tween atuibutes 
caused differences in memorability between central and incidental features. When the 
stimulus was perceived as unitary (i.e. central and incidental components were 
integrated), children of all ages attended to information in'elevant for the location task 
(i.e. colour), as well as relevant stimulus characteristics (shape). These result.:; point to 
the necessity of caution in comparing studies that have used stimuli whose 
components are separate entities (see Park & James, 198~ , Park & Mason, L982, 
below) with others in which the stimuli were integrated (e.g. Hatwell, 1995). 
Like Hale and Piper (l97~), other researchers have also looked at the effect that the 
complexity of stimuli has on the perception of colour. Both Corah (1970) and 
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Tomikawa and Dodd (1980) found that the majority of pre-schoolers, when asked to 
choose an ohject to match to a coloured geomettic stimulus shape, were more likely to 
choose one that matched the shape, rather than the colour. In a physiological study 
with adults, Eimer (1995) discovered that when attention was simultaneously cued to a 
stimulus with hoth a spatial (left or light side of a computer screen) and a non-spatial 
attrihute (colour), hrain activity recorded hy electrodes for spatial information was 
greater and preceded the effects of colour attention. 
Colour memory: Recognition and recall 
Whether colour is part of the long-term memory representation of an ohject is of 
interest to cognitive theorists as well as eyewitness memory researchers. Does access 
to ohjects automatically mean access to their colour or is there separate. independent 
access to each? If colour is part of the stored memory representation of an ohject then 
it may provide an additional attIihute to aid matching the retrieval cue lO the internal 
representation at rettieval. Several researchers have examined whether colour and fonn 
are separately encoded. Expelimenters examining attention (e.g. Stfurak & Boynton, 
1986) have found that when verbal encoding was prevented. partiL:ipants could not 
discriminate new colour-form conjunctions from old ones. Stfurak and Boynton 
presented participants with coloured animal shapes hut changed some of the colour-
shape combinations for a later recognition test. When verhal encoding was prevented 
by a counting task, participants were unable to discriminate new colour-shape 
combinations from old ones. However in object recognition studies, Wilton (1989, 
helow) and Price and Humphreys (1989) demonstrated that hoth intentional and 
incidental recaJI for colour was hetter when colour and form were linked than when 
separated. 
Asch (1969) canied out an expeliment similar to Hale and Piper' s (1973) study that 
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examined the effect on recall for colour of unitary (where colour was contained within 
the boundaries of an object) and non-unitary conditions (where the colour was located 
outside the boundaries of a shape (i.e. in the background)). Recall of colour in 
response to the cue of object shape was hetter in the unitary condition. Asch argued 
that there was a disposition for some features (such as shape and surface colour of an 
ohject) to become selectively associated with each other in memory. Wilton (1989) 
showed participants similar stimuli to Asch ' s, and gave them instructions to make 
associations hetween a shape and its colour. Recall of stimuli colollr was more than 
50% higher in the unitary group than the non-unitary . These results were replicated 
under incidental conditions in a second experiment. Wilton suggested that this effect 
may result from the operation of special-purpose (perhaps innate) learning 
mechanisms (cL Hasher & Zacks, 1979, helow) that selectively associate some 
features of the environment rather than others . A disposition to associate different 
features of an ohject (e.g. shape and colour) may be more adaptive than a disposition 
to associate different features of different objects (e.g. shape and background colour). 
Wilton (1989) found that cued recall of names of everyday objects was higher when 
separate pictures accompanying the names were presented in the same colour than 
when presented in different colours. McKelvie, Sano and Stout (1994) used pairs of 
concrete nouns illustrated with pictures to extend Wilton 's work. McKelvie et al. 
examined whether a black and white test picture (e.g. chair) would activate the 
coloured image leamt at acquisition (e.g. yellow chair), and if the colour would further 
permit retrieval of the other picture in the pair (e.g. banana) which was learnt. 
Although participants were told to expect a memory test they were not told to focus on 
any specific aspects of the stimuli. Relative to recall with uncoloured separate 
drawings, recall was not enhanced if the response colour was placed only in the 
response drawing (e.g. a yellow banana) or if an irrelevant response colour was 
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placed only in the response drawing (e.g. a red chair or a red banana). McKelvie et al. 
observed that colour improved cued recall if it was a common property, and this effect 
was also additive, at least for separate pictures. 
If the presence of colour at study and test aided memory perfonnance in a visual mem-
ory task, Hanna and Remington (1996) suggested it would imply that colour 
information is represented in long-term memory. Using stimuli similar to Hale and 
Piper's (1973) geometric shapes, Hanna and Remington found that the presence of 
colour benefited recognition accuracy when the stimuli were coloured identically at 
study and test, compared to black and white stimuli at study and test. However when 
they changed the colour of a test stimulus, for example a blue triangle at study became 
a red tIiangle at test, there was no difference in recognition performance of participants 
compared to when study and test stimuli were identically coloured. Hanna and 
Remington suggested this implied separate processing of colour and shape: if colour 
identity and fonn identity had been bound together then performance in the changed 
colour condition would have been worse than in the same study and test condition. 
Hanna and Remington concluded that the presence or absence of a colour is stored at 
object encoding, but it is not given a specific colour value. Given their display times 
(two seconds) coupled with stimuli composed of multiple geometric forms, they 
argued it was unlikely that deliberate colour/fonn conjunctions were made, hut in their 
task a colour advantage could have occlllTed even if colour and form were encoded but 
not bound together. Attention, they suggested, is necessary for binding, and this 
accounts for Wilton's (1989) and Hale and Piper' s results. Colour and form can be 
integrated if the task requires it, but such integration is a "deliberate strategic response 
to a specific set of conditions, not the natural consequence of encoding" (Hanna and 
Remington, p. 329). Therefore, for Hanna and Remington, the encoding of colour is 
not an automatic but an effortful process (see pp. 54-65, below). 
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Complementary results were ohtained hy Heil, Rosier and Hennighausen (1994). 
Adult participants leamed associations hetween line drawings and colours hefore a 
recognition test in which they had to decide whether two hlack and white pictures 
shared the same associated colour. There were few en·ors, this supported Heil et {If.'s 
hypothesis that non-verbal and verbal mateIial is stored and accessed in the same way. 
Several investigators have also examined the effect of delay on recall for colour (see 
also introduction to Chapter 3). BertuJis (1988) found colour memory did not decrease 
when stimulus numher or the interval hetween presentation and reconstruction was 
increased, or if exposure time was decreased. Bertulis suggested that the visual system 
has narrow-band colour detectors that allow the retention of any particular hue 
ilTespective of all others. In an expeliment also designed to examine the effect of delay 
on recall for colour, Nilsson and Nelson (1981) tested matching ability for lfi colours 
after delays of between 0.1 seconds and 24.3 seconds. Matching accuracy increased 
linearly with the length of delay, and Nilsson and Nelson observed that the stored 
colours closely resemhled the input colours, perhaps hecause of the neuro-
physiological basis of colour memory. However, Newhall, Burnham and Clark 
(1957, in Simmons, 1989) found that after a five second delay, colour matches were 
more variable and of higher saturation and luminance than for simultaneous matches, 
that is, there was a shift towards more 'stereotypical ' colours. 
The effect of previous colour knowledge on recall for colour 
Whether colour perception and learning are decided pIimalily by experienced colour 
and physiology (i.e. focality; Berlin and Kay, J969; Heider, J972), or whether they 
are shaped by an interaction of hiological, social and linguistic factors (e.g. Brown & 
Lenneherg, 1954) remains unclear. Although Lucy and Schweder's (1979) study 
failed to suhstantiate the experential/physiologicaJ perspective, their conclusions 
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regarding the social dimensions of colour memory are limited since they used Munsell 
chips as stimuli. Ratner and McCarthy (l990, p. 371) echo the criticisms of Saunders 
(1995): "The cultural dimensions of focality for color memory cannot be explored by 
Munsell color chips because they are bits of color removed from any social 
psychological context and deprived of social psychological significance." Munsell 
chips may not provide much information about how people expetience colour in their 
everyday lives: we remember colour in association with an object or environment, not 
in isolation (Hale & Piper, 1973; Wilton, 1(89). Indeed Ratner and McCarthy 
concluded, in contrast to Berlin and Kay (1969) and Heider (1970), that the Munsell 
colour chart actually eliminates the possibility of discovering cultural differences in 
perception. 
Using ecologically relevant stimuli is dearly the only meaningful way to discover how 
typicality (the appropriateness of a colour for a particular object) and focality affect 
colour memory. Ratner and McCarthy (1990, p. 371) defined such stimuli as those 
which are "situated in a psychologically meaningful ecological context where they will 
possess psychological significance." Ratner and McCarthy examined the effects of 
these factors (and the relative strength of each) on intentional memory for colour with 
a number of stimulus figures. They used pictures which included a tree, stop sign, 
lack-o-Iantern and an ocean. Typicality was a significantly more powerful variable for 
colour memory than focality, with typical colours (e.g. black dog) remembered more 
accurately than atypical ones (e.g. blue dog). Nevertheless, focal colours were still 
remembered better than non-focal colours (for example, a black dog was remembered 
better than a brown dog). Despite this latter finding, Ratner and McCarthy argued they 
had "illuminated the lack of importance of focality for normal colour memory" (p. 
375), and that the superiority of focal colour memory mllst be artifactual. In more 
normal recall conditions, they concluded, the focality effect diminished and colours 
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were remembered according to whether they approximated the typical colour of 
familiar objects. 
As discussed above, a number of researchers have suggested that everyday knowledge 
and understanding of typicality leads to inaccuracies in recall of specific past events 
(e.g. Baker-Ward et al., 1990; Bartlett, 1932; Brewer & Treyens, 19R1; Nelson, 
1986; Schank & Abelson, 1977), and the effect of this infonnation increases with time 
(e.g. Stangor & McMillan, 1992). Several experimenters have also investigated the 
intluence of post-event infonnation on participants' recall of oliginal event infonnation 
(e.g. Belli, Lindsay, Gales & McCarthy, 1994; Loftus, 1977; Toglia, Hemhrooke, 
Ceci & Ross, 1994; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994). Loftus showed participants a series of 
slides, including one of a green car. Half the participants were later given misleading 
information that the car was blue. After a tiller task, participants chose the car ' s colour 
from a range of colours. Control participants who were not given misleading 
information tended to select accurate green hues , but the misled participants often 
chose a green-blue blend, a single 'compromise' memory of both original event 
infonnation and post-event infonnation. Loftus conc1utled this was evidence that event 
memories consist of more than the environmental input that caused them. Memories 
are also based on prior knowledge, and on information aCl/uired (dter the initial 
experience. Information from these sources becomes integrated to form a single 
memOlial expelience. 
Belli (1988) tested the hypothesis that participants' prior knowledge of an object's 
typical colouring (i.e. colour schema) will inl"luence their recognition. Participants 
viewed a series of slides, including one of a green jug. If there was a delay between 
testing for colour, there was a greater shift towards choosing the stereotypical colour 
of the jug (yellow) than when there was no delay (supporting Stango.- & McMillan, 
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1992). He also found that participants who. when given a list of ohjects to give typical 
colours to, chose yellow as the typical colour for a .iug. were more likely to recall the 
jug heing 'yellowish' or yellow-green in colour rather than its original green. In a 
second experiment, Belli again showed that colour recognition was simultaneously 
intluenced hy typicality colour knowledge, event information and post-event 
infOImation leading to colour blend retrievals. Similar results were ohtained hy Joseph 
and Proffitt (1996) who observed that when hoth stored colour knowledge and surface 
colour information were availahle in the same experiment, stored colour knowledge 
was the oveniding intluence. 
Slightly different results were obtained in other work with adults. Wippich, 
Mecklenhrauker and Baumann (1994) stated they had found that there were no or 
small effects of repetition priming for objects paired with their prototypical colours 
(e.g. yellow lemon) when participants were asked to choose a suitahle colour for each 
ohject at testing. This supported previous research which had made arhitrary 
associations hetween objects and colours (e.g. green hook). There was no 
improvement even when participants were told to attend to the colours of ohjects at 
encoding. The results of this study therefore supported the idea that colour may be 
encoded without effOIt. 
Holowinsky and Fan·elly (1988) compared intentional and incidental visual memory of 
developmentally delayed children (CA 15;5, MA 11;4) with average children (CA 
10;5, MA I1J) as a function of cognitive level and stimulus colour. Two identical 
pictures were used as stimuli, one colour, the other hlack and white. The children 
were shown one of these and told to remember information about part of it. Recall was 
tested after an interval, and after a further short delay incidental recall for the rest of the 
picture was tested. Both groups performed better with the colour than hlack and white 
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picture, and when incidental recall for the coloured picture alone was considered, there 
were no differences between the two groups of participants. Such a result is of interest 
because it imJicates that colour can be successfully encoded without any intention to do 
so, and as such it has implications for both theories of memory automaticity (e.g. 
Hasher & Zacks, 1979) and for eyewitness testimony (e.g. Chlistianson & HUbinette, 
1993; ChIistianson & Loftus, 1991). 
Before discussing these theories, a methodological point needs to be made. An 
important distinction between the paradigms used in eyewitness expeIiments and those 
employed in tests of incidental memory was first discussed by Mandler et al. (1977) 
with reference to studies of location recall. In their paper, they argued that traditional 
incidental memory studies 'cued' recall for the incidental components of stimuli by 
giving participants instructions which required them to remember some other (central) 
aspect of the stimuli. Mandler et al. felt a much better way to test what they termed 
'true incidental' memory was to get participants to look at stimuli outside the context 
of a memory test, for example judging the total price of a selies of ohjects. Mandler et 
al. argued that this was a better way of tes ting incidental reca ll, as participants are 
given no cue that they would later be tested on their recall for any information. This 
approach approximates the type of methodology used by a number of eyewitness 
experiments, and it can be contrasted with paradigms like those used by Hatwell 
(1995) and Park and Mason (1982), in which participants were told to remember 
certain aspects of stimuli on which they would later be tested (see pp. 5~-()5 , below). 
In addition , this methodological dissimilarity hetween eyewitness and incidental 
memory studies may be one explanation for the diffe re nt levels of colour recall 
observed in these types of experiments. 
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Eyewitness experiments involving colour 
As the previous sections have indicated, few investigators have focused on colour 
memory. Although a small number of researchers examining eyewitness recall have 
incorporated colour into their work (e.g. Loftus, 1977; above), it has often been in the 
form of 'tiller' questions, and the answers to these have been merged with answers to 
questions about other types of ' pelipheral' data (e.g. Parker, et of. 1986). 
Parker et al. (1986) showed eight year olds and adults a series of slides which 
depicted a simulated crime. Participants were asked multiple choice questions about 
the suspect (age, weight, hair colour and clothing), and also about peripheral events 
(such as the colour of a blanket) . Parker er (f/. did not examine recall for colour 
specilically, though they did note that children recalled as much pelipheral information 
as central or descliptive, and adults remembered more descriptive information than 
pelipheral (supporting Hagen, 1967). 
Christianson and Loftus (1991) examined the effect of emotion on recall of central and 
peripheral colour information. Adults saw a series of full-colour slides which were 
presented at five second intervals. One of these slides was the clitical one. Depending 
upon their condition, "Neutral", "Unusual" or "Emotional", participants saw a slide 
which depicted either a woman bicycling, the same woman carrying a bike, or lying 
bleeding beside her bike, respectively. In all three versions there was a car in the 
background. Information about the woman was considered as central to the slide, and 
infonnation about the car as peripheral. Christianson and Loftus tested recall for the 
colour of the woman's coat and compared this to recall for the colour of the car across 
the three conditions. Participants in the emotional group recalled the coat colour more 
accurately than in either the unusual or the neutral groups (66% v. 22% and 25% 
respectively). Peripheral infOimation was recalled better by participants in the neutral 
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group. Taken together these results indicated that there was no simple relationship 
between emotion and memory, rather an interaction between emotion and the type of 
infonnation to be remembered. Whether these findings can be extrapolated to the real 
world is unclear, as the feelings experienced viewing slides may be less emotive than 
seeing a real body lying by the side of the road. In another study, the colour of 
clothing of an injured person was recalled with more accuracy. Yuille and Cutshall 
(1986) interviewed people several months after they had witnessed an actual crime. 
Although they reported that colour of clothing appeared to he the " most difficult 
feature to retain by witnesses" (p. 3(1), accuracy (i.e. recall excluding omission 
el1"ors) was high, and individuals' scores ranged from 66% to 83% correct. 
Christianson and Hlibinette (1993) interviewed witnesses of robberies to compare 
their emotional experiences of the robbery with the amount they recalled of various 
aspects of the situation, including the time and dale of the crime and charactetistics of 
the robbers, such as height, age, and clothing, as well as eye and hair colour. 
Christianson and Hubinette questioned three groups of people, victims (bank tellers), 
and bystanders who were either other bank employees or customers. The effect of 
witness group was significant, with tellers recalling more than other employees who 
recalled more than customers. Colour information was also remembered hest by the 
victims; hair and eye colour were both recalled at above chance levels. The colour 
recall of the other two groups was lower, but the distance they were from the robber 
may have been a confounding variable. When they compared witnesses who 
expelienced high levels of stress to those with low stress, they found colour recall was 
reduced by high emotion. 
Researchers have also examined eyewitness recall for colour in laboratory studies. 
Ruback (1986) found that shortly after observing a laboratory-based staged theft, adult 
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witnesses were 86%,40%,58% and 31% correct in recall of a male suspect's hair 
colour, eye colour, weight, and age, respectively. In a similar study, Yalmey (1993) 
tested three age groups of adults (young, middle-aged and elderly) for their recall of 
the physical appearance of a young female (one of two confederates) with whom they 
had interacted bIiel1y. Overall participants recalled 60% of the target characteristics 
correctly. Hair colour (77%), height (84%) and complexion (87 %) wt:re the best-
recalled features, eye colour (22%) was worst. Such findings contrast with those of 
Yuille and Cutshall (1986) who found that height, weight and age estimations were 
particularly prone to error. Age differences were greatest in recall for hair and eye 
colour, and also for age. Yarmey found that recall accuracy for eye colour (blue) of 
one target was 40~J , while for the other (who had green eyes) was 3%. Both targets 
were blonde. Blue eyes are associated with hlonde hair, so witnesses recalling blonde 
hair will usually be correct if they report the confederate had blue eyes. Yarmey's 
(1993) results emphasise that when information runs contrary to expectations (see 
above), recall can be very inaccurate. 
Schwal1z (l990) examined the differences in suggestihility of children (aged five to 
seven years) and adults for person and event infollllation. Participants saw a video of 
a staged robbery, in which the thief wore a grey-blue T-shirt and brown hat. After a 
[j)]er task, participants answered 10 yes-no questions. The questions contained the 
suggestion that the man wore a yellow T-shirt (person information) and that he 
touched a telephone, rather than a computer (event information). After a second filler 
task, event and person information was tested a second time. The majority of adults 
were accurate when asked if the shirt was yellow (i.e. they said no), however half of 
them were unable to state the correct colour at second reca ll. A third of children were 
accurate during objective questioning about the colour of the shirt, but half of these 
were later inaccurate at third and final recall. The effect of the post-event suggestion on 
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the reported colour of the suggested person item also interacted with the age of 
participants. Whereas 56% of the children reported the colour of the shirt to he yellow 
as had heen suggested, only 14% of the adults did so. Instead 10% of the adults 
indicated they did not recall the shirt's colour during final recall, and 48% exhibited 
disrupted memory, reporting neither grey-hlue, nor yellow. These participants 
"selected colours that were either close to yellow ... or defaulted to the most 
prototypical T-shirt colour, white" (p. 38). The most likely colour selected was either 
cream or tan, as predicted hy Belli (1988). Colour hlending occurred Jess often with 
children (presumably because children will not have yet developed a relevant schema 
for T-shirt colour) . Adults were more likely to choose a colour other than the 
suggested one, while children accepted the suggested colour as if it had heen the 
ohserved colour. These results extend those of Belli, as Schwartz tested recall and not 
recognition of ohject colour. Children did not perform similarly to the adults in either 
Schwartz's or Belli's studies. The majority (61 %) reported the suggested colour of the 
shirt. Only one child suggested white, and only one hlended yellow with white (and 
said that the T-shirt was cream). 
SUI11J111.UY (~f colour issues and eyewitness memory 
A degree of contradiction exists with respect to eyewitness memory for colour. As 
noted ahove, few researchers have looked at memory for colour in an eyewitness 
context. When colour has heen included in eyewitness expeliment~ it has often been in 
the form of filler questions (Christianson and Loftus, 1991; Parker et al., 1986). 
Despite this, researchers have drawn (varying) conclusions ahout the memorahility of 
colour. 
Schwartz (l990) found only a small proportion of participant~ in her experiment could 
remember colour accurately, however the most negative conclusion ahout eyewitness 
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colour recall was made by Yuille amI Cutshall (1986), who reported that colour of 
clothing is the most difficult feature for witnesses to recall. However, witness 
accu.racy was still high, and the majority of colour information recalled was correct. 
Other experimenters have also observed high accuracy rates for recall of colour 
information. Ruback (1986) and Yarmey (1993) both found that hair colour was 
remembered well. Eye colour, in contrast, was remembered poorly. In studies which 
treated colour as pelipheral infonnation, recall for colour was intluenced by encoding 
conditions. Although Parker et al. (1986) found peripheral information (including 
colour) was remembered as well as more salient information, ChIistianson and Loftus 
(1991) discovered that peripheral information, including colour, was recalled hetter 
when the stimuli were neutral. When colour information was a central feature, 
Christianson and Loftus found it was remembered hest in the emotional condition. 
With the exception of Schwartz (1990), all the eyewitness research has been 
conducted on adults. Therefore the extent and accuracy of children's recall for colour, 
as well as any developmental trends in eyewitness colour memory, remain 
undetermined. In addition, the delays lIsed in these experiments were all different, 
which makes comparison between studies problematic (see p. 17). 
Automaticity of colour recall 
Some researchers have suggested that colour information is attended to, at least to 
some degree, without any instructions to encode it (Allport, 1971; Hatwell, 1995; 
Logan, Taylor & Etherton, 1996). Others have found very poor memory for colour 
unless participants were given explicit instructions to encode it (Light, 1976; Park & 
James, 1983; Park & Mason, 1982; Schulman, 1973). Studies of selective attention, 
such as Wilton (1989, below), have used stimuli with central and incidental features. 
The degree to which participants recall this information is assumed to retlect the 
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amount of attention given to this infonnation. Hagen (L967) found no evidence of an 
increase in incidental learning between middle childhood and adolescence. though 
capacity to perfOlID central tasks did improve. which may have been related to changes 
in metacognitive ability, with greater attention to stimulus features critical for leaming, 
at the expense of extraneous or incidental infonnatinn. 
Hasher and Zacks (1979) presented a framework for understanding how a numher of 
different cognitive processes intluence memory. The central idea of their theory was 
that encoding operations vary in their attentional requirements. Hasher and Zacks 
placed these encoding operations along a continuum. depending upon how much 
attentional capacity they take up. At one end of the continuum are those processes that 
require some degree of cognitive load. and which may disrupt other cognitive 
activities. these they tenned effortful (also called intentional) processes. Hasher and 
Zacks described strategies such as rehearsal. organisation and imagery as effortful 
processes. At the other end of the spectrum Hasher and Zacks put processes which 
require a minimal amount of attentional energy and proceed without conscious effort 
so that "certain basic aspects of both internal and external events are entered into long-
telm memory despite other. concurrent demands upon capacity" (Hasher & Zacks. p. 
358), these they lenned automatic (or incidelHal) processes. Such processes were also 
characterised as innate and invariant with age. Memory for spatial location and 
frequency of OCCUITence were cited as two such automatic processes. 
Although they made no specific comments ahout colour. Hasher and Zacks (1979), 
there are a numher of theoretical points which relate to any examination of the 
automaticity of a cognitive process. First. Hasher and Zacks did not con<.:iude that 
automatic processes are processes which operate at ceiling levels in all situations. 
Under some circumstances, this may occur. hut for Hasher and Zacks. an automatic 
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process is one that has minimal resource requireml!llls, amI as a cOllsequence functions 
at a constant level at all times, regardless of other resource demands. Therefore. if 
colour recall is an automatic process it should remain identical under intentional and 
incidental conditions and he insensitive to the effects of practice and secondary task 
demands. Second. Hasher and Zacks specified two types of automatic processes. The 
first were those that encoded 'fundamental' information . By fundamental, they meant 
information that humans are 'genetically prepared ' (p. 356) to acquire and which 
should require minimal experience to lead to automatic encoding. The second type of 
processes are those which are initially effortful. but eventually becom e automatic 
through practice. Hasher and Zacks cited reading as one such process. Hence, there 
may he some development in parLicular automatic process, similarly, development may 
also occur through maturational increases in attentinnal capacity (see Case, I YX5). 
In summary, according to Hasher and Zacks ' (I Y7Y) theory, for a process to be 
considered to be automatic it must fulfil four distinct cIiteIia: 
1. there should be no difference between intentional and incidental performance 
2. performance should be better than chancl! 
~. there should he no developmental differences 
4. be unaffected by practice or secondary task loau 
Only the first three of these criteria were assessed with regaru to the automaticity of 
colour recall because of the practical difficulty of getting young children to perform 
dual tasks, and also because of the greater importance of the first three cliteria for the 
analysis of eyewitness testimony. 
Hasher and Zacks' (l97Y) theory was similar tll the ' lite ral copy ' hypothesis o/" read 
words devised by Light and Berger (1974, 1976). In their theory, Light and Berger 
examined whether some non-semantic attrihutes of words could he rememhered 
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without any conscious effort to do so. Students were instructed to remember case 
(upper/lower) and colour (red/green) of words. Light & Berger (1974) found that 
these participants recalled the attributes better than those who were not given such 
instructions. They therefore concluded that storage of non-semantic attributes was 
effortfu!. 
Participants in Light and Berger (1976) also had to remember a similar list of words 
that were coloured in combinations of red/green and were in upper/lower case. Adult 
participants were told that the experiment was examining short-term memory for 
words and they had to focus on particular atuibutes, either case and/or colour, or no 
attlibutes. Light and Berger observed that hits declined and false alarms increased as a 
function of number of atttibutes to be retained. There was no trade-off in recognition 
between participants asked to remember one or two attrihutes, compared to those 
asked to remember none. However, instructions to remember attributes did affect 
recall: participants told to remember one attribute performed worse than those 
instructed to remember two, but better than those told to remember none. There was 
an effect of instructions to remember colour. When participants were told to remember 
colour, they remembered it accurately (78% correct), but in the colour-incidental 
condition they performed at chance (5~%) . Schulman (1973, Expeliment 2) examined 
intentional recall for colour. He showed adults a series of slides of single words 
coloured reo, blue, green or orange; the words were placed in anyone of the four 
compass points. Schulman found that in contrast to Light and Berger, intentional recall 
for colour was at chance levels, and was even lower than recall for spatial location 
which had been encoded under incidental conditions. 
Another researcher has observed that simultaneous presentation of colour and form 
stimuli (outlines of geomeuic shapes coloured red, green or hlue) led to almost perfect 
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encoding of both types of attlibute. Allport (1971) showed adult participants a selies 
of stimuli that varied on either one or two dimensions (colour, shape, or number). 
Accuracy of colollr recall was largely unaffected hy having to take in information 
about either of the two form dimensions. The capacity for simultaneous encoding of 
colour and form information, Allport argued, is largely independent of the particular 
colours and forms involved. Thus judging or detecting two different features of the 
same object (e.g. the colour and orientation of a line) may he accomplished without 
obvious capacity limits. Pashler (1994) presented adult participants with brief ::lITays 
of characters. In a dual task they classified the colour of some or all of the items 
(making an immediate response) and stored the shape of some of the items for a later 
recognition test. There was little mutual interference between classifying and storing, 
however the tasks were by no means independent: there was substantial interference 
when d~fferent objects from the array had to he stored for nne task and classified for 
the other. Pashler interpreted this to mean that the colour task reyuired visual attention 
to be allocated to the coloured items, and that visual attention is both necessary and 
sufficient to ensure that items are stored in short-term memory. Pashler argued that 
storage in visual short term memory may be a "contingently automatic" (p. 118) 
consequence of having visual attention allocated to a given location. 
The incidental processing of physical attlihutes of stimuli can have a significant affect 
on later perfolll1ance. After reviewing the literature on colour memory, Cave, Bost and 
Cobb (1996, p. 642) concluded that the "weight of evidence suggests that colours of 
objects may be explicitly remembered, albeit at a low level, even without specific-
memory instruction." Besides examining the inlluence of colour changes on naming, 
Cave et ai. (Study 1) tested the effects of colour on explicit memory to see whether 
adult participants could detect colour changes at recognition. Changing the colours of 
previously-seen stimuli (pictures of everyday ohjects) in a naming task did not impair 
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naming latency compared to stimuli which were the same colour at acquisition and in 
the naming task, on the basis of these results Cave et (fl. considered shape was a more 
effective cue than colour. This result contrasts with those or Ostergaard and Davidoff 
(1985), who observed that colour facilitated object naming. Researchers have 
suggested that when identification can be easily acwmplished by shape alone then 
attending to other physical attIibutes such as colour becomes unnecessary (Biedelman 
& Ju, 1988). In a further experiment where Cave et ([I. measured the degree to which 
participants could detect whether stimuli remained the same colour (Study 2), 
participants performed better than chance. This result suggests that colour infOimation 
can be encoded without any particular intention to do so. Cave et al. also found that 
colour infOimation was relatively long-lived, with recall tested an hour after encoding. 
In brief. several experimenters have looked at how well colour is rememhered. In 
general, those that have given participants coloured words to rememher (Light & 
Berger, 1974, 1976; Pashler, 1994; Schulman, L973) have found that colour is not 
well-remembered (though Pashler's findings were ambiguous). When participants 
have been given coloured pictures or shapes to rememher (Allport, 1971; Cave et al., 
1996) recall for colour has been better than chance. In addition to these experiments 
there have been a number of more specific and direct tests of colour automaticity, 
which have also used a variety of stimuli. 
Most of the research that has investigated colour memory for pictures, especially as it 
relates to automaticity of recall (Hasher & Zacks, 1979), has heen conducted hy Park 
and her associates (e.g. Park, 1980; Park & James, 19~3; Park & Puglisi, 1985) 
using procedures similar to those of Light and Berger (1974, 1976) and Schulman 
(1973). Park and Mason (1982) examined whether recall for colour (red or green) and 
location (left or right) was ' automatic' (according to Hasher & Zacks' strict 
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definition). Adults were shown slides of everyday objects (shoe, car, fence, etc.). The 
objects were placed on either the left or right side of each slide and the slides were 
coloured either red or green (with the outline of the ohjt:cts picked out in white; see 
Figure 1.4.3). Participants saw four series of 16 slides, with each slide shown for five 
seconds. There was a brief filler task and a recognition-and-recall test of some of the 
items between each set. Park and Mason divided adult participants between four 
encoding conditions: "item only" (where participants were instructed to remember 
object only), encoding "item and position", encoding "item and colour" or encoding 
"item, position and colour." After a final fill e r task, memory for all acquisition and 
distracter stimuli was tested; participants were tested on thei r recall for all stimulus 
attributes (i.e. item, position (lnd colour), regardless o/" thei r origi.nal encoding 
condition. A similar procedure was devised for words which matched the picture 
stimuli. 
Participants in the item and colour condition remembered position as well as those in 
the item and position , and item, position and colour condition, which suggests that 
position was encoded at no extra cognitive cost once attention is directed to colour. 
Colour was recalled at chance levels in those conditions where participants were not 
explicitly told to recall colour (item and position, and item-only). The participants in 
the item-and-colour, and item-position-and-colour conditions recalled colour well 
above chance, which suggested to Park amI Mason " very clearly that it is etlortful to 
remember color, as subjects remembered it much be tter when actively trying" (L982, 
p. 79). There were no differences between memory for picture-colour and word-
colour. Their findings suggested that position required substantially less capacity than 
colour, since colour was remembered at chance levels under colour-incidental cond-
itions and position was recalled accurately under position-incidental conditions. 
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(i) 
Figure 1.4.3 Example of coloured object (i) and matched 
coloured word (ii) used by Park & Mason (1982). 
(ii) 
Park, Puglisi and Sovacool (1983) compared the memory of college students and 
elderly for spatial information only, however they changed the stimuli they used from 
the coloured-in slides used in their earlier experiments, to black-on-white line 
drawings of everyday objects (e.g. spade, glove). This change was "initiated because 
the positive image is more typical of stimuli present outside the lahoratory" (p. 584). 
Park et al. found an age effect in recall for position (left or right) of pictures on index 
cards and also that attending to spatial location decreased item memory, that is, 
encoding position took up processing capacity which prevented better item memory. 
Similar findings were interpreted by Light and Berger (1976) as evidence of effortful 
processing. However, Park et al. concluded that memory for position was an 
automatic process, and that their task may have been easier than Park's previous 
research, as in the past (Park & James, 1983; Park & Mason, 1982) they had used 
photographic negatives which may have been " less discriminable than those used in 
the present study" (1985, p. 587). 
Park and Puglisi (1985) discounted the findings of Park and Mason (1982) as the 
stimuli they had "little ecological validity" (19~5, p. 199; see pp. 6-7, above). In their 
study, Park and Puglisi presented young and elderly adults with slides of line 
drawings (or matched words) of objects in red, green, yellow, or blue, hut this time 
the objects alone, not object and background, were coloured. They found an effect of 
encoding instructions, with intentional better than incidental recall, although recall was 
above chance in both conditions, however there was an interaction hetween encoding 
condition and stimuli. When participants were given words to remember colour 
memory was at chance in the incidental condition, though higher in the intentional 
condition. Overall, intentional colour memory for pictures was good (8()%), but only 
marginaIly better than incidental recaIl (73%) which was higher than chance. Again 
pictures were recognised hetter than words, and there was an age difference: young 
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adults recalled colour better than older adult'). The main effect of colour was also 
significant: yellow was remembered best, followed by red and green; blue was 
remembered least well. The results of the younger adults are most relevant to this 
summary. Park and Puglisi concluded that Hasher and Zacks' (1979) automaticity 
ctiteria had not been met for colour recall in their sttictest sense, as they had observed 
age differences in colour recall. 
Backman, Nilsson, Herlitz, Nyberg and Stigsdotter (1991) and Backman, Nilsson 
and Nouri (1993) assessed the intluence of secondary task performance (backwards 
counting) at encoding on recall of infonnation from a seties of 'mini-tasks' performed 
by adult participant') involving objects and verbs (e.g. tllllling a wallet) . These subject-
performed tasks (SPTs) may be more ecologically valid memory tasks than, for 
example, word lists, because of their multi-modal nature and because of the variety of 
features on which encoding may be based (e.g. visual, auditory, tactile). Backman et 
al. (1991) speculated that verbal components of SPTs, like most verbal memory tasks, 
are encoded with attention and effort, whereas the encoding of specific physical task 
features (e.g. colour, weight) is less attention demanding. Backman and Nilsson 
asked palticipant') to perfonn 24 SPTs with objects in anyone of eight colours. In one 
condition participants were asked to memOtise verbal and physical features of SPTs. 
In a second (dual) condition participants were asked to memorise the same features , 
but also to count backwards. Each SPT took six seconds to complete. Backman et at. 
found that the dual task exerted a much smaller effect on the recall of physical features 
compared to the verbal ones. However the backwards-counting task used by Backman 
etal. (1991) was a verbal one which may have affected memory for the verbal aspects 
of the SPTs. In a second experiment, Backman et al. (1993) replicated and extended 
these findings , observing that memory for SPTs was unaffected by whether 
participants learned the verbs and colours under incidental or intentional conditions. 
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These results indicate that memory for colour may be an automatic process, and also 
that it may be primarily a visual process, since it was unaffected by a verbal 
interference task. 
Effortful encoding operations may not be as important for achieving good encoding of 
physical features as they are in the case of verbal features . As a result, the initially 
encoded physical feature (e.g. colour) may be relatively similar to the final memory. 
The fact that there were no effects of intention on memory in either experiment. 
"would seem to suggest that all features assessed were encoded with minimal 
effort.. .. that the material is acquired automatically" (Backman et al.. 1991, p. 252). 
Nevertheless, colour recall did drop in the dual task so it may not be fully automatic. 
In summary, encoding of colour of objects in SPTs is less attention-demanding than is 
encoding of action verbs and object names. Whether this generalises to other types of 
experimental settings is unclear. Backman et 01. did not assess the implications of 
SPTs for memory: are they better-remembered hecause of the variety of features on 
which encoding may be based (e.g. visual, auditory, tactile), and if so are they are 
also accessible through these channels? 
In a study with children, Park and James (1983) examined whether the spatial and 
colour attributes of pictures were automatically encoded. Park and James tested three 
groups of participants, aged six, eight and 10 years. The children were told they 
would see some pictures which they should try to remember as the experimenter 
wanted to see how well they could do. The stimuli were the same pictures of everyday 
objects used in Park and Mason (1982), and they were also placed on the kft or right 
of each slide. coloured either red or green and shown for five seconds each. The 
children were split into the same attribute encoding conditions as in Park and Mason 
(i.e. item only, item and position, item and colour, or item position and colour), but 
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were tested individually. There were three sets of eight acquisition stimuli which the 
children named. After each set, children looked blietly at a book before being given a 
recognition and recall test for some of the items. After the last memory test, children 
read a book for a further three minutes before being shown the whole set of stimuli 
(i.e. 24 acquisition pictures and 12 distracters) and asked to recall all attlibute infor-
mation, regardless of their encoding condition. 
Park and James (1983) therefore tested three predictions which needed to be met in 
order to accept memory for colour as an automatic process . These predictions were 
age invaIiance, no difference between intentional and incidental recall, and a minimal 
drain on attention. 
There were three salient findings of Park and James' (l9~n) study. First, there was a 
linear age effect in recall for colour, with increased age associated with better recall. 
This conflicted with the automatic processing model. Second, there was an effect of 
instructions on recall. Children who were asked to encode item and colour performed 
better than those in the item-only condition; when children were not asked to encode 
colour they recalled colour at chance levels. Thus intention did improve recall of 
colour, disconfilming another cliterion for automaticity. Children who were asked to 
remember position and colour also recalled position better than participants asked to 
recall item alone. Third, when participants were asked to recall colour (i.e. in item-
colour, and item-colour-position conditions) recall for other attributes was reduced. 
This suggested that attempting to recall colour did place demands on attentional 
capacity. In c;onLrast, there were no differences in rec;all for colour between children 
asked to remember item and colour, and those who encoded item, position and colour. 
Position recall was also above chance in all ages and in all conditions. These findings 
indicated that encoding position did not require any additional attentional resources, as 
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Hasher and Zacks ' (1979) automaticity theory would suggest. For colour recaIJ, item 
and position was different from item, position and colour, and item and colour from 
item-only, disconfirming one of the critelia for automaticity. Similarly to Park and 
Mason, colour memory was only recalled above chance in the item and colour, and 
item, position and colour conditions, that is, when the children had been told explicitly 
to encode the colour infonnation. 
Park and James' (1983) tindings provide little evidence for the automaticity of colour 
memory. Although learning colour did not appear to impede item memory, 
performance was vil1ually at chance in colour-incidental conditions and there were also 
large increases in colour memory relative to incidental when participants were given 
intentional instructions Age also intluenced reca ll for colour, with greater age 
associated with better recall. The increase Park and James ohserved in in.tention.al 
perfonnance with age for colour and position supported earlier research (e.g. Hagen, 
1967). 
In summary, two trends can be seen for colour recall in Park 's research. The first 
trend, observed in her earlier research (Park & James, 1983; Park & Mason, 1982) 
was for colour recall in colour-incidental conditions to be poor, wi th young and old 
participants alike remembering colour at levels no better than chance. Her later 
research (Park & Puglisi, 1985) was characterised by far better colour recall in the 
colour-incidental conditions. The differences between these two series of studies, as 
Park and Puglisi implied, may be accounted for by the changes in the stimuli used. In 
the earlier expeI;ments Park used stimuli similar to Hale and Piper's (1973) coloured 
background stimuli, in her later experiments the stimuli resembled the coloured shape 
stimuli. In these later expeI;ments her adults' results matched those of Hale and Piper, 
however Park did not test children with such stimuli. 
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Hatwell (1995. Experiment 2) showed seVen and nine year ()Id childre ll 1I se ries of six 
red and green shapes. Participants were asked e ithcr til try ,1I1d mClllurise the shapes, 
or hoth the shapes amI the ir colours . The ()hjects we re visihlL: for 2() seconds each . 
Participants were tested for their recall of hoth shape and colour, re gardless of 
encoding condition. ResulL<; showed that e m:ouing conuition appeareu to have little or 
no effect on the ability of participants to recall colour. Hatwell conduded that colour 
was memorised "nearly perfectly" (p. () 1) in hoth the intentional and the incidental 
conditions, hy hoth the younger and the older children, that is, memory f()r colour was 
almost automatic. 
1.5 Summary and aims of the thesis 
This introduction has summarised th e lite rature re lated to th e ec()logical issues 
involved when investigating children ' s memory, as we ll as S01l1e of Llw research into 
the eyewitness performance of childre n. The major part ()f the introduction reviewed 
the work of researchers who have examined colour. As emphasised throughout these 
sections, the re have heen very few studies which have examined colour recall from an 
eyewitness perspective, and there has heen lillie investigation of speciric eyewitness 
abilities across the age range : most eye witness researchers have confined their 
investigations [() the recall or t'i'her children OJ" adults. This thesis has, therefore, three 
main aims. First, to de te rmin e whethe r memory fur c()lour is an automatic or an 
effortful process. This investigation was hased primarily ()n the w()rk conducted by 
Hatwell (1995) , Park and James (19Xl ), and Park and Mason (Il)X2). Second, to 
investigate colour memory from an eyewitness perspective. Third, to directly compare 
the perfOimance of children and adults. 
As explained ahove. a numher of rese:.ln:hers ha ve in vestigated th e prucl~sses lInder-
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lying colour recall, yet the hasis of colour memory remains unclear. Some researchers 
have argued that colour recall is an etTnrtflil procc:ss, Lind l1ut!;d re(.;all of colour to he 
low or at chance levels (Davidnll & Mitchell, I (JSl~ ; Light & Berger, 1974. I ()76; Park 
& James, l()~Q ; Park & Mason, I ()Xl), whik others ha ve arguc:d that (.;olour re(.;all is 
good and that it is an ulltomalit.: prm.:c:ss (Halwdl, I ~JSl5; Park & Puglisi. I ~R5) . Still 
other investigators have concluded that incidental colour recall. though hetter than 
chance, does not approach the ceiling levels noted hy other researchers (Backman et 
al., 1991; Cave ef ([/., J 9()6). The prohlem with t.:omparing these different expetiments 
is the variety of stimuli they used tn examinl' colour recall , from slides (Park & James; 
Park & Mason), to geometric hlocks (Hatwe ll ) and suhjcct-perfonned tasks (Backman 
et til.) . Another pmhlem, at least fmlll a de ve lopmental pe rspective, is that not one of 
these expetiments directly compared the performance of adults to that of children, and 
so it is difficult to conclude anything in terms of the maturation of colour memory. 
Nonetheless, the availahle evidence favours the idea that colour recall is effortful. 
There are difficulties in comparing H:.I!wcll·s ( 1~~5 ) rl'slilts with tllllse of Park and 
James ' (l9!:D). Participants in Hatwell 's experiment saw the stimuli for 2() seeonds 
each, but in Park and James' study, a new stimulus was presented every rive seconds. 
Hatwell's acquisition set comptised only six shapes (and three distracters), compared 
to Park and James' 24 (and 12 distracters) , and th e re fme the pmcessing load in 
Hatwell's task was possihly smaller. This factor Illa y have inte racted with the 
processing of the contextual cUe. as shown hy Shad(Jin allli Ellis (I ()()2) who ohserved 
'increased' automaticity of location coding when the cumplexity (Jf the task decreased. 
In another study, Hatwell, (l ()94, pel's. l:oml11.) tested the recall of seven and nine 
year olds for a greater number of shares. This time Hatwell found that when 
participants were asked tn recall the coluurs of J () red ur grel'n ()hj~cts which they had 
seen under intentiunal or incidental cunditiuns. th erl' " 'OS :Ill age el'i'ect, with nine year 
olds recalling more colours correctly than seven year olds. However the re was no 
effect of encoding condition: in both the inciuc nwl and intentional conditions, recall 
was consistently highe r than chance (70-X()(/t corrcct ), and the re was no inte raction 
hetween age and e ncoding condition . This mcans that although the task in this 
expeIiment was more difficult than that used in Hat well ( 11.)1.)5 ), as demonstrated by 
the age effect, effective recall of stimuli colour was possihle without instruction to 
leam the colours. The effect of stimulus exposure time am! numher on recall for colour 
are examined in Experiments 2 and 3, respectively. rn Expeliment I th e re will he a 
foclis on the dlects of age, e ncoding instructiolls and range of stimuli colours on 
recall for colour. 
CHAPTER 2 
EXPERIMENT 1 
THE EFFECT OF AGE, ENCODING CONDITION, AND STIMULI· 
COLOUR ON COLOUR RECALL 
INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter 1 (pp. 66-67), the experiments conducted by Hatwell 
(1995), Park and James (1983), and Park and Mason (1982) differed in a number 
of respects, such as the type of stimuli they used. Park and Mason and Park and 
James used slides of drawings and words representing familiar objects, and 
Hatwell used geometric blocks. The colour of blocks may be easier to remember 
than those of variolls objects as individuals may have preconceived ideas about the 
colours that particular items should be, such as black cats and blue jeans, but may 
not have stereotypical colours for triangles and squares (Belli, 1988). In other 
words, blocks may be less likely to suffer from inferences or colour blend 
retrievals of the type noted by Schwartz (1990). 
Park and James ' (1983) and Park and Mason's (1982) and Hatwell's (1995) 
findings for incidental colour memory are in marked contrast, one completely 
effortful (with performance at chance levels), the other automatic, with perfOimance 
in excess of 80% correct. Other researchers have also examined memory for 
colour, and drawn conclusions which may explain Park's and Hatwell's 
contradictory findings. Hale & Piper (1973; see Chapter 1, pp. 39-41) found 
evidence for a difference in recall of stimuli whose components (e.g. colour and 
shape) were contained within a single unit (for example a red triangle on a white 
background which is similar to Hatwell's stimuli; see Figure 1.4.2), and those with 
a spatial separation or lack of clear integration between the components (such as a 
blue diamond on a background of the same shade of blue, which cOlTesponds to the 
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stimuli used by Park & Mason). 
Wilton (1989, Experiment 3) also found that particular juxtapositions of colour and 
form had different effects on recall. In a study of incidental colour memory in 
adults, Wilton showed participants 14 coloured shapes in one of two conditions 
(see Figure 2.1). One condition involved the presentation of unitary pictures - each 
shape appeared in one of seven colours and was presented on a white or black 
background. These stimuli were similar to those used in Hatwell's experiments, 
where colour was contained within the boundaries of the shape. In a second, nO/l-
unital)' , condition Wilton presented participants with shapes that were either white 
or black and but had a coloured background. This condition was similar to the 
stimuli that Park and James (1983) and Park and Mason (1982) presented to their 
participants, as in these studies, no colour was directly associated with the object, 
since background and foreground (i.e. object) were similarly coloured. One 
prediction that could be drawn from Park's and Hatwell ' s results would be that the 
colour of stimuli in Wilton's unitary condition (similar to the stimuli Llsed by 
Hatwell) would be better remembered than colour in the non-unitary condition (as 
Park and James and Park and Mason) if there was a clearer association between 
object and colour. This was indeed what Wilton found. In the unitary condition 
pm1icipants had colour recall rates of 70% compared to only 47% in the non-unitary 
condition. 
More equivocal evidence regarding the automaticity of colour memory was 
collected by Backman et al. (1993, Experiment 2; see Chapter 1, pp. 62-63). 
Backman et al. found that recall was unaffected by whether adults leamed colours 
under intentional or incidental conditions. They concluded that the colour 
components of simple tasks (e.g. lifting a black pen, tuming a blue wallet) required 
less attentional resources to encode than the action verb components (lift, turn). 
However, although participants did score above chance when asked to recall these 
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(i) (ii) 
Figure 2.1. Examples of (i) unitary and (ii ) non-
unitary (ii) stimuli used by Wilton. 
(i) (ii) 
increase in incidental learning for colour (though not for pictures) between eight 
and 12 years of age, which, in the strictest sense of Hasher and Zacks' theory 
(1979), is contrary to what would be expected if colour was an entirely automatic 
process: if colour is an automatic process, it should be invariant with respect to age. 
Although colour memory was very good in their study, Park and Puglisi concluded 
that Hasher and Zacks' automaticity criteria had not been met for colour recall in 
their strictest sense, since they too had observed age differences. 
The fact that participants in Park and Puglisi (1985) had good recall of picture-
colour but not word-colour is significant, and they made a strong case for careful 
choice of stimuli as there appears to be an interaction between how colours are 
presented and how well they are remembered. "Colored dots or words, for 
example, will not be used effectively .... Adding color to real-world 
pictures ... however, would appear to be a potentially useful and meaningful 
manipulation" (p. 203; see Light & Berger, 1974, 1976; Schulman, 1973, above). 
Although Park and Puglisi observed a substantial decline of colour memory in the 
elderly, these participants were still "able to remember a substantial amount of 
colour information without even trying" (1985, p. 203, emphasis mine). 
The degree of accuracy in colour recall that Park and Puglisi (1985) found is closer 
to the levels observed by Hatwell (1995) than either those of Park and James 
(1983) or Park and Mason (1982), and to some extent they seem to have addressed 
the problems of the stimuli used in Park's earlier experiments. Nevertheless, their 
study had limitations. First, although Park and Puglisi used a greater range of 
colours than the red and green used by Park and James, Park and Mason and 
Hatwell, they still only used four colours, yellow, red, blue and green. It is unclear 
what difference, if any, exposing participants to a wider range of stimuli colours 
would have on their colour recall, as well as whether any developmental differences 
will be present in this (Heider, 1971). Second, Park and Puglisi made no reference 
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to the development of colour memory in people you.nger than the college-aged 
students they tested. Thus it is unclear whether children of the age tested by Park 
and James and by Hatwell would mirror the results of the adults in Park and 
Puglisi. 
Experiment 1 was designed to test the prediction of Park and James (1983) and 
Park and Mason (1982) that memory for colours will be at chance levels, against 
the prediction of Hatwell (1995) that colour recall will be much higher than chance. 
Experiment 1 compared the colour memory of three age groups of participants, six 
year olds, nine year olds and adults, for a selies of coloured pictures shown under 
both intentional and incidental conditions. Experiment 1 therefore also tested the 
reliability of Park and Puglisi's (1985) findings, and attempted to extend them in 
two important respect". First, children were tested to see if developmental trends in 
colour recall exist at the lower end of the age range. Second, a comparison between 
stimuli of only two colours and stimuli of six colours was made, partly to see if 
there were any predictable trends in the ease of memorability of different colours 
(Berlin and Kay, 1969; Heider, 1971), and partly to examine why the results of 
Park and Puglisi differed so greatly from Park and Mason's. Three predictions 
were tested in Experiment 1. 
First, whether encoding condition had an intluence on memory for colour. If colour 
memory is an automatic process, then participants who were given no instruction to 
remember colour (i.e. incidental encoding) should remember as many colours 
correctly as those told to remember colour (i.e. intentional encoding). 
Second, whether age has an effect on colour recall. According to Hasher and Zacks 
(1979), if a process is automatic then there should be no age-variation in 
performance in the incidental condition. If age differences were observed in 
memory for colour in Experiment 1, colour memory cannot be automatic. The 
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participating age groups were seven and nine year olds, as tested by Hatwell 
(1995), and an adult compaIison group. 
Third, a comparison was made between memory for two colours and memory for 
six colours. If participants can remember colour automatically then colour recall 
should be above chance in both colour conditions. Ostergaard and Davidoff (1985) 
found that objects which were coloured differently from each other (i.e. more 
discriminable) were recalled better than object.;; which were similarly-coloured. In 
other words, Ostergaard and Davidoff found that a variety of colours led to better 
recall. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Three age groups of 56 participants each were tested: seven year olds (average age 
7;5; range: 6;11-8;1), nine year olds (average age 9;1; range: 8;7-9;6) and young 
adults (average age 22;8; range 18;1-33;8). All children attended local state-funded 
infant and primary schools. The adult group was composed mainly of university 
student.;;. Each participant group included 28 males and 28 females. All participants 
had normal or cOITected-to-nOimal vision. 
Stimulus Materials 
The acquisition stimuli were four sets of 36 single-colour line-drawings of various 
items taken from the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) and the Peabody 
Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT). All of the test stimuli included in the expeliment 
were monosyllabic (e.g. bed, shoe, door). Stimuli were chosen so as to be easily 
identifiable by even the youngest group of children, the acquisition stimuli were 
also chosen and coloured to avoid common relationships such as blue jeans or 
black cats (see Table 2.1a and 2.1b). Each picture was photocopied onto coloured 
paper before being cut out and glued on to white paper and placed in clear plastic 
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envelopes. The envelopes were then bound into a book so that only one item could 
be seen at a time. 
The four sets of acquisition stimuli were identical in all respects save colour: two 
sets were coloured half red and half green, the other two sets of stimuli were 
coloured black, red, blue, yellow, green and orange, with each colour o<.:<.:uning an 
equal number of times. Two sets of stimuli were constructed for each selection of 
colours so that particular colour/object combinations were not a factor in recall. 
Thus were two sets of multi-coloured (MC), to reduce the effe<.:ts of any 
stereotypical associations (see Table 2.1a, overleaf). The red and green (RG, see 
Table 2. J b, overleaf) stimuli were counter-balanced across the sets, with items 
coloured red in one set appearing as green in the other. and vice versa. All four seLs 
of stimuli were presented in one of two random orders. 
All the recognition items were black and white line drawings. These consisted of 
black and white copies of the original 36 coloured acquisition items as well as an 
additional 18 pictures which were used as di stracters ami placed at random among 
the acquisition items (see Table 2.1c). Examples of a<.:qui sition and recognition 
stimuli can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
Table 2.1c Distracters used in Experiment J, all black on white line drawings 
dress book nag lamp bin rope 
belt torch fish fork Jar dish 
bath saw tin scarf nurse tie 
Design and Procedure 
The participants were divided into four groups for testing , each balanced for age 
and sex. with each group receiving one of the four (two RG and two MC) versions 
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Table 2.1a Acquisition stimuli in MC conditions (bracketed colours ind icate item 
colours for second set of MC stimuli) 
Black comb bed sock wheel plane sweets 
(Blue) 
Green spade bus hat bag doll cup 
(Orange) 
Blue glove bike brush door glass bat 
(Black) 
Red fence boot ball axe peg couch 
(Yellow) 
Orange kite ZIP car .lug case bell 
(Green) 
Yellow gate shoe chain boat kni fe drum 
(Red) 
Table 2.1b Acquisition stimuli in RG condi tions (bracketed colours indicate item 
colours fo r second set of RG stimuli) 
Red comb bed sock wheel plane sweets 
(Green) 
Green spade bus hat bag doll cup 
(Red) 
Red glove bike brush door glass bat 
(Green) 
Green fence boot ball axe peg couch 
(Red) 
Red ki te ZIP car Jug case bell 
(Green) 
Green gate shoe chain boat knife drum 
(Red) 
of the acqui sition stimul i. These groups were further split into either intentional or 
incidental encoding conditions. Participants in the incidental condi tion were asked 
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Figure 2.2 Examples of acquisition and recognition stimuli used in Experiment 1 
to remember only the particular pictures that they were shown; participants in the 
intentional condition were instructed to remember both the items and their colours. 
The experiment had an independent groups design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to each condition, with the proviso that all conditions contained equal 
numbers of males and females. All participants were tested individually, either in a 
quiet area away from their classrooms (children), or in their own homes (adults). 
Pre-Test 
Before testing began, all participants were pre-tested to make sure that they 
understood the task. In addition, the pre-test also served as a means of emphasising 
to participants in the incidental group that they had to recall only the items they were 
shown, rather than the item and any other attributes (like colour). The participants 
assigned to the incidental condition were presented with six acquisition pictures 
(which were different from the stimuli used in the main expel;ment) at five second 
intervals and told to remember them. The pictures were drawn from either the RG 
or MC stimuli, depending upon the condition to which each participant had been 
allocated. Participants in the intentional condition were also told to remember 
picture colour. All participants named the pictures as the experimenter turned 
through the book then talked with the experimenter for a minute before the item 
recognition test. The six original stimuli were replaced by a second book containing 
black on white versions of the coloured pictures as well as three distracter pictures. 
The experimenter turned slowly through all of the stimuli, asking the palticipant if 
he or she had seen the item before. Those participants who had been assigned to the 
intentional conditions (i.e. either the RG or MC conditions) were also asked if they 
could remember the colours of the acquisition items they had recognised. 
This procedure was repeated a second time with different stimuli to ensure that the 
participants understood the instructions for their particular condition before going 
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on to the main expeliment. All participants appeared to understand the task. 
Main Experiment 
The procedure for the main experiment was the same as for the pre-test. After being 
given the encoding instructions appropriate to their experimental condition (which 
was the same as the pre-test), participants were shown a series of 24 coloured 
pictures which they had to remember. After a three-minute break during which they 
talked with the experimenter, the memory of the participants for the stimuli was 
tested. Participants viewed black and white copies of all the 24 acquisition items as 
well as an additional 12 distracter pictures which were interspersed randomly 
throughout the 'target' stimuli. Memory for both item and colour of the stimuli was 
tested regardless of the original encoding instructions. The experimenter went 
through the full set of recognition stimuli, and asked participants whether they had 
seen each stimulus previously, if they replied that they had seen it before they were 
then asked to name the original colour of the picture. 
After the final stimulus was shown, participants in the incidental condition were 
asked if they had made any attempt to remember the object colours: if they had, 
their data were excluded from the analysis. Four participants were excluded, one 
adult and three six year olds; these were replaced with other participants. 
RESULTS 
Recall was measured in two ways. First, whether participants could pick out 
previously-seen stimuli from the recognition stimuli (item recognition data), and 
second, whether participants could recall the colour of the object depicted (colour 
recall data). Correct and incorrect item recognition and colour recall data were 
compared across encoding condition, age, sex, and stimuli colour. The type of 
errors that participants made when they failed to report stimuli (omission errors) 
and when they mistakenly reported as having seen stimuli before (commission 
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errors) was also examined. Unless otherwise stated, all scores are given as 
proportions correct (i.e. including omission errors which are treated as incorrect) 
Preliminary analysis yielded no significant interactions or differences between the 
sexes nor any effects for order of stimuli . 
In the main analyses below omission errors (i.e. 'don't know' responses) were 
treated as incorrect, however such responses are important from a forensic 
perspel:tive because they are not incorrel:t. A separate analysis of these results 
excluding omission errors is given at the end of the reslllLs section (see p. 81). 
Item recognition data 
The item recognition data were analysed by a three fal:tor, ~ (Age) x 2 (Colour 
Condition) x 2 (Enwding Condition), independent groups ANOY A. There was no 
effect of encoding condition on item recognition, F (1, 150) = 1.92, p>O.05, 
however age did lead to differences, F (2, 156) = 4.10, pdU)5, with greater age 
associated with greater item recognition, see Table 2.2. The level of item 
recognition in all age three groups was high, the adults had the best recognition 
Table 2.2 Proportional item recognition scores by age, colour and encoding 
condition in Experiment 1. (Standard deviations are shown in brackets.) 
Ase Groll~ Overall Mean 
7 years 9 years Adult 
RG Intentional 0.83 (0.19) 0.82 (0.19) 0.93 (0.08) 0.86 (0.17) 
Incidental 0.79 (0.23) 0.85 (0.08) 0.80 (0.21) 0.81 (0.18) 
MC Intentional 0.76 (0.18) 0.83 (o.n) 0.76 (0.23) 0.78 (O.I S) 
Incidental 0.66 (0.14) 0.09 (0.23) 0.93 (o.OS) 0.76 «(l .20) 
Overall Mean 0.76 (0.20) 0.80 «(UR) O.g6 (0.17) 0.81 «(J.I!) 
score (0.86), followed by the nine year olds (0.80), and then the seven year olds 
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CO.76). The scores of the adults and seven year olds differed CTukey HSD, 
pdUJ5). Colour condition also had an effect on item recognition, F (1, 156) = 
6.12, pd)J)5, participants recognised more previoUSly-seen pictures in the RG 
condition (0.84) than those in the MC condition (0.77) . 
There were no two-way interactions, neither colour x condition, F (1, 156) = 
0.158, p>(U)5, colour x age, F (2, 156) = 0.75, p>O.05, nor condition x age, F 
(2, 156) = 1.14, p>OJ)5, approached significance. However there was a three-way 
interaction between colour, encoding condition and age, F (2, 156) = 7.20, 
pdlOl; see Figure 2.3. The main reason for this was the good recall of the adults 
in the MC incidental group compared to the relatively poor colour recall of the 
seven and nine year olds in that condition. 
Figure 2.3 Item recognition data: Interaction between encoding condition, colour 
and age in Expeliment 1 
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Item. recognition errors 
The rate of false positives made by participants (i.e. mistakenly reporting that a 
so 
picture present only in the recognition stimuli was present in the acquisition stimuli) 
emphasised item recognition accuracy. Nine out of 168 participants made false 
positive errors (two seven year olds, five nine year olds and two adults, all of 
whom misidentified a single object each), this was a rate of 0.05 false positives per 
person. For the false negative data: adults were least likely to dismiss a previously-
seen object as novel and made 41 incorrect responses (mean: 0.03), followed by 
the nine year aIds with 85 incorrect responses (mean: 0.06) and then the seven year 
olds (92 responses; mean: 0.07). 
Colour recall data 
(i) Chance comparison." 
Participants could choose from a different num ber of colours in each colour 
condition, therefore the possibility of getting the colour of an item correct by chance 
differed. In the RG condition chance was 0.50, in the MC condition chance was 
0.17. Except for the seven year olds in the RG group, the performance of all 
groups in the intentional condition was greater than chance (Wilcoxon signed rank, 
p<f)J)5). In the incidental condition only the nine year olds and adults in the MC 
group were better than chance, none of the other groups were better than chance 
(see Table 2.3). 
(ii) ANOVA results: Colour recall including omission errors (as incorrect) 
The colour recall data were analysed with a three factor, 3 (Age) x 2 (Colour 
Condition) x 2 (Encoding Condition), independent groups ANOY A. An analysis of 
the encoding condition data revealed a difference between the two conditions, F (1, 
156) = 28.96, p<O.Ol. Participants in the intentional condition recalled more colour 
information correctly than those in the incidental condition (means of 0.59 and 
0.43, respectively). There was also an effect for age, F (2, 156) = 3.53, pdU)5: 
the colour recall of the seven year olds (0.46) and the nine year olds (0.51) did not 
differ, but there was a difference between the scores of the seven year olds and 
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adults (0.56; Tukey HSD p<0.05). Stimuli-colour had an effect on the amount of 
items to which participants could give a correct colour, F (1, l56) = 31.02, 
p<O.01. Since they had a lower baseline, pm1icipants in the MC condition cOITectly 
recalled the colours of more pictures than those in the RG condition (0.42 versus 
0.59 correct). The means of the individual groups are shown below in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 Proportion of colours recalled cOlTectly in ExpeIiment 1 by age, colour 
and encoding condition, treating omission elTors as incolTI::ct 
Ase Grou~ Overall Mean 
7 years 9 years Adult 
RG Intentional 0.60 (0.21) O.65t (C1.2I) O.76t (CUn) O.67t (0.20) 
Incidental 0.55 (0.26) 0.53 (0.14) 0.44 (0.16) 0.51 (0.20) 
Me Intentional 0.45 t (0.20) 0.47t (0.21) O.59t (0.15) 0.51 t (0.20) 
Incidental 0.23 (0.16) O.38t (0.22) 0.45 t (0.18) O.35t (0.20) 
t signifiGUltly different from chance (Wilcoxon signed rank, p<OJl5) 
No two-way interactions were observed, neither condition x colour, F (1,156) = 
O.n3, p>O.05 , condition x age, F (2,156) = 1.81, p>O.05, nor colour x age, F 
(2,156) = 2.28, p>O.05, reached significance. However there was an interaction 
between colour of stimuli, encoding condition and age, F (2, 156) = 3.21, pdU)5. 
With the exception of the RG incidental condition, adults perfolmed better than the 
other ages in each condition. In the RG incidental condition the adults performed 
poorly in compat;son to the other groups (see Figure 2.4, overleat). 
(iii) ANOVA results: Colour recall excluding omission errors 
In a further analysis the 'don't know' responses were excluded to allow 
comparison between correct and incorrect responses only. The results were 
reanalysed with a three factor, 3 (Age) x 2 (Colour Condition) x 2 (Encod ing 
Condition), independent groups ANOY A. Encoding condition had an effect on 
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colour recall, F (1, 156) = 32.49, p<O.01, intentional instructions (O.7l) led to 
better colour recall than incidental instructions (0.55). Age did not affect colour 
recall, F (2, 156) = 1.89, p>0.05, adults (0.67), seven year olds (0.63) and nine 
year olds (0.60) all recalled the same amount of colour information. There was a 
difference in colour recall between the two groups of stimuli, F 0, 156) = 30.01, 
pd>.()l, participants in the RG condition (0.71) recalled more item colours 
correctly than those in the MC condition (0.55). The means of the individual 
groups are shown below in Table 2.4. 
Figure 2.4 Colour recall data: Interaction in Experiment 1 between encoding 
condition, colour and age, including omission elTors 
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There was an interaction between colour condition and age, F (2, J56) = 5.63, 
pdUll, the seven (O.7!) and nine year olds (0.73) in the RG condition performed 
better than those in the MC condition (0.55 and 0.47, respectively), however there 
was no difference between the scores of the adults in the RG and MC conditions 
(0.69 and 0 .65, respectively). There were no interactions between encoding 
condition and age, F (2, 156) = 1.66, p>(W5, or enCOding condition and colour 
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condition (F (1, 156) = n.oo, p>O.(5). 
Table 2.4 Proportion of colours recalled correctly by age, colour and encoding 
conditions excluding omission elTors in Expeliment 1 
Ase Grou~ Overall Mean 
7 years 9 years Adult 
RG Intentional n.81 t (0.16) O.73 t (O.B) O.82t (0. 16) O.79t (0.15) 
Incidental 0.61 t (0.21) O.73t (0. 16) 0.54 (0. 17) O.63t (0.19) 
MC Intentional O.56t (0.21) O.60t (0.23) O.74t (O.B) O.63t (0.21) 
Incidental 0.53t (O.B) 0.34 t (0.21) O.56t (0.19) 0.48t (0.21) 
t significantly differenL from chance (Wilcoxon signed rank, p<O.O.'i) 
Figure 2.5 Colour recall data (excluding omission errors): Interaction between 
encoding condition, colour and age in Expeliment 1 
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There was an interaction between colour, encoding condition and age, F (2, 156) = 
6.31, p<OJll ; see Figure 2.5. This interaction was due to the poor perfo lmance of 
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the nine year olds in the MC incidental condition and the adults in the RG incidental 
condition. and the accuracy of the adults in the MC intentional condition. 
DISCUSSION 
In the introduction several predictions were made with respect to the automaticity of 
memory for colours. If memory for colour can be considered an automatic process 
(as defined by Hasher & Zacks. 1979; and predicted by Hatwell, 1995) a number 
of conditions needed to be satisfied. First, participants should remember a large 
proportion of picture colours correctly, regardless of encoding condition. Second, 
there should he no difference in colour recall with respect to age. And third, the 
range of colours used in the stimuli should have no effect on colour recall. 
There was lillIe evidence of participants in the incidental conditions recalling a large 
proportion of picture colours correctly when omission errors were included in the 
analysis. In several incidental conditions, memory for colour did not exceed chance 
levels. There was also a consistent effect of encoding condition on colour recall, 
with intentional recall for colour exceeding incidental recall. This result suggests 
that memory for colour requires cognitive effort, and as such this result supports 
the findings of Light and Berger (1974, 1976), Park and James (1983) and Park 
and Mason (1982). Participant age also affected recall for colour, with greater age 
associated with hetter recall, a result which did not support the findings of Hatwell 
(1995). However the fact that there was no difference hetween the scores of the 
seven and nine year olds supports Hagen's (1967) research, that age differences 
should not be apparent in incidental memory through middle childhood. 
Hagen (1967) also concluded that there should he an improvement in the ability to 
perfOim intentional tasks with increasing age, but there was no evidence of this in 
Experiment l. In the present experiment, the colour recall of the seven and nine 
year olds in the intentional conditions did not differ, thus there was no evidence of 
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any development in intentional learning, but rather a ljuaJitative shift from 
perfOimance in early to middle childhood and adulthood. 
A further aim of Experiment 1 was to investigate the effect of stimuli-colour on 
colour recall, and compare recall for stimuli of two colours (similar to Park & 
Mason, 1982; Park & James, 1983; and Hatwell, 1995) to stimuli in a wider range 
of colours. Although colour-condition had an effect on colour recall, different 
trends were observed in each condition. The RG data supported the notions of Park 
and James and Park and Mason that colour recall is relatively poor, in this condition 
recall for colour was little better than chance levels. In contrast, the Me data (with 
the exception of the seven year olds in the incidental condition) supported Backman 
et aL. (1993): although colour recall was higher than chance, it did not approach the 
levels observed by Hatwell, which would be predicted for a process which is truly 
automatic. Thus similar conclusions to Hale and Piper (1971) and Park and Puglisi 
(1985) can be drawn, that is, that the type of stimuli participants have to remember 
(in this case the range of colours presented) does have an impact on their recall of 
colour. 
In the RG incidental condition the adults perfonned worse than would be expected 
by chance, they also performed worse than both the seven year olds and the nine 
year olds. For seven year olds in the RG condition, there was no effect of encoding 
condition on colour recall; adults in RG incidental condition did worse than in the 
corresponding intentional condition. The trend was somewhat simpler in the Me 
condition, with greater age leading to greater levels of colour recall, regardless of 
encoding condition. 
The fact that (i) the performance of the adults differed from the seven and nine year 
olds, that (ii) intentional colour recall was more accurate than incidental, and that 
(iii) colour recall was more likely to be above chance in the Me than the RG 
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condition, indicated an interaction between age, encoding condition and colour of 
stimuli, and this was indeed what was observed in the results. So why did these 
differences occur? The results of Expeliment 1 suggested that the type of stimuli 
that a participant is shown, in this case whether only red and green pictures or 
pictures of a greater number of colours, has an effect on colour recall, if not on 
encoding (e.g. Light & Berger's, 1974 'fortuitous conjunctions'), then in recall 
(Belli, 1988). 
In short, the main analysis of Experiment 1 showed differences between encoding 
conditions, ages and type of colours, and therefore provided little support for the 
idea that colour memory is an automatic process. These results cOll·espond to the 
findings of Light and Berger (1974, 1976), Park and James (1983) and Park and 
Mason (1982) in that neither children nor adults have appear to have good 
incidental recall for colour. However the differences between the encoding 
conditions in this experiment were smaller than those observed for either the adulL'i 
in Park and Mason, or the children in Park and James, and both the nine year oids 
and adults in the MC incidental conditions recalled more colours correctly than 
predicted by chance. 
Although Experiment 1 had a similar procedure to Park and James and Park and 
Mason, recall for colour was much better in the present study. This difference may 
have been the result of particular combinations of stimulus features. Colour 
memory appeared to be affected by the way in which the attributes of a picture (e.g. 
item and colour) are linked; to use Hale & Piper's (1973) terminology, whether 
colour is 'bound' to an object (unitary), or whether it is a background feature (non-
unitary) . The most salient difference between the Park and Mason and Park and 
James and Expeliment 1 was in the type of stimuli used, and this seems a possible 
explanation for the obselved differences in the results. The stimuli used by Park 
and James and Park and Mason were a series of coloured pictures presented on 
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same-colour backgrounds which may have led to difficulties in combining picture 
and colour effectively. In contrast the stimuli used in Experiment 1 were a selies of 
coloured pictures presented on a white background. According to Hale and Piper's 
theory, such stimuli might have permitted easier combination of item and item-
colour. 
To summarise, differences were observed in performance of different age groups, 
with greater age strongly associated with greater performance, and differences in 
performance across encoding conditions, with intentional encoding of colour 
leading to better performance than incidental encoding. Neither of these findings 
would be predicted if colour memory was an automatic process, as Hatwell (1995) 
proposed. Thus the results of this experiment support the findings of Park and 
James (1983) and Park and Mason (1982), that memory for colour is an effortful 
process. 
When omission elTors were excluded from the analysis, better recall for colour was 
observed, and all groups (with the exception of adults in the RG condition) did 
better than chance. In this analysis, recall for colour also approached the high levels 
noted by Hatwell (1995), althollgh unlike Hatwell's results, in Experiment 1 there 
was an effect of encoding condition on colour recall, with intentional recall 
exceeding incidental recall. Participant age had no effect on colour recall when 
omission errors were excluded, however recall was again intluenced by the range 
of colours of the stimuli. 
If we are to examine why sllch superficially similar expeliments (Hatwell, 1995; 
Park & James, 19X3 and Park & Mason, 1982) produced such different results 
then each aspect of the task needs to be investigated. One difference between these 
experiments was in the time for which participants saw stimuli. In the Park and 
James and Park and Mason experiments, participants saw a new stimulus every 
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fiv e seco nds, in the Hatwel! 's study, parti c ipants s aw s timuli for 20 seconds each. 
The foll owin g s tud y, Ex pe rime nt 2, was des ig ne d LO in ves ti gate the efkc l of 
different exposure times on recall for co lour. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT 2 
THE EFFECT OF EXPOSURE TIME ON COLOUR RECALL 
INTRODUCTION 
A difference between Park's studies (Park & James, 1983; Park & Mason, 1982; 
Park & Puglisi, 1985) and Hatwell's (1995) was in the length of time for which 
participants saw each stimulus. In all Park's studies and in Experiment 1, above, 
participants saw each stimulus for five seconds. However in her study, Hatwell 
showed participants stimuli for much longer, 2() seconds. Given this length of 
time, participants in Hatwell's study may have been induced to spend some time 
consciously attending to colour. This increased encoding time may have led to the 
high levels of colour recall in the incidental condition. Some evidence supports 
the existence of such long-term memory processes over short intervals. 
Although several researchers have investigated duration estimates (Friedman, 
1991, 1992; Loftus & Marburger, 1983) or delays on recall (Burt, 1993; 
Cathelwood, 1993; Flin et aI., 1992), including Simmons (1989) who examined 
the effect of different delays on recall for colour, few investigators have 
considered the effect of exposure times on memory and none have investigated 
exposure times with specitic reference to memory for colour. 
As was noted earlier (Chapter 1, p. 55), Light & Berger (1974) looked at memory 
for the colour and case of typewritten words. They concluded that when a word is 
shown to a participant "semantic attributes are tagged for storage first, and then !( 
time permits, incidental attlibutes associated with [the ohject] may also be stored" 
(p. 860, emphasis mine). However Light and Berger did not examine the issue of 
exposure time beyond this general idea, but if they are correct it would he expect-
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ed that longer exposure times will result in better recall. 
Although the greater the time a stimulus is availahle to the perceiver may allnw 
the extraction of more information, there is no reason to believe that it will 
necessarily lead to greater recall. In other words. above a certain threshold, more 
time will allow more perceptual processing, but the perceiver may not necessarily 
use the additional time for that purpose. Von Hippel and Hawkins (1994) 
conducted a study which investigated implicit memory and word comple tion. On 
the basis of their results, they concluded that once enough perceptual processing 
has occurred to allow recognition of a stimulus, the perceiver may either engage 
in further perceptual processing to extract meaning. or cease attending altogether. 
Therefore increased exposure time may lead to diminishing returns in perceptual 
memory tasks. In their study they observed that increases in exposure time led to 
increased memory for object features (word case). hut not increased conceptual or 
semantic memory. Extrapolated to Experiment 2, these results would mean better 
recall for colour with increased encoding time, as colour is a perceptual reature. 
The role that time plays in colour recall is unclear, and the role is made all the less 
clear by the fact that many studies have used cnI.our as a tool to examine 
particular aspects of the memory process rather than focusing on cnlour per se, 
and that some researchers investigated delays. and others ex amined exposure 
times. 
In the following experiment the colour recall of st!vt!n year olds, nine year olds, 
and adults was tested for a series of pictures which they saw for three periods of 
time. This t!xpt!riment examined whether the dirrt!r~nces in colour recall ohserved 
by Park and James (1983) and Park and Mason (l982) and Hatwell (1995) were 
due to differences in stimuli exposure time. Participants in Experiment 2 were 
shown stimuli for five and 20 second intervals (as in Park & Mason and Hatwell, 
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respectively), as well as an intermediary, 12 second, period. It was predicted that 
greater exposure time would lead to greater recall for colour. 
METHOD 
Partici pan ts 
Three age groups of participants were tested in this study, 28 seven year olds 
(mean: 7;2; range: 6;1 1-7;5), 28 nine year olds (mean: 9;2; range: 8;9-9;5), and 28 
adults (mean: 22;6; range: I ~;2-29;(). Participants came from similar 
hackgrounds to those in Experiment 1. All participants had nOJ1nal or corrected-
to-normal vision. 
Stimulus Materials 
The acquisition stimuli were 13 single-colour line-drawings taken from the set of 
red and green stimuli used in Experiment 1. The recognition stimuli were 21 
hlack and white pictures, which consisted of copies of the 13 acquisition stimuli 
and eight distracters. All stimuli were hound into a hook so that only one stimulus 
could he viewed at a time. There were three sets of exposure times for the stimuli. 
Since there was a smaller numher of pictures to recall in Expeliment 2, the ratio 
of distracters to acquisition stimuli was decreased to reduce the chance of 
participants recognising a picture cOITectly hy guessing. 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment had a mixed measures design, with encoding condition and age of 
participants as independent variahles, and, to control for individual differences, 
exposure time was a repeated measures valiahle. An equal numher of participants 
from each age group was assigned to the dille rent encoding conditions. Like 
Expeliment 1. one group was given intentional encoding instructions for colour, 
and the other incidental encoding instructions. Again like Experiment 1, in the 
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final recall test, participants were tes ted for their memory of hoth colours and 
objects regardless of encoding condition. Participants were tested individually. 
All participants were pre-tested. ParticipanL<; assigned to the intentional condition 
were shown four acquisition pictures (which were not drawn from the larger set of 
stimuli used in the main part of the experiment) at 10 second intervals and were 
asked to remember both the pictures and their colours. Colour was not mentioned 
to participants in the incidental condition. Participants named the pictures as the 
experimenter turned through them. Following this , the participants talked to the 
experimenter for one minute before an item recognition tes t. In the item 
recognition test, the four OIiginal stimuli were replaced with four identical black 
on white line drawings and also two previously-unseen distracter pictures. The 
experimenter turned through all the stimuli, asking the participants if they had 
seen the item before, and noting their responses . Participants assigned to the 
intentional condition were also asked if they could rememher the colours of the 
acquisition items they had recognised. The pre-test was then conducted a second 
time, with different pictures. All participants appeared to understand the task by 
the end of the pre-test. 
In all but two important respects the procedure for the main ex periment was the 
same as for the pre-test. First, after he ing given the encoding instructions 
appropriate to their experimental condition (i.e. either intentional or incidental 
with respect to colour) participants were presented with an array of red and green 
pictures that they had to remember, though this time the array consisted of 13 
pictures rather than four. Second, and most importantly. the amount of time 
participants had to look at each stimulus picture was varied: rather than seeing 
each picture for 10 seconds as they had in the pre- test, participants saw pictures 
for either five. 12 or 20 seconds each (although the first stimulus was shown for 3 
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seconds). The time limit for each picture was randomly pre-determined before 
testing began. 
After a three-minute break where they again talked with the experimenter, the 
memory of participants for stimuli-colour was tested. Partidpants were shown 
black and white copies of all 13 acquisition items, and nine distracter pictures 
interspersed randomly throughout the acquisition items. Recall for item and 
colour of the stimuli was tested regardless of the original instructions. After 
participants in the incidental condition saw the final recognition stimulus, they 
were asked if they had made any attempt to rememher the ohject colours, none 
admitted to having done so. 
RESULTS 
The data were analysed in several ways. First, whether or not participants 
remembered having seen an object previously (item recognition data), and 
second, whether or not they could rememher the colour of the object depicted 
(colour recall data). Two analyses were conducted on the colour recall data, in the 
first of these 'don't know' (omission) responses were treated as incorrect. In the 
second analysis, omission responses were excluded from the data. The 
proportions of correct versus incorrect item recognition and colour recall data 
were also compared, as well as the proportions of commission and omission 
errors for age, encoding condition and time. 
Item recognition data 
Item recognition data were analysed with a three factor, ~ (age) x 2 (encoding 
condition) x 2 (time), mixed measures ANOY A, with repeated measures on the 
time variable. 
<)4 
Item recognition was good in hoth encoding conditions (see Tahle 3.1). All 
groups recognised more than 90% of the acquisition stimuli correctly. Encoding 
condition did not intluence item recognition, F (l, 7X) = L.65, p>O.05 . Participants 
in the incidental condition (0.98) recogni sed sti muli as well as those in the 
intentional condition (0.96) . There was an effect for age, F (2 , 78) = 4. J 9, pdU)5, 
although the adult participants (0.99) scored similarly to the nine year olds (0.97), 
though higher than the seven year olds (0.95 ; Tukey HSD, p<O.(5). 
Table 3.1 Proportional item recognition scores in Experiment 2 hy age grou p, 
time and encoding condi tion t 
A~e Grnlll2 Overall Mean 
7 years 9 years Adult 
5 seconds 
Intentional 0.93 (0.1) 0.96 (lUll) l.OO (0.10) 0.96 (0.10) 
Incidental 1.00 (0) O.9g (IUl7 ) J .00 (0) 0.99 (OJ)4) 
J 2 seconds 
Intentional 0.96 (0.11) O.9g (o.!l7) J.()() (0) 0.98 (0.07) 
Incidental 0.98 (0 .07) 0.95 (lUI) O.9g (O.!l7) 0.97 (O.OR) 
20 seconds 
Intentional O.8R (0.10) 0.98 (CUl7) 0 .98 (0 .07) 0.95 (0.12) 
Incidental 0.95 (0.11 ) O.9S (o .!l7) l.OO (0) O.9S (IUl7) 
Overall Mean 0.95 (0.10) 0.97 (CWX) 0 .99 (IUl) 0.97 (1!.O8) 
The time participants had to view each stimulus had no e ffect on item recognition, 
F (2, 78) = 1.46, p>O.05. Recognition for the five-second items (O.9S), the 12-
second items (0.98), and the 20-second items (0.90) all approached ceiling levels. 
t Although some cells have zero variance, most JrIoLkrn theorists accept that pan unetric tes ts are 
robust enough to handle such violations (see IJryman & Cr;uncr, 1')<)7 , pp.l I7-11 R) 
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The interaction between age and time was significant. F (4, IS6) = 2.S4, pdl.OS. 
seven and nine year olds recognised fewer pictures in the 2() seconds condition 
(0.91 and 0.92. respectively) than the adults (O.YY). Neither of the other two way 
interactions were significant (age x encoding condition. F (2.78) = 2.31. p>(UIS; 
encoding condition x time, F (2, IS6) = 2.18. p«U)S). The interaction between 
age, encoding condition and time did not approach significance, F (4, IS6) = 0.17, 
p>O.OS. 
Item recognition errors 
Participants made very few false positives. Out of 84 participants, only four (one 
seven year old and three nine year olds) misidentified distracters as acquisition 
stimuli. All four misidentified a single object each. The rate of false negative 
responses across the different age groups was also very low. however adults and 
nine year olds had the lowest rate of false negatives (each made 22 such errors, 
mean: 0.(6); seven year olds made slightly more false negatives (2Y responses, 
mean: 0.(8). 
Colour recall data 
(i) Chance comparisons 
Chance comparisons revealed that perfonnance was ahove chance in the majority 
of conditions. In all but the five second incidental condition, adults performed 
above chance levels. In the 12 seconds and 20 seconds conditions, the 
performance of the nine year olds in the intentional condition was above chance, 
but their incidental colour recall was below this level. This u·end was reversed for 
the seven year olds, whose colour recall was ahove chance in the incidental 
conditions. but not in the intentional conditions (Wilcoxon signed rank, p«>.OS or 
greater; see Table 3.2). 
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(ii) ANOVA results: Colour recaLL in.cluding omission errors responses (as 
incorrect) 
The colotlr recall data were analysed with a three factor, 3 (age) x 2 (encoding 
condition) x 3 (time), mixed measures ANOY A, with repeated measures on the 
time variable (see Table 3.2). Encoding condition had no effect on the proportion 
of picture-colours that participants recalled correctly, F (1, 78) = 3.37, p>O.05 
(intentional mean: n.77, incidental mean: 0.69). 
Table 3.2 Proportional colour recall scores in Experiment 2 hy age group, time 
and encoding condition, treating omission eJT()l"S as incorrect 
A£e Grou~ Overall Mean 
7 years 9 years Adult 
5 seconds 
Intentional o.7M (0.28) 0.61 (0.22) n. 7 4"1 «(1.:15) 0.70"1 (0.28) 
Incidental (UM (0.20) 0.66 (0.:15) 0.63 «(Uo) (l.()8"1 (030) 
12 seconds 
Intentional 0.71 (039) O.90t (0.14) O.sst (0.24) O.S3t (0.26) 
Incidental 0.77t (0.21) 0.67 (0.:1:1) 0.72"1 (0.27) 0.72"1 (0.27) 
20 seconds 
Intentional 0.67 (0 .27) 'f i 0.7 . (0 .25) 
.~ 0.93 I (0.12) .J.. 0.78 1 <0.21) 
Incidental O.69t (0.25) 0.64 (0.2') o.n t (0.:14) O.68t (0.29) 
Overall Mean 0.73 t (0.27) O.70t ((l.2o) O.77t (O.2X) O.73t <0.27) 
t significantly different from c1uUlce (Wilcoxon signed rank, pdU)5) 
The age of participants did not have an effect on colour recall, F (2, 7R) = 0.93, 
p>(U)5, with the adults (0.77) recalling a similar amount to the seven year olds 
(0.73) and nine year olds (0.70). The amount of time participants were exposed to 
each picture also made no difference to their colour recall, F (2, 156) = 2.22, 
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p>0.05. The mean for colours of pictures that were viewed for 12 seconds was 
0.78, for those seen for 20 seconds, O.7~, and for 5 seconds, 0.69. 
There were no two-way interactions: age x encoding condition, F (2, 156) = 1.75, 
p>O.OS, age x time, F (4, IS6) = 1.80, p>(U)S, condition x time F (2, IS6) = 0.7S, 
p>O.OS. The three-way interaction between age, condition and time, was not 
significant, F (4, IS6) = 0.84, p>O.OS; see Table 3.2. 
(iii) ANOVA results: Colour remll excluding omission errors 
A similar pattern of results was observed when ' don't know' responses were 
excluded from the data. None of the main effects were significant. There was no 
effect for encoding condition, F (1, 78) = 2.86, p>O.OS. The mean for intentional 
instructions was 0.79, and for incidental instructions, 0.72. Age had no effect on 
Table 3.3 Proportional item recognition scores in Experiment 2 by age group, 
time and encoding condition, excluding omission elTors 
A~e Grou~ Overall Mean 
7 9 Adult 
S seconds 
Intentional 0.82t (0.23) 0.61 (0.22) O.74"f (0.35) O.72t (0.27) 
Incidental 0.86t (0.22) 0.69 «US) 0.63 «U() O.Dt (0031) 
12 seconds 
Intentional 0.81 t (0.36) O.90t (0.14) O.8S "f (0.24) 0.86t (0.25) 
Incidental 0.80t (0.22) 0.71 t (0.33) O.77 "f (0.25) O.76t (0.27) 
20 seconds 
Intentional 0.69t (0.29) O. D"f (0.25) O.93t (0.12) 0.78 t (0.22) 
Incidental O.69t «US) 0.64 (O.2X) .L 0.71 1 (0.34) O.68t (0.29) 
Overall Mean (>.78t (0.26) 0.71 t (O.2(i) 0.78 "1 (0.27) O.76t (0.26) 
t significantly different from ch,Ulce (Wilcoxon signed rank, p<ll.(5) 
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colour recall, F (2, 78) = L18, p>(U)S; the seven year olds and adu1ts (0.78), and 
the nine year olds (O.7!), performed equally well (see Table :l~). Exposure time 
did not effect colour recall, F (2, J56) = 2.1\6, p>(l.05 . The mean for stimuli seen 
for 12 seconds was 0.81, followed by the 20 seconds stimuli (0.73) , and the five 
second stimuli (0.72). 
There was an interaction between age and exposure time, F (4, lS6) = 2.S7, 
p<O.OS. Although all three age groups remembered an equal proportion of the 
pictures correctly in the 12 seconds condition, the seven year olds recalled more 
pictures in the five second condition than the other two age groups, and the adults 
recalled more in the 20 seconds condition. 
Neither of the other two way interactions was significant: ag~ x encoding 
condition, F (2, n) = L~O, p>0.05; encoding condition x time, F (2, 156) = 1.14, 
p>O.05. The three way interaction , between age, encoding condition and time, 
was not significant, F (4, IS6) = O.6~ , p>O.05. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of Experiment 2 provided no support for the idea that exposure time 
has an effect on memory for colour. Item recognition approached ceiling levels 
for all ages, and there were no age, encoding or time effects in incidental colour 
recall . The predictions made in the introduction were therefore not supported. 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether differences in exposure time 
(such as those employed by Park & James, 1983 ; Park & Mason, 1982; and 
Hatwell, 1995) led to differences in recall for colour. In the ir studies , Park and 
James and Park and Mason showed participants stimuli for five seconds each and 
found that recall for colour was at chance levels in the incidental condition. 
Hatwell showed participants stimuli for 2() seconds, and found that th~ir colour 
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recall approached ceiling levels. In the present experiment, participants recalled 
picture-colour equally well whether they saw the picture for five, 12 or 20 
seconds. Thus, contrary to expectations, there was no improvement in colour 
recall with increased exposure time - the ditTerences in the results ohserved by 
Park and Mason, Park and James and by Hatwell do not appear to be the outcome 
of differences relating to the time for which individual stimuli were seen. Von 
Hippel and Hawkins (1994) found that increased exposure time led to diminishing 
returns, though there was still a trend for stimuli seen for longer periods to be 
recalled better. The present results did not support this finding, stimuli shown for 
five, 12 and 20 seconds were all remembered equally well. This may he due to the 
fact that stimuli in the present expel;ment were all shown for longer periods than 
in von Hippel and Hawkins' experiment, in which the longest exposure time was 
two seconds. 
No age or encoding main effects were ohserved in Experiment 2, and recall for 
colour was be tter than chance in most conditions, which sugges ts that at least 
some colour information was remembered without effort. Thus the results of 
Experiment 2 appear to support Hatwell 's ideas of colour recall , and two of 
Hasher and Zacks' criteria for automatic processes. However one result which 
de tracts from concluding the existence of automatic processing in memory for 
colour was the observation of an interaction hetween age and exposure time. 
Seven year oids remembered the colours of stimuli shown for five seconds be tter 
than either the nine year olds or the adults, and the adults reca lled more of the 20 
second stimuli. The fact that older participants appeared to use the time more 
effectively may be indicative of age-related metacognitive differences, such as 
those observed by Flavell eta/. (1966). According to Hasher and Zacks ' theory, if 
memory for colour is to be characterised as an automatic process, there should be 
no effect of strategy use on colour recall. 
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The present results have implications for Light ami Berger's (1974) idea that the 
incidental attlibutes (e.g. colour) of an ohject will only be stored if time permits. 
Since time had no effect on the recall of colour information, with participants 
performing as well in the shortest exposure time as they did in the longest. it begs 
the question of how much time participants do need to encode colour attributes 
incidentally. No explanation is offered here. though the five second condition in 
this experiment matches the time for which participants in Light and Berger's 
(1974, 1976) experiments saw the acquisition stimuli. Light and Berger also 
concluded that colour recall was not an automatic process, hut if 20 seconds is 
insufficient to encode the colour of an item. how long is'! 
In Experiment 2 a repeated measures design was used. in which participants saw 
pictures for different periods of time, rather than an independent groups design, 
where participants saw stimuli for five seconds or 12 seconds or 2() seconds. 
These two designs could potentially exert qualitatively different demands on 
participants. If this is true. it may explain the differences hetween the present 
findings and those of Park and Mason (19S2). Park and James (1 98~) and Hatwell 
(1995). For example, participants who see evel)' stimulus for 20 seconds may pay 
more attention to them than if they also saw some stimuli for five seconds as the 
'extra' time available for the 20 second stimuli may seem redundant. 
The results of the present experiment were evidence that there was no effect of 
varying exposure times to stimuli on recall for colour. Thus dillerences in 
exposure times do not appear to be the cause of the divergent results of Park and 
Mason (1982) and Park and James (1983). and Hatwell (1995) . In addition. when 
the results of Experiments 1 and 2 were compared. a clear difference was 
observed. with the performance of participants in Experiment 2 better than those 
in Experiment 1. In other words. the results of Experiment 2 were more 
supportive of memory for colour heing an automatic process . 
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Apart from an interaction between age and exposure time, the exclusion of 
omission errors from the analysis yielded no new main effects or interactions. 
So why did these studies reach such different conclusions about the automaticity 
of colour recall? In addition to exposure time. anothe r di fference hetween these 
studies was in the number of stimuli that participants saw. In Park and Mason, 
adult participants were shown 64 stimuli, and Park and James showed the 
children in their study a total of 24 pictures. In contrast, the children in Hatwell's 
study saw fewer stimuli: the seven and nine year olds in he r expel;ment saw only 
six objects. There was also a difference he tween the numher of stimuli shown to 
participants in Experiments Land 2. In Experiment I , participants had to 
remember 24 stimuli, and in Experiment 2 they had to remember 12. When the 
five second condition of Experiment 2 was compared to the RG condition of 
Experiment 1 (in which all stimuli were shown for five seconds), there was a 
difference in colour recall, with participants in Experiment 2 performing hetter 
than in Experiment 1. These differences in colour recall may have heen due to 
better performance when there where fewer items to r'member. The following 
study, Experiment ~, was conducted to investigate the effect of the number of 
stimuli on colour recall. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENT 3 
THE EFFECT OF ARRAY SIZE ON COLOUR RECALL 
INTRODUCTION 
As noted at the end of Experiment 2, one difference between Park and James 
(1983) and Park and Mason (1982), and Hatwell (1995) was in the number of 
stimuli that participants were shown. Hatwel1used only six shapes, in contrast to 
the 24 pictures used by Park and James, and the 64 pictures used by Park and 
Mason. Hatwell concluded that colour was remembered automatically. There was 
also a difference observed between Experiments 1 and 2, in which participants 
also saw different numbers of stimuli. However, as Hatwell pointed out, because 
of the small number of stimuli, she may have uncovered a similar effect for colour 
encoding as Shadoin and Ellis (1992), who ohserved an 'increased' automaticity 
of location recall when the complexity 01" the task decreased . Even so, in a 
separate study, Hatwell (1995) found no effect or encoding condition on colour 
recall when participants were presented with 10 stimuli to recall. 
Experiment 3 was therefore carried out to determine whether the findings of 
Experiments 1 and 2, as well as Park and Mason (1982), Park and James (1983) 
and Hatwell (1995) studies were due to the effects of the numher of stimuli that 
participants had to recall. In Experiment 3, participants were shown different 
numbers of stimuli. There was a single prediction: incidental colour recall would 
be inversely proportional to the number of stimuli seen. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
There were 84 participants in this study, they included of 28 seven year olds 
(average age: 7;0; range: 6 ;8 to 7;6) , 28 nine year olds (average age: 9;3; range: 
8;10 to 9;9) and 28 adults (average age : 22;5; range : 18;2 to 44;10. Participants 
came from similar backgrounds to those in Experiments 1 and 2. All partit:ipants 
had nonnal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Stimulus Materials 
The acquisition stimuli consisted of two sets of single-colour line-drawings taken 
from the set of red and green stimuli use d in Experiment 1. One se t was 
composed of 6 aC4uisition pictures, and the other o/" 15 pictures. The re were either 
10 or 22 black and white recognition stimuli , depe nding upon which set of 
acquisition stimuli had heen viewed. All stimuli were hound into a hook so that 
only one stimulus could he viewed at a time. 
Design and Procedure 
The experiment used an independent groups des ign with e ncoding condition, age 
of participants and numher of acquisition stimuli as the independent variahles. As 
in Experiments 1 and 2, one group was given intentional encoding instructions for 
colour, and the other, incidental encoding instructions. Within each 0/· these 
encoding groups participants were split into two further groups, one of which saw 
6 aC4uisition stimuli, and the other, 15 stimuli. Again as in Experiments 1 and 2, 
in the final colour recall phase participants were tested for their memory hoth of 
colours and ohjects regardless of encoding condition. 
Othe r than the diffe rence in the numher of stimuli they saw, participants were 
tested and pre -tested identically to those in Expeliment 1. 
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RESULTS 
The colour recall and item recognition data were analysed separately hy means of 
a series of ANOVAs. The RG condition results from Experiment 1 were also 
included in the analysis. Thus colour re<.:all for three numbers of stimuli, six and 
15 stimuli (from Experiment 3) and 24 stimuli (from Experiment 1) was 
compared. 
Item recognition data 
Item recognition data were analysed by a three fa<.:tor, 3 (age) x 2 (encoding 
condition) x 2 (number of stimuli), independent groups ANDV A. Performance 
approached ceiling levels in every wndi tion (see Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1 Proportional item recognition s<.:ores 111 Experiment 3 for by age 
groups, number and encoding condition 
A~e Grou~ Overall Mean 
7 years 9 years Adult 
6 stimuli 
Intentional 0.98 «Ul4) 0.97 «l.OS) I. 00 (0) 0.98 (o.m) 
Incidental 0.99 (0.04) 0.95 (0.01» 0.99 (0.02) 0.9X (O.OS) 
15 stimuli 
Intentional 0.93 (OJ)S) 0.96 «l.OS) 0.99 (0.02) 0.96 (O'(l4) 
Incidental 0.96 (O.!)S) O.9S (O.OS) l.OO (0) O.9S (0.03) 
24 stimuli 
Intentional 0.82 «l.l~) (u·n (O.2fi) 0.93 (O.OX) O.B6 (0. IS) 
Incidental 0.85 (o.mo o. 79 (O . 2~) O.XO (0.21) O.X 1 (0.l7) 
Overall Mean 0.92 (O.OS) 0.91(0.12) 0.95 (O.(l6) 0.93 (0.09) 
Encoding condition had no effect on item recognition, F (1, 150) = 0.32, p>O.05, 
with participants in the incidental groups (0.94) correctly recognising as many 
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previously-seen pictures as those in the intentional conditions (O.9~). There were 
no age differences in item recognition, F (2. ISO) = L.2 I, p>O.OS. The adults 
(0.95) and the seven (0.92) and nine year olus (0.91) all recognised high 
proportions of the pictures correctly. However, the number of stimuli that 
participants saw had an effect on item recognition score, F (2, ISO) = J9.X2, 
pdU)]. Participants in the six-stimuli (O.9~) and the IS-stimuli (0.97) conditions 
recognised more pictures correctly than those in the 24-stimuli conuition (0.84; 
Tukey, pdUH). 
There were no two-way interactions between any of the variables: age and 
encoding condition, F (2, ISO) = 0.80, p>(U)5. age and numher of stimuli, F (4, 
ISO) = 0.21, p>O.OS and encoding conuition and numher of stimuli, F (2. ISO) = 
0.81, p>O.OS . The three-way interaction be tween age . enc()uing condition and 
number of stimuli was not signiticant, F (4, 150) = (1.50, p>(1.05. 
Item recognition errors 
Participants made few false positives, only two participants saiu that they had 
previously seen one of the distracters (one seven year old and an adult in the 
intentional condition, both of whom made a single error). Age had litLIe effect on 
the number of false negatives. Adults were least likely to dismiss a previously-
seen object as novel with a total of 41 incorrect responses (including one 
participant who made 10 false negatives; mean: J .46), followed by the nine year 
olds (66 incorrect responses overall, mean: 2.~(), anu then the seven year olds (69 
incorrect responses. mean: 2.46). 
Colour recall data 
(i) Chance comparison.\" 
With the exception of the seven year olds in the 24-stimuli condition, all 
participants in intentional encoding conditiolls recalled Illore colours correctly 
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than would be expected by chance (Wilcoxon signed rank, p«U)5). Chance 
comparisons revealed a more complex pattern of results for incidental colour 
recall; in the 24-stimuli condition, no age group performed ahove chance, and the 
nine year old participants failed to show ahove-chance colour recall regardless of 
the number of stimuli they saw. Surprisingly, despite having high levels of colour 
recall (0.67), the adults in the 6-stimuli incidental condition did not perform 
significantly above chance levels (see Table 4 .2). 
(ii) ANOVA results: Colour recall including omission. errors (as incorrect)) 
The colour recall data were analysed with a three factor, 3 (age) x 2 (encoding 
condition) x 2 (number of stimuli), independent groups ANOY A (see Tahle 4.2). 
Encoding condition had an affect on colour recall, F (1, ISO) = 23.47, p«J.(ll, 
more picture-colours were recalled correctly hy participants in the intentional 
condition (0.79) than by those in the incidental (0.63). Age did not effect colour 
recall, F (2, ISO = 2.14, p>(U)S, the adults scored 0.75 correct, followed hy the 
seven year olds (0.71) and the nine year olds (0.67). The !lumber of stimuli that 
participants affected memory for colour, F (2,150) = 15.17, p«U)J. Participants 
in the six-stimuli condition (0.79) recalled the same amount as those in the IS-
stimuli condition (0 .74), though they both had higher colour recall than 
participants in the 24-stimuli condition (0.59; both Tukey p<lUll). 
There were no interactions between either number of stimuli and encoding 
condition, F (2, ISO) = 1.78, p>(U)5, or age and number of stimuli, F (2, J 50) = 
0.58, p>O.OS. However there was an inte raction hetween age and encoding 
condition, F (2, ISO) = 3.17 , p<lU)S. 
Incidental encoding instructions affected the colour recall or the nine year olds 
greatest (0.57; lower than all intentional scores), in comparison with the seven 
year olds (0.69) and adults (0.64) . Adults (O.So) henefited most from intentional 
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Table 4.2 Proportion of colours recalled correctly in Experiment 3 by age, 
number and encoding conditions 
AL:e Grour Overall Mean 
7 years 9 years Adult 
6 stimuli 
Intentional O.83t (0.15) O.90t (0.1 I») O.98t (ON)) O.90t (0.13) 
Incidental 0.81 t «1.O6) O.S8 «U X) 0.67 «1.~0) O.69t (0.18) 
15 stimuli 
Intentional O.76t (O. l~) O.74t (0.1')) O.84t «US) O.78t (0.18) 
Incidental 
.I. 0.70 I (0. 17) 0.62 (11.21) (Umt (0.27) 0.71 t (0.22) 
24 stimuli 
Intentional 0.60 (0.21) O.6St «(1.21) O.76t (0.10) 0.67 t (0.19) 
Incidental O.S7 (0.26) O.S2 (0.14) 0.44 (0.10) O.St (0.19) 
Overall Mean O.71t (0.17) O.67t (0. E») 0.7 s t «u X) 0.71 t (0.18) 
t significantly different from chance (Wilcoxon signed rank , pdUl)) 
Figure 4.1 Interaction between age and encoding condition in Experiment 1 
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instructions, followed by the nine year olds (0.76), and the seven year olds (0.73). 
This interaction is shown in Figure 4.1. The seven year olds were the only group 
not to benefit from intentional instructions relative to their incidental scores. 
There was not a three-way interaction hetwe(;n age, em;oding condition and 
number of stimuli, F (2, 150) = 1.30, p>(W5. 
(iii) ANOVA resu.lts: Colour recall excluding omission errors 
A similar pattern of results was observed when ' don't know' responses were 
excluded from the item recognition data. Encoding condition had an effect on 
colour recall, F (1,150) = 23.12, pdUlI, participants in the intentional (;ondition 
recalled more picture colours corre(;tly (0.84) than those in the incidental 
condition (0.71). Age did not intluence colour recall, F (2, 150) = 1.29, p>O.05, 
Table 4.3 Proportion of colours recalled (;orrectly in Experiment 3 hy age, 
number and encoding conditions 
A~e Grou~ Overall Mean 
7 years 9 years Adult 
6 stimuli 
Intentional 0.86t (0.16) O.90t (O . I~) 0.98 t «).On) 0.91 t (0.14) 
Incidental O.87t (0.09) O.66t (0.10) 0.68 (0.28) O.74t (0.17) 
15 stimuli 
Intentional O.80t (O.IS) O.77 t (o.n) (U5() t (0.1 L) O.8I t (0 .13) 
Incidental O.75t (0.12) O.67 t (0.17) (Un t (o.n) O.76t (0.14) 
24 stimuli 
Intentional 0.81 t (0.13) O.72t (O.ln) .1. (UQ I (O.ln) O.78 t (0.15) 
Incidental 0.61 t (0.1 ()) 0.73 t (0.21) 0.54 (0.17) O.63t (0.18) 
OveraIl Mean O.78t (0.13) O.74t (0.17) O.79 t (O. IS) O.77t (0.15) 
t significantly different from chance (Wilcoxon signed rank, pdUl.'i) 
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the adults and seven year olds (both 0.79) and the nine year olds (0.70) performed 
equally well. Number of stimuli had an effect on colour recall, F (2, I50) = 7.07, 
p<C).Ol , participants who saw six s timuli (0.83) or J 5 stimuli (0.79) recalled more 
than those who saw 24 (0.71; Tukey HSD pdUl J). 
None of the two-way interactions approached significance: age x e ncoding 
condition, F (2, ISO) = l.4S, p>O.OS, age x numher of stimuli, F (4, ISO) = l.X5, 
p>O.OS, and encoding condition x number, F (2, 150) = 2.52, p>(l.OS). 
However, there was a three-way interaction between age, encoding and number, F 
(4, ISO) = 3.S3, pdUll ; see Figure 4.2. With the exception of the nine year olds, 
colour recall was generally better in intentional than incidental conditions, and 
better when few s timuli had to be rememhered. Although their perf0ll1lanCe 
Figure 4.2 Interaction between age, number of stimuli and encoding condition in 
Experiment 3 
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resembled the other age groups in the six-stimuli condition, the colour reca)] of 
the nine year old group was constant across both number and ~ncoding 
conditions, and overall they performed poorest of the three age groups. 
DISCUSSION 
In Experiment ~, the number of stimuli participants had to rememher had an 
effect on the accuracy of their colour recall. Memory for colour was better when 
participants had only six or 15 items to remember, when compared to their recall 
for 24 items. Therefore a factor in the differences hetween Park and James' 
(1983), Park and Mason's (1982) and Hatwell's (1995) findings appears to be the 
result of the number of pictures or objects that their participants had to remember. 
Thus, similarly to the findings of Shadoin and Ellis (1992), the results of 
Experiment ~ indicated that when the task was simplified, the performance of 
participants better-resembled an 'automatic' process. This indicated that memory 
for colour may not be effortless. There was also an effect of encoding condition, 
with participants recalling more in the intentional than the incidental condition. 
However in Experiment 3 there were no age differences in colour recall; this 
finding was similar to Hatwell (1995), who also found no effect of age on the 
colour memory of the seven and nine year olds she tested. This result therefore 
supported one of Hasher and Zacks' (1979) principles, that automatic processes 
are ones which are invaliant with age. Nevertheless, the fundamental requirement 
for automaticity is that there should be no elTecl of encoding instructions. The fact 
remains that varying the encoding instructions in Experiment 3 did have an effect 
on colour recall, this sustains Park and James' (19~3) and Park and Mason's 
(1982) conclusions about the lack of automaticity in recall for colour rather more 
than Hatwell's automaticity conclusion. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION OF EXPERIMENTS 1-3 
Three experiments were conducted to (i) examine the enet.:ts of v~lIiollS fat.:tors on 
colour recall, and (ii) to investigate whether t.:olollr memory is an automatic 
process. Previous researchers have debated whether colour memory is an 
automatic process, some researchers (Light & Berger, 1974,1976; Park & James, 
1983; Park & Mason, 1982) have conduded that rememhering object colour is a 
process which requires cognitive effort, and as sllt.:h t.:annot be conceived of as 
automatic, in Hasher and Zacks' (1979) terms. Other researchers (Hatwell, 1995; 
Pashler, 1994) have concluded that colour reca ll can he good under certain 
conditions. Experiments I, 2 and 3, were the refore also designed to examine why 
researchers have reached such different conclusions regarding the nature of colour 
memory. 
In particular, these studies were conducted to rind out why the results of Hatwell 
(1995) differed from those of Park and Mason (1982) and Park and James (1983). 
There were a number of differences between these latter three studies which were 
examined in Experiments 1-3. The main differences between the experiments 
were in the range of colours (Ex periment 1), how long participants saw each 
picture (Experiment 2), and in the numher of stimuli eac h participant saw 
(Experiment 3). Experiments 1-3 all had separate intentional and incidental 
encoding conditions. 
Before the results of Experiments 1, 2 and 3 are summarised, I shall recap the 
predictions which must be fulfilled, according to Hasher and Zacks (1979) and 
Hatwell (1995), for colour ret.:all to be t.:nnsidercd an automatic prot.:ess. First, 
there should be a large proportion of picture colours correctly recalled regardless 
of encoding condition, that is, intention to ret.:all colour should not improve 
memory for colour relative to conditions when there is no intent to ret.:all t.:olouL 
Second, there should be no ditTere nt.:e in recall for colour across the age range: 
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Hasher and Zacks said that automatic processes are innate and as such there 
should be no effect of learning on colour recall. Third, altering the appearance of 
the stimuli (for example, by increasing the range of colours participants have to 
recall, as in Experiment 1) should have no effect on colour recall. 
In Experiment 1 there were effects of age, encoding condition and number of 
colours, though these differences were smaller than those ohserved by Light and 
Berger (1974, 1976), Park and James (1983) and Park and Mason (1982). Chance 
comparisons revealed that the RG stimuli were remembered little better than 
chance, and those in the MC condition were recalled be tter than chance. These 
findings do not support the idea that memory for colour is automatic. However 
colour recall for the MC stimuli approached neither the high levels predicted by 
Hatwell , nor even the levels observed for the RG stimuli. 1n Experiment 1, 
increasing the range of colours from two (RG condition) to six (MC condition) 
decreased accuracy. None of these results would be predicted if memory for 
colour was an automatic process, since if colour was encoded without effort the 
memory trace would be equally strong regardless of the range of colours. 
Forensically, knowing what effect exposure tim e exerts on recall is of great 
importance. For example, it would be very useful to the police if they knew that 
information viewed for a certain length of time, say 2() seconds, would be recalled 
more or less accurately than if it had been viewed for five seconds or five 
minutes. A logical assumption about the impact of time on colour recall would be 
that so long as an item is viewed for enough time to register, the likelihood of 
recall would be more directly related to the salience of the ohject than to the 
length of exposure, an assumption that was supported hy Brewer and Treyens 
(1981). An alternative view has been forwarded by the U.S. Supreme Court (cited 
in Yarmey & Matthys, 1990), who concluded that the greater the opportunity a 
witness has to become familiar with a suspect, the smaller the chance of 
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misidentification, in other words, exposure time outweighs salience. Given this 
debate, it is surprising that no researchers have examined the effect of seeing 
items for various relatively short periods of time has on the memorahility of 
information. 
According to the results of Experiment 2, the kngth of time for which participants 
saw stimuli had no effect on recall of stimuli-colour. Stimuli seen for 2() seconds 
were no better-recalled than objects seen for five or 12 seconds. These results are 
therefore at odds with the conclusion of the US Supreme Court (19YO), who 
concluded that greater exposure time leads to greater recall. There are three 
possible explanations for the absence of time effects in colour recall. 
First, participants may have extracted all availahle information from the pictures 
they saw in less than five seconds. This expbnatinn seems unlikely given that the 
scores did not approach ceiling levels in any of the conditions. Second, there may 
have been a 'muddying' of the original object-colour information hy stereotypical 
information, leading to confused recall of the original information (see Davidoff 
& Mitchell, 1991; Simmons, 1989). Although Burt (J 993) argued a hrief delay 
between acquisition and testing may exclude the contextual knowledge which 
biases everyday colour recall, this explanation is plausihle: Belli (19S9) observed 
a typicality effect of colour schema after only 90 seconds. However, since no 
participant in Expel;ment 2 responded with a colour which was not red or green, 
this appeared to rule out the intluence of stereotypical information on colour 
recall (which was, in any case, controlled for by careful selection of acquisition 
stimuli, see also p. 115). The third explanation differs only slightly from the first. 
In the 20 second condition, the attention of participants may not have been 
sustained; although they were given extra time to encode information they 
seemed not to have used it for this purpose. This finding supports the conclusion 
of von Hippel and Hawkins (1994), that increased exposure time leads to 
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diminishing returns. The results of Experiment 2 have implications for Light and 
Berger's (1974) hypothesis that the incidental attrihutes (e.g. colour) of an object 
will only he stored if time permits: colour was stored e4uaIJy well, regardless of 
exposure time. therefore the minimum amount of time required to encode colour 
must be shorter than the shortest delay used in Experiment 2. which was five 
seconds. 
As event or object memory is a combination of hoth prior knowledge and 
information acquired after a particular experience of an ohject or event, colour 
blend retrievals seem impossihle to. avoid : even in very young children 
knowledge of the typical colour of an item has been shown to have an effect on 
test performance (Perlmutter. 1980h). Although Experiments 1-~ were rigorous 
tests of eyewitness memory for colour. hecause of the limited array of colours 
used. they may not have simulated the reconstrm:tive memory processes ohserved 
by others (Belli. 1988; Loftus & Palmer, 1974). In Expeliments 2 and 3 all stimuli 
were either red or green. Since participants saw a number of stimuli in these 
conditions. it is possihle that they may have recalled that overall. there were only 
red and green stimuli in the array. hut would still he unahle to link ohjec t and 
colour correctly. If participants were aware of each ;lITay hei ng composed or only 
two colours . even if they felt an aC4uisition picture had heen coloured differently 
they may have resisted giving an answer rather than giving one they knew to be 
incorrect. If participants have a wider array to choose from they might be more 
likely to give an incorrect colour as they would feel less constricted in their colour 
choice. This may be an explanation for the differences in colour recall hetween 
the Me and RG conditions in Experiment 1. 
Expeliment 3 was conducted to examine the effect of number of stimuli on colour 
recall. In Park and Mason (J 982) the adults saw 64 acquisition stimuli , while the 
children in Park and James' (1983) study (and Experiment 1) saw a total of 24 
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acquisition stimuli. Hatwell (1995) presented her participants with just six stimuli. 
If colour memory is a truly automatic process (as defined by Hasher and Zacks, 
1979), there should be no effect of increasing the number of stimuli on colour 
recall. In Experiment 3 the effect of presenting participants with either six, 15 or 
24 stimuli was investigated. There was a single main effect of numher in 
Experiment 3, participants who were shown six or 15 stimuli recalled colour 
better than those who saw 24 stimuli. This result is similar to the finding of 
Shadoin and Ellis (1992) who observed that when the ir location task waS made 
easier, between-groups differences were reduced and perfOlmances hecame ' more 
automatic' . 
The differences between performance in Experiments 1-3 appeared to be due to 
varying the number of objects to be recalled, this was an important difference 
between the studies of Hatwell (1995) and Park and James (1983) and Park and 
Mason (1982). Encoding condition, however, only affected colour recall when 
there were 24 stimuli to remember (Expeliment J). Altering aspects of the stimuli 
(range of colours to be recalled, Experiment 1) also had an impact on colour 
memory. Although exposure time did not mediate recall for colour, given the rest 
of the factors which did intluence colour recall, there is little evidence to indicate 
that colour memory is an automatic process. 
In summary, Experiments 1-3 investigated ability of seven year olds, nine year 
aIds and adults to recall picture-colour under a numher of different conditions. In 
Experiment 1, encoding condition inlluenced recall, with intentional recall for 
colour better than incidental recall, though in Experiments 2 and 3 the affect of 
encoding condition was less consistent. Varying ex p()sure time had no affect on 
memory for colour, although increasing the number of stimuli diel reduce recall 
accuracy. Participant age affected colour recall, and in general adults recalled 
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more than the seven and nine year olds. Therefore the results of Experiments J-3 
failed to satisfy Hasher and Zacks' (l979) automaticity criteria. 
However, one factor which can be considered when comparing studies is in the 
fonn of stimuli participants were presented: th~ differences in memory for colour 
observed by previous researchers may have been as much a result of the stimuli 
they employed in their experiments as a underlying processes operating in their 
participants. A problem with the stimuli used hy Park and James (J 9S:~) and Park 
and Mason (1982). and an explanation for why participants in Hatwell (.1995), 
and in the present studies performed comparatively well. may be related to how 
Park and James and Park and Mason constructed their pictures. Black-on-white 
line drawings taken from the PPVT were pasted onto the left or right hand side of 
index cards before being photographed and developed as a negative white on 
black image. Colour (either red or green) was then added to the picture to produce 
a white line drawing on either a red or green slide. Colour, therefore, may not 
have appeared to have been an integral parl of their items: participants, rather than 
remembering a green jug, may have remembered a jug that was presented upon a 
green background. This may have meant parLicipants had to remember two 
separate pieces of information which had no necessary connection, rather than a 
single fact: a coloured object. 
Colour was intrinsic to the stimuli that Hatwell used (coloured blocks), in a way 
that it was not to Park and James' and Park and Mason's stimuli (coloured slides). 
Hatwell's blocks were discrete objects which 'contained' the colour rather than 
being 'part' of the colour. A similar point has been made by Hale and Piper 
(1973, p. 333) who observed that 
"stimuli whose components are contained within a single unit such as 
coloured shapes, appear to be functionally different from the type of 
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pictorial stimuli ... usually employed to measure children's incidental 
learning." 
If such a difference between these two categories exists then there is no reason 
why there should not be a similar difference hetween memory for pictorial stimuli 
and actual objects. Hale and Piper's evidence was that there were different 
developmental trends for recall of these two types of information: amount of 
incidental learning in Hale and Piper's coloured background task was relatively 
low, did not increase with age and did not correlate with central (i.e. elJortful) 
learning. In contrast, recall for coloured sh;Jpes W;JS ;Jssociated with an increase in 
incidental learning across ages; incidental le;Jrning was also hetter in this 
condition than in the coloured background task. Since the form stimuli took had 
an effect on colour recall, this indicates that recall for colour may not he an 
entirely automatic process. 
Thus, it may be the degree of integration hetween shape and colour that is a 
determinant in recall of item colour (Davidoff & Mitchell, 199~; Hagen, J 967). 
The difference between item recognition and colour recall scores may be 
indicative of colour being functionally separate from shape (Davidoff & 
Mitchell): colour detail may be represented in more than one code (i.e. verhal or 
pictorial). However to test this more accurately, colour recall would need to be 
tested under item recognition conditions, that is, participants would have to 
choose which of two coloured pictures had heen seen hefore. Previolls researchers 
have demonstrated the dirticulty of recalling the colours 01' ohjects it' these ohjects 
are difticult to differentiate from their backgrounds, especially if the hackground 
is not white and the object is white (as in the stimuli used by Park & James, 1983; 
Park & Mason, 1982), or if there is a lack of spatial separation he tween the central 
and incidental components (Hale & Piper, 1973; Wilton, 1989). These are all 
areas which require further research, ;Jnd in addition a direct comp;Jrison hetween 
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different stimuli using a repeated measures design may clarify the relative 
contributions of vmious factors to memory for colour. 
In conclusion, although exposure time did not m~diate recall for colour, given the 
rest of the factors which did intluence colour recall, it is difficult to concur with 
Hatwell, that recall for colour is a quasi-automatic prm;ess. However participants 
in Expeliments 1-3 had only to recall a series of coloured pictures, and a different 
pattern may exist in recall for colour if participants are asked to recall objects (see 
Expeliments 5, 7 and 8). 
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CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENT 4 
EFFECT OF PROMPTS ON COLOUR RECALL 
INTRODUCTION 
Researchers have found age differences in several aspects of eyewitness and general 
memory perfonnance. One of the most consistent findings is that of age differences in 
free recall. Although free recall typically produces very accurate responses regardless 
of age, adults tend to recall a greater amount of information than older children, and 
older children usually recall more information than younger children (Cole & Loftus, 
1987; Kobasigawa , 1974). However age, jJer se, does not appear to preclude an 
accurate description of events (Goodman & Reed, 19~6; Loftus & Davies, 1984; 
Malin et ai., 1979). Rather than young children having difficulty in the recollection of 
information, it may actually be the interaction between age and other, environmental, 
factors that effects the testimony of young children disproportionately. Many factors 
may cause children difficulties in telling an adult what happened, including interviewer 
effects (Goodman, Hirschman, Hepps & Rudy, 199J; Moston, 1992), shyness or 
nervousness (Ceci, Toglia & Ross, 1(87) or the novelty of the interview situation 
(Saywitz & Nathanson, 1992). However, an additional factor intluencing the recall of 
children is that of linguistic competence, and because of this free recall alone may not 
be a satisfactory means of obtaining testimony from children, especially when 
interviewing young children (Smith el (1/., 1987). 
If children do not have appropriate language terms to descrihe their memories then 
their eyewitness descIiptions could be both less comprehensive and less accurate than 
those of adults (Saywitz, 1989; Saywitz, Jaenicke & Camparo, 199(), in Saywitz & 
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Snyder, 1993). Methods aimed at gelling children to report more information have 
focused on different ways of questioning (Hutcheson, Baxter, Telfer & Warden, 
1995; Porter et uf., 1995). However the problem with this approach is that there is an 
increased risk of leading children to provide particular infonnation as any factually-
based question must contain information, and some of this may be new to the 
interviewee. For exampk if a child is asked ahout the colour of a man's jumper, she 
may infer there was a man present, regardless of whether she could actually remember 
one. As an alternative to fact-based questions, researchers have examined ways of 
enhancing children's recall without distorting it through the use of props. Props or 
non-verbal cues may be useful aids to help children recall infOlmation and/or facilitate 
communication by reducing the verbal skills required to convey this information (Price 
& Goodman, 199(); Wilkins et (Ii., J 991). Props have been used successfully in many 
contexts. For example, Getz et (/1. (1984) found that giving children props (toys and 
other objects) to help with social problem solving (like wanting a toy another child is 
using) led to the generation of 63% more solutions compared to when participants 
were tested with pictures. 
A clear problem exists with respect to the use of props as memory aids in eyewitness 
situations. There maya trade-off between the need to give children as much support as 
possible for their statements, while at the same time trying to ensure that they report 
only what they saw, without embellishment, just like leading questions, inappropriate 
cues may 'suggest' information to young children (King & Yuille, 1987). Several 
researchers have attempted to determine the most productive ways of supporting the 
recall of infonnation by witnesses, as well as discovering whether particular methods 
achieve improved recall at the expense of accuracy. This research has continued 
despite some misgivings about the possihility of props giving rise to false or 
'embellished' reports from children (see Boat & Everson, 1993) or an increased num-
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ber of errors (Sahlins, 1976; Saywitz, Goodman, Nicholas & Moan, 1989). 
Several investigations into the usefulness of verbal and non-verhal prompts and cues 
have been conducted. These have included the Cognitive Interviewing Procedure 
(Geiselman & Padilla, 1988), the Step-Wise Interview (Yuille et ai., 1993), a 
combination of visual cues and preparation (Saywitz, Snyder & Lamphear, 1990), 
non-verbal contextual cues (e.g. environmental re-instatement, Smith, 1986; Smith & 
Vela, 1992) and non-verbal props, such as anatomically correct dolls (Goodman & 
Aman, 1990), or model rooms (Wilkins et o/., 1991). 
From the perspective of interviewers, such as the police and social workers, young 
children are a difficult group with which to work because of their language-related 
limitations. Wilkins et al. (1991) tested three and four year olds for their recall of an 
episode in which a clown came into their nursery. They found verhal prompts led to 
75% and 40% improvements in the amount recalled hy the older group and younger 
group respectively; but the prop (a model of the nursery) increased recall hy 2{)()% in 
both age groups, due largely to better recall of peripheral items. The three year olds in 
the prop condition reported as many items as the four year olds in the verbal prompts 
condition. Props thus helped young children remember without leading them to 
provide particular answers. such as if they were asked specific questions. Similar 
facilitatory effects were observed by Price and Goodman (J99()) with two and a half, 
four, and five and a half year olds. 
O'Callaghan and D' Arcy (1989) examined the effect'> of a model prop on the recall of 
a short film by four year olds. They found that when props were lIsed both free recall 
and correct answers to direct questions improved. How~v~r accuracy ()f free recall 
was reduced by the addition of props. Th~ addition of props tn the direct questioning 
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condition caused no decrease in accuracy compared to direct ljuestioning without 
props. O'Callaghan and 0' Arcy 's (1989) study illustrates the chief problem in th~ use 
of props and prompts. On the one hand, recall was improved , hut on the other, at least 
when props were used along with free recall, there was a corresponding fall in 
accuracy (similar tindings were ohserved hy Saywitz el ul., 1999). O'Callaghan and 
D' Arcy concluded props should therefore be used whenever direct ljuestions are 
asked. Though these results have yet to be replicated, at the very least their results 
indicate a strategy involving a combination of methods may be a fruitful one. 
In a selies of experiments which investigated the effects of different various cues on 
recall, Pipe, Gee and Wilson (1993) tested the memory of children for a hrief 
interaction with an adult 'magician '. In thei r first study (Wilson & Pipe, 19X9; in Pipe 
et ai., 1993) found props were more effective than verhal cues: children in an ohject-
cue condition recalled more information correctly. ]n a second study, Pipe, Gee & 
Wilson (1993, Study 2) found cues had no effect on accuracy, and concluded that they 
"may not only be useful , they may also he a safe means of facilitating recall" (p. 37). 
Pipe et at. also found that props did not need to he exact re plicas ot· the original 
objects. Objects which were related, though not identical , to the originally expelienced 
objects also improved recall and did not lead to any decrease in accuracy. However in 
a later study, Gee and Pipe (1995), found that props increased inaccuracy when the 
delay between testing was long (10 weeks). Thus physical cues can promote recall , 
especially in comparison to verhal cues but are best used soon aner the event. These 
results provide support for the conclusions made hy Wilkins et at. (1<)<) I ). 
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Use of props for colour recall 
McKelvie et af. (1994) outlined the theory which unde rpins the provision of colour 
props. Paivio 's (1971) imagery-mediation hypothesis states that a stimulus drawing 
(e.g. yellow chair) will help cue recall of a previously seen response ohject (e.g. 
yellow banana) si nce common e lements (e .g. 'yel lowness ' ) help cue memory. 
Therefore if participants are provided with an array or colours, they may he prompted 
to remember object colour. In fact. Ostergaard and Davidoff (l9g5) found that the 
reverse was true. when they gave participanLIi a colour, it helped them to name objecLIi. 
Ostergaard and Davidoff (Ex periment 1) found a unidirectional facilitation effect, 
colour facilitated object naming , but object naming did not facilitate colour naming. 
Therefore, providing participants with a colour chal"l may possihly he lp them recall 
objects they had not mentioned. However, Ostergaard and Davidoff (Ex periment 2) 
found that though naming was aided by colour information, with normally-coloured 
stimuli named faster than black and white or atypically coloured stimuli, there was no 
affect on item recognition performance, perhaps because item recognition is an 
automatic process (Hasher & Zacks, L 979). Ostergaard and Davidoff suggested that 
coloured objects are named faster than achromatic ones hecause objects are intemally 
represented as a seIies of attributes, one of which is colour. As colour can he accessed 
either directly by the physical colour input or by some categorical form of it (such as 
colour name retrieval), colour may therefore prime ohject names. The fact that colour 
facilitated object naming but not item recognition led Ostergaard and Davidoff to 
assume that there was a recombination of ohject identification and name retrieval. One 
prediction that could be drawn from Ostergaard and Davidoff's results is that if 
participants are provided with a series oj" colours, their recall for ohjects with 
associated colours may be improved. 
Vygotc;ky (1929) argued children first make use of ex ternal instruments availahle and 
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then shift to internal ones based 011 speel:h. Leont'ev (J 932) gave participants a task 
which involved them answering quesions about the colours of items (e.g. 'What 
colour is the sea'!'), a rule of this task was that participants could not use the same 
colour for than one 4uestion. Leont' ev found that children as young as eight could use 
the coloured cards to help them rememher which colours had heen used, however 
more recent researchers who have condul:ted replications of this study have suggested 
that five year olds can henefit from instruction in how to lise the canis (van der Veer, 
1994). Both Leont'ev and van der Veer demonstrated that, as Vygotsky suggested, 
children can make use of external instruments to accomplish tasks successfully. It is 
unclear whether children even younger than rive can use ext 'mal instruments (in other 
words, props) to aid their perfol1TIance in more complicated and realistic tasks. 
The prop used in Experiment 4 was constructed as a means of supporting colour 
recall, in Vygotsky's (1929) terms, this was an external instrument. Colour recall is 
important from an eyewitness point of view: cars involved in hit-and-run accidents 
may be remembered in tenTIS of their colours, descliptions of criminals lIsually make 
mention of clothing, skin and hair colour (Baddeley, 1993). Few researchers have 
investigated colour memory from an applied viewpoint (though some have included 
questions on colour, e.g. Christianson & Hlibinette, 1993; Parker et (//., 1986; see 
Chapter 1, pp. 52-53), and only a few researchers have looked at the colour memory 
of children younger than school age (Bushnell et a/., L984; Catherwood, 1993; 
Davidoff & Mitchell, 1991; see Chapter 1, pp. 37-40). 
The ideal prop is one that improves recall, but which dnes not reduce the accuracy of 
recall, relative to someone who is not given a prop to use. As props allow children to 
show, rather then say, information, they also reduce the linguistic demands of free 
recall. Such cues may therefore augment the limited verhal skills of younger children, 
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but be redundant for older children (Leont'ev, 1~12; Smith et (JJ., 1~87). In 
Experiment 4 pre-school children were tested with a prop constructed to aid colour 
recall. Testing took place a day after the acquisition event, since 'best practice' of both 
the police and social services dictates that witnesses be interviewed within 24 hours of 
exposure to an event. The children who were given the prop to lise were expected to 
remember more colours correctly than those who were not given the prop. 
METHOD 
Participants 
All children in Experiment 4 were more than fOllr years of age, as a group of three 
year olds who were pilot tested had found hoth the games and the recall session too 
difficult. Forty pre-schoolers (average age: 4;6 range: 4;0-4; II), who attended state-
funded nursery schools participated in the study. The children were assigned to two 
conditions, each of which included J() boys and j() girls. In the prop condition, 
children were given a card covered in different colours to help their recall for colour, 
in the control condition, the children were not given the colour chart. 
Stimulus Materials 
Twelve ohjects which were recognisahle to pre-schoolers were chosen as stimuli. 
These were, a comb (yellow), phone (green), hal (white), pen (yellow), cup (black), 
bowl (green), jar (red), book (orange), peg (blue), bag (white), ball (blue), and a sock 
(red). Each object-colour was not one commonly associated with the ohject (see 
Appendix A). With the exception of black and orange which appeared once each, the 
other colours were all represented twice within the 12 ohjects. 
As the aim of the expeliment was to discover whether a colour prompt chart was an 
effective means of eliciting colour recall. the extent of the colour-telm knowledge of 
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the pre-schoolers was assessed. The expeIimenter initially attempted to get the children 
to tell him all the colours they knew (i.e. a production task) hy asking 'Can you tell me 
all of the colours that you know?'. but he had to change to a naming task (pointing at 
different objects and asking, 'What colour is that'!'). This alteration to the pre-testing 
procedure was made because, in several cases, children failed to respond with even a 
single colour term when asked which colours they knew. 
The colour chart that was given to children in the prompt condition was a 60cm x 
30cm piece of grey card with nine equally-sized areas of paint covering most of its 
area. The areas of paint consisted of all the colours used for the objects (hlack, white, 
blue, green, red, yellow, orange) as well as an additional two colours (pink and 
brown) which were distracters. The distracters were included to (a) reduce the 
possibiJity of children choosing the C01Tect object colour hy chance. and (h) so that the 
number of colours from which children in the experimental condition could choose 
was equivalent to the range of colours that the children in the control condition could 
name. 
Design and Procedure 
All children were tested individually in a quiet space away from their dassroom. 
Before testing. the experimenter spent some time in the nursery so that the children 
could become familiar with him. A few days before the main study they were all 
formally tested to ascertain the nlllnber of colour terms they knew (see ahove). 
The acquisition phase of the main study was identical for all children. regardless of 
condition. The experimenter led individual participants into the experimental room 
where he asked them to take a seat at a table and help him sort through the pile of the 
12 stimulus items (see above). The children played two games. a sorting and a shape-
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matching task. In the sorting task, the children were asked to sort the objects on the 
basis of size (large or small) into two hoxes, a large one and a small one. When they 
had completed this task to their satisfaction, they moved on to the next task. In the 
matching task, children took the objects out of the boxes and matched them with their 
outlines, which had been drawn on to a large board (see Figure 5.1). No mention was 
ever made of colour, and the children were not given any indication that they would be 
asked to recall any part of the event. The stimulus event lasted five minutes. 
The children were divided randomly into two conditions for the recall phase of the 
experiment, recall was tested 24 hours after the acquisition pahse. The procedure for 
these conditions was identical except that partic.ipants in th~ prompt condition were 
given a colour chart to help recall the colour of objects. The experimenter explained 
that the chart could he used to help them remember colours and that if they did not 
know the name of a colour they could point to it on the card. Children in the control 
condition did not have a prompt card. 
Recall of the event was examined the next day. During testing it was stressed to the 
children that, rather than guessing an answer, they should say 'I don't know' if they 
were unahle to remember a piece of information. In the prompt condition the colour 
card was placed in front of the children before they were asked any questions and its 
use explained. All children were first asked a general free recall 4lll~stion, 'Do you 
remember what we did yesterday, when we came to this mom'!', and then they were 
asked a second general recall question 'Can you remember what we played with 
yesterday in this room'?'. 
After the general recall questions, children in both conditions were shown ohjects 
similar to the acquisition stimuli, but painted grey. These recognition stimuli were 
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Figure 5.1 Matching task lIsL'd in Experiment .5 
included as a further prompt to aid object-colour recall and to make the task as simple 
as possible. To demonstrate the relationship of these grey objects to the original 
stimuli, the expelimenter tirst showed the children a r~d and then a grey huilding block 
which he said was just like the first block except for its colour. He then asked the 
children to tell him what colour the first block had been, if the child was still unsure, 
the process was repeated and the relationship explained again. All the children 
appeared to understand this. 
The experimenter then held up each of the 12 grey objects, heginning with the ohjects 
the children had recalled, and told the children that, ' You saw a [e.g. hatJ a hit like this 
yesterday. Can you remember what colour it was then'! ' . Inte rviews with the children 
were carried out individually, and each lasted four minutes. 
Children scored for every object-colour they recalled correctly. For the purposes of 
analysis , chance was 0.11 (i.e. 1/9), this was hoth the number of colours on the 
colour prompt chart as well as the maximum numher of colours that children could 
name. 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analysis indicated there was no difference between the colour recall of 
boys and girls. Independent-groups t tests were conducted tn determine whether 
providing children with a colour prompt card made any difference to their recall of the 
colours of the 12 items. 
Colour recall was good, and children in both conditions remembered more colours 
correctly than would he expected by chance (Wilcoxon, p«Ull). Children in the prop 
condition recalled more colours correctly (mean score of 7 out of 12) than those who 
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did not use the prop (mean score of 5.6). A two-tailed t-test showed that this 
difference approached significance, t=1.76, df=~g, p<O.lO. The scores, as 
proportions, are shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Proportional colour recall scores in Expeliment 4, treating omission errors 
as incon'ect 
Prompt 
No Prompt 
O.5R «(l.lR) 
0.47 (0 .22) 
When 'don't know' responses were excluded from the colour recall analysis, there 
was a difference between the two conditions, t=2.04, dl'=38, pdl.05 (two tailed). 
Participants in the prompt condition (mean score of R.l out of 12) recalled a higher 
number of object-colours correctly than those in the control condition (mean score of 
6.6). The scores, as proportions, are shown in Tahle 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Proportional colour recall scores in Experiment 4, excluding omission 
errors 
Prompt (l.6Y (0 .22) 
No Prompt 0.55 (0.22) 
Overall, the number of times that the children in the prompt condition (mean of 0.1 out 
of 12) and in the control condition (mean of 0.3) conditions made 'don't know' 
responses did not differ, t=1.~8, p>O.05. 
DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 4, pre-schoolers were shown a set of objects which they played with as 
part of sorting and matching games. No reference was made to colour in either of 
these tasks. A day later the children were split into two conditions, children in one 
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condition were given a multi-coloured card to help them recall colours. and the 
children in the other were not. Children in both conditions were given an unexpected 
memory test, which involved recalling the colours of the objects they had seen. In this 
way the children's incidental memory for colour was tested. 
Colour recall was good. Children in hoth conditions rememhered more colours 
correctly than would be expected by chance. This supports findings of researchers 
such as Hatwell (1995) who observed high rates of accuracy for colour recall. 
Researchers who have suggested that colour recall is a poor aspect of memory (e.g. 
Park & James. 1983; Park & Mason, 1982; see also Experiments 1-3, ahove) were 
not supported. however the task used in Exp(;riment4 may have heen easier than that 
used hy Park and James as the children had fewer items to recall. and the various 
recognition objects may have been more easily-discIiminable than two dimensional 
black and white line drawings. 
The provision of the non-verbal colour prompt had an effect on tht: numher of colours 
children could recall. Children who were given the prompt rememhered marginally 
more colours cOlTectly than the children who were not given sllch support. and when 
omission errors were excluded from the data. this effect was strengthened. This 
supports previous research on the effects of non-verbal cues (e.g. Leont'ev, 1932; 
O'Callaghan & D' Arcy, L989; Price & Goodman. 1990). In addition to improving 
colour recall. the provision of the prompt had no effect on accuracy ami in fact led to a 
slight (though not significant) decrease in the numher of 'don ' t know' responses. 
Props did not decrease the accuracy of children when compared to those in the control 
condition. a finding which did not support those of researchers who found a larger 
number of errors when props were used (Sahlins. 1976; Saywitz et (/1 .• 1989). 
111 
Pipe et al. (1993) also found that non-verbal props did not need to he exact replicas of 
the original objects. Object\; which were related, though not identical, to the originally 
experienced objects also improved colour reca ll and did not lead to any decrease in 
accuracy. The prop used in the present study was constructed as an aid to colour 
recall. The fact that the prop improved colour reca ll , may he have heen due to a 
reduction in the verbal or communicative demands on the children, and in consequence 
the prop improved the 'communicative competence' of the children (Saywitz, 19X9). 
The children in Experiment 4 did not have to rememher any ohjects, as they were 
provided by the interviewer, and they only had to reca ll ohject-colour. Resea rchers 
have suggested that the provision of objects may not have had a significant impact on 
their colour me mory, for example , Ostergaard and Davidoff (19X5) fo und a 
unidirectional facilitation effect for object and colour naming: colour facilitated ohject 
naming, but not vice versa. Therefore the colour chart m{/y have had a facilitative 
effect on object recall , if participants had not heen given the objects to he lp prime 
recall. In the following study, Expeliment 5, pre-schoolers lIseo the prop in conditions 
where they had to recall object-colour, though this time they were not given ohjects to 
prompt colour recall. 
EXPERIMENT 5 
PRE-SCHOOLERS' COLOUR RECALL OF A NATURALISTIC EVENT 
In Experiments 1 -~ the processes unde rlying recall for colour, inc1udi ng e ncoding 
condition, time per stimulus and number of stimuli were studied. In Experiment 4 the 
effect of a prop on colour recall was investigated. In the present study, Experiment 5, 
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the ability of participants to remember the colours of an array of objects used in an 
everyday event was examined. 
A number of researchers have investigated recall for colour (Backman et til. 1993; 
Hatwell, 1995; Light & Berger, 1974; Park & James, lY8~; Park & Mason, 1982). 
However, as discussed in Chapler 1, the tasks they lIsed were often artificial ones. 
Few investigators have looked at memory for the colour of items within a more 
naturalistic environment, such as those used in eyewitness experiments, even though 
recall for information fanning part of a naturalistic environment may be different to 
recall for a series of pictures or objects (DeLoache & Todd, 1988; Perlmutter, 1984; 
Rogoff & Mistry, 1990). 
ExpeIiment 5 was devised to test the incidental colour and location memory of a group 
of pre-schoolers for a novel event, in which they helped to make a birthday card for a 
children'S television character: Postman Pat's cat, Jess. Experiment 5 was also 
conducted to find out whether children's recall could be improved by the provision of 
non-verbal memory aids. specifically contextual reinstatement (Dietze & Thompson, 
1993; Smith & Vela, 1992; Wilkinson. 1988) and a photograph CO' Callaghan & 
D'Arcy, 1989; Wilkins etat., 1991). 
Participants were divided into three different recall conditions. In the control 
condition. participants were tested in a different room from the one in which they 
played with the expelimenter. In a second, same context. condition participants were 
returned to the OIiginal room for testing. In a third condition. participants were given a 
black and white photograph of the original room to prompt recall, though they were 
tested in a different room. In all three conditions participants were given a prompt 
chart to help them recall colour. Colour memory of children was predicted to exceed 
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chance levels, and recall for general information, which included questions ahout the 
location of objects and the aspects of the stimulus event, was also expected to be 
good. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were 3() children (15 boys and 15 girls) who attended a largely middle-
class state-funded nursery. Their mean age was 4;7, and their ages ranged from 4;2 to 
4; 11. Ten children were placed randomly into each of the thre~ retlieval conditions 
(see below), with the proviso that there were five boys and fiv~ girls in each 
condition. All children were pre-tested for their knowledge of the colours used in the 
experiment. 
Design 
The experiment had a 2 (question type) x 3 (recall condition) independent groups 
design. Question type referred to the information participants were asked to recall, 
either object-colour information (colour data), or general information concerning the 
location of objects (,What was in the folder'!') and other information ('Who was the 
birthday card forT). Recall condition had three levels: environmental reinstatement, 
photo prompt and control condition (see helow). 
In all recall conditions the children were supplied with a colour chart, similar to that 
used in Experiment 4, to lessen the load on verhal ahility. ]n addition to containing all 
the colours of the object'> participant" had to recall (while, hbck, hlue, red, green and 
yellow), the colour chart also contained three colours (orange, purple and brown) 
which were distracters. 
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Stimulus Materials and Procedure 
Each child was informally pre-tested for their knowledge of colours hy showing them 
a large piece of orange card painted with hlack, white, red, green, hlue and yellow 
stripes. The expeIimenter pointed to each colour in turn and asked the child to name 
them. All the children passed the pre-test. The stimulus episode followed two or three 
days after the pre-test. 
All children were tested individually. The experim enter led the children into the 
experimental room where they were asked to help make a hirthday card for Jess, 
Postman Pat's cat, a television character well-known to all the children. The 
experimenter asked each participant to name a series of containers, which were a hin 
(hlack), a hasket (yellow) , a shoe hox (hlue), a plastic hag (white), a hollow brick 
(red) and a folder (green). No refe rence was made to these colours during the stimulus 
episode. The containers, which were all of simibr size, were placed around the room 
(see Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2 Layout of containers for stimulus event in Experiment 5 
\1/ 
Key: 
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6. Brick 
7. Box 
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After children had named the containers, they re turned to a central position in the 
experimental room. From this central position, the ex perimenter asked the children to 
go to each container to re trieve particular ohjects from inside them: 'We need the 
[object], I think that the [object] is over there '. These objects were: a yellow card, 
black pencil, green balloon, white envelope, red tape and blue stamp. One of these 
objects was placed randomly in each of the containers. The objects were retrieved in a 
specitic order: first the card, then the pencil, with which the expelimenter wrote on the 
card: 'To Jess, Happy Birthday, from [experimenter] and [child]'. Each child wrote 
his or her own name or helped the experimenter to write it. After this the children 
picked up a present for Jess, an uninllated balloon, then put this, with the hirthday 
card, into a small envelope. The children then s tuck the hack of the envelope down 
with some tape hefore tinally sticking a stamp on the front and posting the envelope in 
a distinctive mail box which stood just outside the experimental room. 
Children 'S recall of the event was examined the next day . In thi s phase of the 
experiment, the children were placed in one of three test conditions. Tn the control 
condition, children were taken to a different room to the one in which they had made 
the birthday card. In the photo prompt condition, the children were taken to this new 
room but were also shown a black and white photograph of the original room, 
showing the central tahle and the containers, which they were told could help them to 
remember what they had done the previous day. In the third, same context, condition, 
the children were returned to the original room for questioning. The room was empty 
apat1 from the central table. 
Question order was randomised. Participants were asked 12 ques tions ahout the 
colour of objects in the room, and 10 general questions not related to colour, including 
six questions about the location of particular ohjects and four about salient aspects of 
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the event, such as 'Who was the birthday card for'!' (see Appendix 5). Throughout 
testing the children were told that, rather than guessing an answer, they should say 'I 
don't know' if they were unable to rememher an item of information. The interviews 
with the children were conducted individually, and each lasted for ahout five minutes. 
RESULTS 
The recall data were analysed to compare performance on the colour and general 
questions, and between the different recall conditions. Preliminary analysis showed 
that the there was no difference in the perfollnance of hoys and girls . 
Recall condition had an effect on memory, F (2, 27) = ~.70. p<O.05. Participants in 
the same context (0.64) and photo prompt conditions (0.60) recalled a similar amount 
of information. and participants in the control cond ition remembered least (OAX ; see 
Table 5.3). The scores of the same context amI control conditions differed (pdU)5, 
Tukey HSD). 
Table 5.3 Proportional recall scores, including omission errors 
Colour General Overall 
Same context 0.61 (O.IX) 0.66 (0.1 X) 0 .64 (O . I~) 
Photo 0.72 (O. IX ) O.4X «() . 13) 0.60 (0 .16) 
Control 0.59 (0 .13 ) (U7 (0.11) 0.48 (0 .12) 
Overall 0.64 (0.16) 0.50 (0.13) 0.57 (0 .15) 
Information type also had an effect on recall, F (I, 27) = 27.~I. p<O.01. Colour 
information (0.64) was rememhered hetter than general information (0.50). There was 
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a significant interaction between recall condition and type of information, F (2, 27) = 
11.75, pdU)l. As can be seen in Figure 53, recall for colour information was hetter 
than chance for all groups (Wilcoxon signed rank, p«U)S), however participants in 
the photo and control conditions did not rememher general information as well as 
those in the same context condition. 
Figure 5.3 Interaction between recall condition and question type 
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A similar pattern of results was observed when omission errors were excluded from 
the data. Recall condition affected recall, F (2, 27) = 4.0 I, p«l.OS. The same context 
(O.6S) and photo (0.62) retrieval led to belter recall than the control condition (0.48; 
p<O.OS, Tukey HSD). Information also effected recall, F (1, 27) = 25.76, p<O.01. 
Colour information (O.6S) was remembered beller than general infonnatinn (0.52), see 
Table 5.4. 
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There was an interaction between recall condition and information type, F (2, 27) = 
12.96, pdUH. Memory for colour information was hest in the photo condition, 
participants in the other two conditions recalled lower levels of colour infollnation. 
Recall for general infonnation was best in the same context cond ition. 
Table 5.4 Proportional recall scores, excludi ng omission errors 
Colour General Overall 
Same context O.C,2 (O . IX) O.C,7 (0 . I IJ) O.C,5 (0 .19) 
Photo 0.73 ((!.IX) 0.51 (0.1 2) O.C,2 (0 .15) 
Control O.C,O (0.13) 0.37 (0 . 11 ) 0.49 (0 .12) 
Overall O.C,5 (0 . 10) 0.52 (0.14 ) 0.59 (0. 15) 
DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 5, pre-schnolers helped the experimenler make a hirthday card for a 
ch ildren's television character. A day later they were tested for their recall of this event 
in one of three retrieval conditions: same context, photo prompt or no prompt 
(control) . Children's memory for two types of information (colour and general 
questions) was tested. 
There was no evidence in this experiment of children having poor memory for colour. 
This finding was in contrast to some previous studies with hoth pre-schoo!ers and 
children of primary school age (Davidoff & Mitchell, J 993; Park & James, 1983), in 
which colour was not well-recalled. The pre-schoolers in Experiment 5 also performed 
better on recall of colour information than they did on general information, even 
though some of these questions involved recall of lm:atinn whic h is assumed to be an 
139 
automatic process (Ellis, 1991; Mandler et a/., 1977). These results therefore support 
those of Hatwell (1995), who concluded that memory for colour, even when it is not 
leamt deliberately, can be accurate. 
Comparisons can be made between the results of Experiment 5 and those of 
Experiments 1-3. Although pre-schoolers were not tested in any of these experiments, 
the incidental MC condition in Expeliment 1 was perhaps most similar to Experiment 
5, because of the array of colours participants had to recall. Recall for colour in 
Experiment 5 exceeded the level of recall ohserved in the MC condition, and matched 
that in the incidental RG condition, despite the possihility of guessing an item-colour 
correctly by chance being much higher in the RG condition (see Chapter 2, p. 80). 
The difference in recall between the MC condition of Experiment L and Experiment 5 
may have been due to the stimuli used in these studies. In ExpelimenL<; 1-3, all stimuli 
were pictures presented singly in books by an experimenter. In Experiment 5, the 
stimuil were real objects which the participants manipulated themselves. The fact that 
the form stimuli had an effect on colour memory has implications for the idea that 
colour recall is an automatic process. If colour is remembered without effort, that is, 
automatically, then recall should be unaffected by the form of the stimuli (see Chapter 
1, p. 39). Since recall for colour was better in Expeliment 5 when the coloured items 
were everyday objects, this means that colour recall cannot be a completely automatic 
process, according to a sHict interpretation of Hasher and Zacks' (1979) theory. 
There was an effect of retlieval condition in Experiment 5. Children in the control 
condition remembered less information than children in either the same context or the 
prop condition, with those in the prop condition performing hest. These children 
perhaps did so weIl hecause of the presence of the stimulus ohjects in the photograph; 
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although the picture was achromatic, the shading of particular objects may have 
provided cues to their colours. 
Although children in the prop condition remembered more colour information, 
children in the same context condition rememhered the most information overall. 
These results support the conclusions of a numher of mher researchers who have 
found that providing children with non-verhal memory aids in the form of props or 
contextual reinstatement facilitated recall (Dietze & Thompson, 1993; Wilkins et aI., 
1991; Wilkinson, 1988). As the same-context condition led to best overall recall, in all 
the studies in this thesis participants were returned to the location in which they had 
originally experienced the stimulus event (in effect, participants in Expelimenls 1-3 
also experienced reinstatement of context). 
Because of the small number of participants that were tested in Experiment 5, the 
conclusions that may be drawn can only be tenuous. In Expeliment5 only a single age 
group of children were tested, so there could he no examination of developmental 
trends in memory for colour. Another study, Experiment 0, was constructed to 
investigate possible age trends in incidental memory for colour in a similar, 
naturalistic, task (i.e. in contrast to ExpelimenL<; 1-3). 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPERIMENT 6 
INCIDENTAL ENCODING OF COLOUR AND LOCATION 
INFORMATION IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS. 
INTRODUCTION 
Experiment 6 was a developmental study based on Experiment 5 and was designed to 
investigate whether the levels of colour recall observed applied to a wider range of 
ages. In Experiment 6, the memory of four, six and nine year olds and adults for 
coloured items presented as part of a story was tested. 
Given the contlicting assertions made with regard to children's memory for colours 
(see Chapter 1. pp. 62-65), several hypotheses were tested which examined the colour 
and location memory of four, six and nine year olds and a group of adults . Like 
Davidoff and Mitchell (1993), Park and James (1983), Park and Mason (1982) and 
Experiments 1-3, colour memory was predicted to be an effortful process, and so 
therefore developmental differences should exist. Previolls researchers of location 
memory have concluded that this process is automatic (Ellis, 1991; Mandler et ai., 
1977; Park & Mason, 1983; though see Naveh-Benjamin , 1987, 1988 for an 
alternative view). In the present study it was predicted that all age groups would do 
well on the spatial component of the task, and that spatial recall would be superior to 
recall for colour. In addition, recall for spatial information was used as a control with 
which to compare recall for colour. If incidental colour recall matched incidental spatial 
recall which is widely cited as an automatic process (see above), then this would 
support Hatwell's (1995) supposition that colour reca ll was also an automatic process. 
Finally, to test Ostergaard and Davidoff's (1985) idea that colour has a facilitatory 
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effect on memory, recall for two different types or ohjec ls was examined: those that 
were easy to differentiate on the hasis of colour (the items of shopping), and those that 
were similarly coloured (the grey fUll1iture), with the predi<.:tion that partidpants would 
perform better on naming the shopping than the fUll1iture as the latter were all the same 
colour (and therefore colour will act as a cue for the shopping). 
Several criticisms of the experiments conducted hy Hatwell (1995), Park and James 
(1983) and Park and Mason (1982) were addressed in this study. First, the prohlem of 
delay. There was a delay of only one minute hefore the adults in Park and Mason were 
tested, in Park and James, the delay was three minutes. Hatwell tes ted recall 
immediately after the acquisition stimuli were presented. All these experiments 
therefore had only a short interval hetween presentation and testing, and this may have 
allowed participant.;; to use rehearsal to improve their performance. 
Additionally, Hatwell (1995), Park and James (19X3) and Park and Mason (1982) 
tested memory for items - words, line drawings of ohjects and geometric hlocks -
within a context that had little or no meaning outside of a memory test. Hatwell told 
the children in her experime nts to explore the ohjel:ts " in orde r to memorise them" 
(p.55). Park and James instructed children that they were "going to see some pictures 
and that they should try to rememher them, as the ex perimente r wanted to see how 
well they could do" Cp. 63). Thus ne ither of these studies can, strictly, he seen as tests 
of incidental memory, and, although they were never intended to he, they were not 
valid measures of children's eyewitness memory for colour (see Chapter 1, p. 52). 
The items used in Experiment 6 were three dime nsional ohjects, like those in 
Hatwell 's study, however in Experiment () the items were presented as part of a story. 
143 
Knowledge of colour words may correlate with overall developmental level. [f so, 
then the failure of children who do not know colour words may not be specifically 
related to colour competency per se. This possihility <.:an be eas ily tested by the 
inclusion of a control task which requires the same general cognitive abilities but 
without drawing on any kind of conceptual representation of colour, such as asking 
children to recall the items used in an experiment. Performance on this <.:an then be 
compared to their perfonnance on the colour component of the task. 
Finally, recall for colour will be examined in the same way as in previous 
experiments, that is, by looking at it both with and without omission errors. However 
in the remaining studies, Experiments 6-8, omission e ITors take on more importance 
than in Experiments 1-3. In Experiments 1-3, an omission error oc<.:urred when a 
participant correctly recognised a picture as having been in the acquisition array but 
was unable to recall the picture's original colour. In Experiments 6-X, hecause 
participants were asked what colours parti<.:ular ohjects were, 'don't know ' responses 
could mean either the participant had forgotlen the oh.ie<.:L's original <.:o)our, andlor had 
forgotten the presence of the object. Therefore in Expeliments 6-8, the analysis with 
omission errors excluded is more consequential since it is an indication of the recall of 
attended objecL~. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Eighty participants were tested, they were divided into four age groups of 20 
participants: four year olds, six and nine year (lIds, and adults. These groups had 
average ages of 4;5 (range: 4;1 to 4;11),6;9 (range: 6;4 to 6;.1 J), 9;0 (range: 8;8 to 
9;3) and 23;3 years (ranges: 19;10 to 25;11). The <.:hildren all attended local state-
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funded nursery and primary schools, the adult group was mainly university students. 
Each group included 10 males and 10 females. 
Stimulus Materials 
A circular model room (diameter 57 em) was constructed (see Figure 6. L) . The room 
contained six pieces of wooden furniture (a table, cooker, bed, bookshelves, cupboard 
and couch) which were all painted grey (to avoid confusion with the coloured items 
used in the experiment, see below). The furniture was placed in the room quasi-
randomly so that there was no obvious pattern or re lationship between the items, and 
the room was circular so that participant" could not relate the furniture to corners of the 
model. Six miniature items (a blue hat. a red book, a green telephone, a yellow ball, a 
white washing-up bowl and a black birthday card) were included in a shopping bag 
carried by a toy bear. 
The colours of the items were selected on the hasis of two constraints. First, the 
colours had to be ones that could be identified hy the even the youngest children. and 
second, the colours were chosen so that they were not colours typically associated 
with those items (see Appendix A). The stimuli were a green telephone. hlack birthday 
cards, white washing-up bowl, blue hat, yellow heach hall, and red hook . 
Pre-test 
The four year olds were pre-tested for their knowledge of colours with a card on 
which were examples of 10 different colours. including the six lIsed in the experiment 
(black, white, yellow, green. red and blue). All the children were able to name at least 
these six colours. Children were pre-tested a minimum of three days hefore they took 
part in the main expetiment to avoid ptiming effects. 
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Design and Procedure 
All participants were tested individually. The children w~re tested in a quiet area away 
from their classrooms, and the adults in their own hOI1l~s. The model was placed on 
the floor, and participants sat on the 1100r dUling the expeliment. Each participant was 
shown the model room, containing the six pieces of furniture, and told that it was 
'Teddy's house'. The experimenter showed a teddy bear going in to the model room 
with a bag, from which he unpacked s ix items of shopping one by one. The items 
were placed on the 1100r in front of the participants. 
The expel;menter picked up and discussed each item for 15 seconds over the course of 
a story about Teddy's shopping Hip (see Appendix C). No mention was ever made of 
item-colour. The objects were taken from the shopping hag, as well as discussed, in a 
different order for each participant. As each item was mentioned it was placed on a 
different pieces of furniture in the model room . There were also three patterns of 
object placement which were designed to avoid common relationships sllch as putting 
the book on the bookshelf (see Appendix D). The whole story lasted three minutes. At 
the end of the story the children went back into their classrooms, and the adults went 
to a different room where they talked infonnally with the expeIimenter. 
Although the youngest group of children were used to having things read to them, a 
'cover story' was necessary for the older children and adults. These participants were 
told that the expelimenter was carrying out a study on children's language and that he 
wanted to get their impressions of a story that they were ahout to hear, asking them to 
consider an appropliate age group for the story. Participants were not told they would 
be given a later memory test. 
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Thirty minutes after they heard the story, participants returned to the experimental 
room. They were shown the model. with the shopping items and the furniture 
removed, and were then given a surprise memory test (see Appendix E). Participants 
first answered two questions to dicit recall of the shopping items and the furniture. 
'Do you remember what Teddy bought at the shops?', and 'Can you remember what 
furniture Teddy had in his room?' . The answers to these two questions will be 
referred to as object recall. After these questions, half the participants in each group 
were asked the colours of the six shopping items, and they were given each piece of 
furniture individually and asked to replace them in the model room. The other half of 
the participants replaced the furniture first and were then asked for the colours of the 
shopping items. The order of the colour questions ami the order in which the fUllliture 
was replaced was randomised. Finally, participants were asked to put the shopping 
items on the pieces of furniture where they had seen them placed during the story. 
Participants scored for every object and colour that they correctly mentioned in free 
and cued recal1. Two separate measures were taken for location recall, with furniture 
replacement measured both in terms of distance from original position (in cm), and in 
tellTIS of correct shopping-fumiture matches (out of a possible six cOITect). 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses showed that there were no effec ts for gender, or for order of 
testing (i .e. whether colour 4uestions or furniture replacement came first). There were 
no effects due to the three patterns of item placemenlused when pUlling the shopping 
items on the fUl11iture. 
Ol~iect recall 
The responses of participants to the questions ahollt what items Teddy had hought and 
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what furniture was in the room were scored for every item of shopping or piece of 
furniture which was mentioned (out of a maximum possible of 12). Table n.l shows 
the mean number of objects which were correctly rt~<.:alled by ea<.:h age group. A one 
factor analysis of variance showed an effect for age, F (3,76) = 47 .64, p<O.05, and 
Tukey HSD tests indicated that the four year olds rememhered fewer objects than the 
other three groups (p<O.05) and that adulL~ rememhered more (p«Wl). 
The various objects were generally well-rememhered (with an average of 74% 
recalled, see Appendix C), the ball and book were remembered best (0.90 and 0.87 
respectively), and the bowl and cuphoard were rememhered least well (0.45 and 
0.61). 
Table 6.1 Mean number of items of shopping and furniture cOlTectly recalled by each 
age group in Experiment 6. The maximum possihle score was 12. 
Age Group Overall Mean 
4 years 6 years 9 years Adults 
mean COiTect __ 6_.1--.:....(o_.5_o.;..} __ 8_. 5~<_O._4(i....;, ) __ {_9 ._7_<;....0_.3_7;....) __ 1_1_.{_1 ;....(0_. 1_').;..) _~g.:..:.3---,-(O.....;.3..:.8..:..)_ 
Only a few participants made errors of commission (i.e. mentioned objects not 
originally present). Of the 80 subjects tested, seven reported items that had not been 
present in the initial stimulus event (three four year olds, one six year old and three 
nine year olds), with each participant volunteering a single incorrect object each. Five 
of these participants mentioned the existence of a chair and this may have been a 
confusion, because four of the five who recalled a chair did not recall the couch. Only 
one participant recalled an item that was not a piece or furniture - a nine year old who 
said that there had been a box in the room. 
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Memory for position ({tinniture in the model 
Participants replaced the six items of furniture in the model from memory. For each 
piece of furniture the difference between a participant's placement and the original 
position of the furniture was measured (in cm), and for each participant a mean error 
score was calculated for all six pieces of fumiture . The mean error scores for each age 
group are shown in Table 6.2 
These scores were analysed in a one factor analysis of variance which revealed an age 
effect, F (3, 76) = 5.28, p<O.Ol; the adults were beller at replacing the furniture than 
the three groups of children (Tukey HSD, pdl.(5). 
Table 6.2 Mean error scores for furniture placements in Experiment 6. Error scores 
were the distance (in cm) between participants' placements and the correct positions 
mean enor 
scores (em) 
4 years 
7.8 CUO) 
Age Group 
6 years 
7.4 (2.')2) 
l) years 
S.l) (4 .X2) 
Adult') 
4.8 ( lXO) 
Overall Mean 
7.2 (3 .2li) 
To establish a comparison by chance for the replacement performance, ten adults who 
were unfamiliar with the experiment were shown the empty model, given the items of 
furniture in random order and asked to place them wherever they liked in the model. 
Each adult did this five times (making a total of 50 trials). The adults were not given 
any feedback or information between trials. The placements of these adults were 
scored in the same way as the placements by the participants in Experiment 6 and the 
enor scores were taken as indicative of chance performance. The error scores of each 
age group in Experiment 6 were compared to the error scores generated hy the 50 
trials, and for all four age groups the comparison showed that each groups' 
replacement of furniture was much better than chance (I tests, all p<().()l). 
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Memory.for location (~rshopping items 
Participants were asked to replace the items of shopping on the pieces of furniture. and 
they were scored for the numher they placed correctly (out of a total of six). The mean 
scores for each age group are shown in Tahle 0.3 and a one factor analysis of Valiance 
indicated an age effect, F 0.76) =4.59. p<O.OI . 
The four year olds' performance was poorer than the other three groups (Tukey HSD, 
p<O.05), but there were no other differences. Performance on this task was very good 
_ all age groups achieved mean scores of more than 5 out of the maximum of 6. 
Table 6.3 Mean number of items replaced correctly on the pieces of furn iture in the 
model in Expeliment 6 (maximum possihle score was 0) 
Age Group Overall Mean 
4 years 6 years 9 years Adults 
mean concet _~5..:....:.1:......:...( 1_. _12...:..) _----:5....;. .;...9....;(_0 ._4....:X )~_.:..5.;..:.. 9:......:...( O_.4..:....:'J..:....) _----:5....;.  ..:....:8....;(_0_. 0..:....:5 ):.....-_~5..:....:. 7--:.,;(0;,.:... 0;,;.:,9.:..)_ 
Colour memory 
Participants were asked to name the colours of the six items of shopping. Participants 
could have given any colour when naming the colours of the items. and therefore the 
likelihood of heing correct hy simply guessing can he considered to he very low. If a 
more conservative estimate of the level of chance is hased on the numher of different 
colours (six) lIsed in the expeliment, then participants had a one in six chance of heing 
correct hy guessing the colour of each individual item. As there were six items the 
expected proportion correct by chance was O.l7 . All groups performed well above 
chance expectations (Wilcoxon signed rank, p«UIl; Tahle ft.4). 
Participants scored for each colour that was correctly recalled (i.e. if participants gave 
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the wrong colour or said that they did not know the colour of the item these answers 
were treated as incolTect). The first row of Tahle 6.4 shows the mean proportion of 
correct responses for each age group. Memory for the colours of items was very 
good, with all the age groups achieving high mean scores. There was no effect of age 
on recall for colour, F (3,76) = 2.45, p>O.05. A sel:ond analysis for colour me mory 
was carded out exc luding 'don' t know' answers. In other words, participants' l:o\Tel:t 
responses were scored as a proportion of all the answers in which they responded by 
saying a colour. The mean proportion WHeCl is shown in the second row of Table 
6.4. A one factor analysis of variance indicated an effect for age, F n,76) = 3.49, 
p<O.05, and a Tukey HSD comparison showed that the adults performed hette r than 
the 6 year olds (pdl.05). There were no other differences hetween the groups. 
Table 6.4 Mean proportion of correct responses for 4uestions ahout the colour of 
shopping items in Experiment 6. Row 1 shows correct responses as proportion of all 
responses. .. . . 
Row 2 shows correct responses as proportion 01 the responses tor which a colour 
was given (i.e. excluding omission errors) 
Age Group 
4 years 6 years 9 years Adult 
Overall 
Mean 
1 mean proportion correct 0.87 (O. IX ) (un (O. I ()) (UN (0 .1) 0 .93 ( O'!)~) 0 .88 (0 . 15 ) 
2 mean proportion correct 
excluding omission elTors 
O.l{9 (0 .17 ) O.l{4 (0 . 13) 0.94 (o .m) 0.95 (0 .07 ) 0.91 (0 . 12) 
Comparison between. location and colour rnemOly. 
Recall for colour was compared to recall for the location of the shopping items in a 4 
(age) x 2 (information: l:olour or location) analysis of va riance. Although there were 
two separate measures of location recall in furniture replal:emenl and in object 
matching, the latte r was used as it was a more precise measure of memory for 
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location. There was an effect for type of information, F 0, 76) = 9.66, pdU)l, the 
locations of the items (0.94) were recalled beller than item colour (0.88). There was 
also an interaction between age and type of recaIJ information, F (3,76) = 3.89, 
p<O.05, because the four year olds were poorer at locating the items than in recalling 
the colours of the items, but the other three age groups were hetter at locating the items 
than recalling their colours (p«U>l, Tukey HSD). 
Memoryfor individual c%urs (see Tahle 6.5 below) 
A 4 (age) x 6 (individual colour) mixed measures analysis of villiance was conducted 
to examine participants' memory for individual colours. 
Table 6.5 Memory for individual colours, by age group in Experiment 6 
Colour 
Green Blue White Red Black Yellow 
Phone Hat Bowl Book Card Ball 
4 0.80 0.95 0.90 0.85 0.75 0.95 
Age 6 0.75 0.85 (U~5 0.90 0.70 O. SO 
Group 9 O.S5 1.00 0.90 0.90 0 .70 1.00 
Adult"i 0.95 1.00 O.S5 0 .95 (U';5 1.00 
Overall 0.84 0.95 (l.SS 0.90 0.75 0.94 
There was no effect of age, F ( 3,76) = 2.54, p>O.05. There was a difference in 
memory for individual colours, F (3,76) = 4.27, p<O.Ol; see Table 6.5. The black 
object (the hirthday card) was remembered least well out of all the objects by all of the 
groups, with the blue hat and yellow ball (p«Ull, Tukey HSO) and the red book all 
remembered better (pdl.05, Tukey HSO). There were no interactions between age 
and colour, only the scores of the four year olds and the adults differed (pd).05, 
Tukey HSD). 
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One further analysis, suggested by Ostergaard and Davidoff' s ( 1985) work, examined 
the relationship between ohject colour and recall. It was pretlictetl that recall woultl he 
better for the shopping than the furniture it was placed upon. This prediction was 
made despite the fact that the shopping and furniture were seen by participants for an 
equivalent length of time and the fact that both were me ntioned an equal number of 
times by the experimenter. Following Ostergaard and Davidoff would predict the 
shopping would be easier to diffe rentiate on the hasis of colour. 
A 4 (age) x 2 (type of item) independent groups analysis of valiance was canied out. 
Type of ite m referred to whether the ohject was furniture or shopping. Age was a 
factor in recall, F (3,76) = 48.44; p«Ull, with greater age leading to greater item 
recall (see Table 6.6) . Type of item also had an effect on recall with participants 
recalling more items of shopping than fUllliture. F ( L. 76) = H.40; pdl.O.I ; proportions 
of 0.77 and O.7!, respectively. 
Table 6.6 Comparison of recall for furniture and shopping items in Experiment 6 
Age Group Overall 
4 7 l) Adult 
Shopping Items 0 .59 (0. 17) 0.74 (0 . 11 ) (1.84 (0 . 14) (U{l) (0 . 10) 0.77 (0 .13) 
Furniture 0.43 (O. IX ) O.6S (0 .1 (i) 0.77 (0 . 15) O.l)6 (O.OX) 0.71 «1.15 ) 
Overall 0.51 (O . IX ) 0.71 (0 . 14) (l.RI (0 . 15) 0 .93 (O . O~) 0.74 (0 .14) 
There was also an inte raction be tween age and information type, F (3,76) = 5.78; 
pdU)J . As can be seen from Table 6.6, the adults were the only group who recalled 
more items of furniture than shopping. 
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DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 6 children and adults were shown a mudd which contained several 
differently coloured items, which were included in actions related to a story which 
lasted three minutes. The participants were later given an unexpected ml;;mory test 
which included recalling the colours of the items and reconstructing the model. In this 
way, participants' incidental recall of infonnation ahout the model was tested. 
The level of performance was very good, and there were few age differences. In free 
recall, adult<; recalled nearly all the items in the model. and although the nine year olds 
and the six year olds recalled fewer items than the adults they were not significantly 
poorer at the task. The four year olds had poorer recall than thl;; other groups, hut they 
were ahle to rememher more than half the items in the model. and what was 
particularly noteworthy was that neither the rour year ulds nor the other age groups 
made many errors of commission - only very rarely did they incorrectly recall itl;;ms 
which had not heen present in the model. This finding is consistent with previous 
research which has shown that compared to older children and adults, young children 
report less infOimation under conditions of free recall, hut the information which they 
do report is often as accurate as the information reported hy older children or adults 
(e.g. Goodman & Reed. 1986; Malin ef 01 .. J ,)7,)). 
Participant<; were accurate in the two incidental spatial tasks (rl;;placing the furniture in 
the model and placing the COiTect items of shopping nn the fumiture), with particularly 
high levels of performance from the three older groups when they replaced the 
shopping items. These results are what would he expected if recall of spatial 
information is an automatic process, and they correspond to other studies which have 
found high levels of performance in incidental spatial tasks with adults (e.g. Ellis, 
1')90; Park & Mason, 1982; Shadoin & Ellis. J ')')2) and with children (e.g. Ellis, 
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Katz & Williams, 1987; Hatwell, 1995). However, there were developmental 
differences in both tasks, because the adults were beller than the children at replacing 
the furniture, and the three older age groups were helle r than the four year olds at 
placing the shopping items cOiTectly. Hasher and Zacks (J 979) argued that one of the 
defining clitelia for automaticity was an invariance in performance at different ages. 
These results do not fulfil that cIiteIia and therefore the encoding 0/· spatial information 
in the present experiment cannot be descrihed as automatic according to Hasher and 
Zacks ' strict definition of the term. None the less , most studies of incide ntal spatial 
recall have also produced results which do not fully meet Hasher and Zacks' criteria 
(e.g. Hatwell , 1995; Naveh-Benjamin. 19~7; 19~9 ; Park & James, 1983; Park & 
Mason , 1982), therefore Naveh-Benjamin 's (J9X7) description of encoding skills in 
terms of a continuum from non-automatic to automatic may he more appropriate. If 
Naveh-Benjamin' s idea is adopted, participants' ahility to replace items accurately in 
the model can be taken as further evidence that spatial encoding is at the automatic end 
of the continuum. Recall for location may have heen he lped hy the fact that half of the 
stimuli were hIightly coloured: Widdel and Pfendler ( 199~) found that perfollnance of 
adults was better in a spatial task when the stimuli was coloured with highly saturated 
colours than when they were either of low sa turation or achromatic, two thirds of the 
stimuli in this experiment were highly saturated (othe rs were achromatic hlack and 
white) and this may have been a factor in the high matching scores. 
Colour recall was very good. For all age groups more than 80% of responses to the 
questions about the colours of the shopping items were correct answers. This figure 
was much higher than would have been expected hy chance ( 17%) and indicated that 
participants of all ages were able to encode the colours of lhe items. As the participants 
had not been given instructions to lea1l1 the items' colours, and had no expectation of a 
memory tes t, such e ncoding was inc ide ntal. The hi gh leve l of performance 
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demonstrated the automatic processing of colour information . There were no 
differences between the age groups (see Row j, Tahle h.4), and lack of developmental 
differences is one of the criteria put forward by Hasher and Zacks (l <)7<) for 
identifying automatic processes. 
Experiment 6 was a developmental study which was designed to extend the findings 
observed with pre-schoolers in ExpeIiment 5 to a wider range of ages. In Experiment 
5, the colour recall of pre-schoolers exceeded recall for general information, however 
memory for colour did not reach the high levels of the pre-schoolers in Expet;ment 6 
(Chapter 5, p. 137). One possible reason for this may he the difference in the numbers 
of stimuli participants had to recall. In Experiment 6, participants had to recall the 
colours of six objects, in Experiment 5 they were asked to recall 12. As was observed 
in Expetiment 3, the number of items that are presented has an effect on memory for 
colour. Therefore, it appears that when the memory load is light, recall for colour can 
be a very accurate aspect of memory. Neverthe less, the fact that the format of the 
stimuli has such an innuence on colour recall indicates that this cannot he an automatic 
process in the su;ct sense of Hasher and Zacks ' (1<)7<) theory. 
If colour recall was an automatic process performance levels shoule! he equivalent to 
the recall of other stimuli for which there is evidence of automatic encoding. However, 
a comparison of colour recall and the recall of spatial information (i.e. where the 
shopping items were placed in the model) showed that memory for spatial information 
was better than memory for colours. This implies that however well colour was 
encoded it was still not recalled as well as spatial information. In Naveh-Benjamin's 
(1987) terms it would be appropriate to say that colour recall was towards the 
automatic end of the continuum of automaticity, hut less far along that continuum than 
the recall of spatial infonnation. 
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Nonetheless, under some conditions colour information con he recalled very accurately 
even when people have not made a deliberate atlempt to learn that information. 
Expeliment 6 supportc; and extends the results of Davidoff and Mitchell (1993). Adults 
and children alike remembered objects as colourless templates which they proceeded to 
colour in when required. However Experiment 6 does not support Davidoff and 
Mitchell in that there was no evidence of four year olds finding access to colour names 
"enigmatic" (p.122). The results of Experiment 6 therefore repl icated their later finding 
that a majority of pre-schoolers can name colours accurately (Mitchell et 01., 1996). 
In previous studies (Experiments 1,2 and 3; Park and James, J9!n; Park and Mason, 
1982; Hatwell, 1995) the delay before the memory test was usnally brief, but in this 
expeliment there was a thirty minute delay before participants were tested. The stimuli 
of this experiment were presented in the context of an activity which was described in 
a story, and this was also a contrast to earlier studies in whidl participants saw only a 
series of unconnected pictures or ohjects. For these reasons the present study 
approximated to a test of eyewitness ability, and as the participants had very good 
recall of both spatial and colonr infonnation, it can be argued that these aspects of 
recall may be particularly accurate when people report events which they have 
witnessed. 
There are several explanations for the differences in recall for individual colours that 
were found in the present expelimenl. These include the salience of the ohjects, for 
example the red item (the book) was rememhered hest; see Appendix F); the interest 
value of the objects (see Appendix F), for example four year olds were more likely to 
remember the presence of the ball than the washing lip howl; participants may also 
have had preconceptions of particular colour-ohject associations (which may cause (a) 
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forgetting the colour of the object completely, (b) replacement of the correct colour 
(e.g. the black card) with an incolTect but nevertheless appropriate colour (e.g. white), 
or (c) colour blending (Belli, 1988)). Nevertheless, particular item-colour 
combinations were unlikely to have caused the high colour recall scores as they were 
not stereotypical (see Appendix A). Even if stereotypical colours had heen chosen 
there may have been no effect: research has indicated that there are no or small effects 
of repetition for objects paired with their stereotypical colours (Wippich et aI., 1994). 
Although incidental memory for colour was examined in this experiment, the tasks 
used by Hatwell (1995), Park and James (19X3) and Park and Mason (l9X2) may be 
qualitatively different to the task employed in the present experiment (see Mandler e.t 
aI., 1977; Chapter 1, p. 52). Park and Mason asked partici pants to focus on a picture 
and asked them to remember it (and in the intentional condition, picture-colour, also) 
as they would be tested on it later. The procedure was similar in Hatwell's experiment 
where participants were asked to "memorize" (p. (1) ohjects for later testing. The 
present experiment differed from such a procedure hecause although participants 
listened to a story and saw a series of objects, they were never given instructions to 
remember them. This makes the present results all the more interesting: we would 
perhaps expect the opposite results as participants in this study were given no 
motivation to remember the objects or their colours. Although the older participants 
may have uied to remember pans of the story as evidence for the age-appropriateness 
of it, this still does not account for the excellent recall of colour hy all of the groups. 
Thus it is necessary to look further than the instructions to participants to explain the 
kind of differences observed between the expetimental results, such as the form of the 
stimuli used (see Chapter 1, p. 39; Chapter 4, pp. 113- j j 6). 
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If colour does facilitate naming but not item recognition (Ostergaard & Davidoff, 
1985) then there should be better performance on naming the shopping than the 
furniture as the colours of the shopping will provide stronger cues than the uniform 
grey of the furniture. There was evidence of a facilitative effect of colour 111 
Experiment 6, thus supporting Ostergaard and Davidoff's theory. 
The results of Experiment 6 have several implications for child eyewitness h:~stimony. 
First, this experiment showed that the memory of children can be accurate. Children as 
young as six years recalled a majority of the objects they saw, and children from four 
years onwards remembered colour almost as accurately as adults, with performance 
approaching ceiling levels. Even when errors of omission were included in the 
analysis of colour recall, the poorest-performing group (the six year olds) was still 
correct for most of the colours. 
The low commission rates observed in this experiment supported recent eyewitness 
literature (Milne et oZ., 1994; Saywitz et 01., 1 YY:i). This contradicted the view that 
young children have inaccurate memoIies and are prone to making things up in order 
to compensate for their poor recall (Varendonck, J Y J I). Although a small numher of 
children did name an object that was not originally present, in most of the instances 
this seemed to be a function of participants misrememhering a single ohject (a couch) 
as a similar one (a chair). 
In summary, Experiment 6 showed that the recall nt' young children can match the 
performance of adults for several different types of information. Most significantly, 
the memory of both children and adults for ohject colour appears to be a highly 
accurate fonn of recall, even when colours of ohjects were non-canonical (e.g. green 
telephones, and black birlhday cards). This result was not predicted from some 
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previous research (e.g. Davidoff & Mitchell, L99~ ; Park & James, J 9X~; Park & 
Mason, 1982; Experiments 1-3 ; though see Hatwell, 1995). Colour memory also 
seems to hold up weIl when compared to memory for place, a form of memory widely 
taken to be an automatic process (Ellis, 1991; Hasher & Zacks, 1979). However in 
Expeliment 6, participant<; had to remember the colours of only six ohjects, and recall 
took place within the context of a story. Comparisoll hetween Experiments 3, 5 and 6 
suggested a link between colour recall and the number of stimuli presented. Therefore 
in Experiment 7, pal1icipants had to recall the colours of a much wider sdection of 
objects (24) which were presented as part of a series of· tasks. 
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CHAPTER 7 
EXPERIMENT 7 
EYEWITNESS MEMORY FOR COLOUR INFORMATION 
INTRODUCTION 
Experiment 7 was conducted for two reasons. First, it was designed to be a large-scale 
replication of Experiment 6, primarily to see whether the good recall for colour in 
Experiment 6 was due to particular charactelistics of the miniature objects or story, or 
whether colour memory would also be accurate in other contexts. Second, in all the 
previous experiments, even in the incidental conditions, the coloured objects 
themselves were always drawn to the attention of the participants, either by turning 
through a series of pictures and asking participants to remember specific aspects of 
them (Experiments 1-3) or by introducing ohjects individually (Experiments 4-6). 
Eyewitness events are multi-faceted, and in such contexts, information which may not 
have been a central feature of the event could be of importance. Therefore Experiment 
7 also examined whether the degree of attention paid to an object affected accuracy of 
colour recall when objects were not specifically pointed out. 
Centrality refers to whether a piece of information is central to an event, like the 
actions or individuals involved in a situation. Researchers have found that memory for 
central information, especially central events, is better than recall for other types of 
information (Rudy & Goodman, 1991; Wilkins et (fl., J(89). For example, Rudy and 
Goodman found that children's memory for games they had played and people with 
whom they had interacted, was better than for (peripheral) details of the room in which 
the expeliment took place. 
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The type of information that witnesses will recall has been investigated by a number of 
other researchers (Belli et al., 1992; Cassel et a/., J996 ; Memon & Vartoukian, 1996). 
Both Cassel et (II. and Memon and Vartoukian ohserved that peripheral details, such as 
the colour of a confederate's shoes, were recalled with less accuracy than central 
details, such as a musical instrument an actor played. In contrast, some investigators 
have found no difference in recall between central and peripheral items (King & 
Yuille, 1987), and others have found an interaction he tween type of information and 
age (Parker et at., 1986). Parker et a/. observed that eight year olds re<.:a ll ed as much 
pelipheral information as central information, hut adults rememhered more central 
information than peripheral. Parker et al.'s findings support those of Hagen (1967) 
who found no evidence of an increase in incidental learning hetween middle childhood 
and adolescence, though capacity to perform central tasks did improve. Hagen related 
this to changes in metacognitive ability, with greater attention allocated to stimulus 
features critical for learning, at the expense of ex traneous or incidental information. 
Although Hagen did not infer it, there may he some correspondence hetween recall for 
central and intentional aspects of stimuli, and recall for pe ripheral and incidental 
components, with memory for centrallintentional information he tter than memory for 
peripheral/incidental. Though this is perhaps an ohviolls point, no researchers have 
investigated whether such an association ex ists, and if slIch an association, if present, 
can be mediated by the fOlm of the information to he rememhered. 
There is also a degree of overlap hetween the arguments of researchers who have 
investigated ohject centrality, and those who have examined the affect of object 
salience on recall. The tenTIS 'centrality' and 'salience' have heen used analogously hy 
some investigators (Brewer & Treyens, 1981; Christianson, 1992). However thi s use 
may be inappropIiate since salience, whether an nbjeL:t is noticeahle in a given context 
(such as a skull on a bookshelf in a teache r's office), may actually inte ract with 
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centrality. The evidence for the memorahility of salient ohjects is somewhat mixed. 
Some researchers have ohserved that salient items are more likely to he reca lled than 
other ohjects, especially under emotional conditions (e.g . Christianson, J 992), and 
Camphell (1993) found that pre-schoole rs were more likely to choose ohjects which 
were incongruously coloured than those which were typically coloured in a visual 
forced-choice paradigm (see also Mitchell et (f/., 1996). Other investigators, including 
Brewer and Treyens and Yuille and Cutshall (19g6), found that unexpected items were 
less well-rememhered. However in terms of salience. Brewer and Treyens argued, 
somewhat circularly, that simply because a particular ohject was recalkd. it must 
therefore he more salient. 
Previous researchers have demonstrated that activities. espec ially those re lated to 
goals, are recalled hetter than other types of event information hy hoth children 
(Hamond & Fivush, 1991; Pillemer. 1992 ; Rudy & Goodman. J991) and adults 
(Backman et ul .. 1986). Both Experiments 5 and 6 had d ea r 'goal states' , which were 
making a hirthday card and unpacking a hag of shopping, respectively. Expeliment 7 
also involved participants working towards goal states. However unlike the 
participants in Experiments 5 and 6, those in Experiment 7 performed a numher of 
separate tasks. 
In Experiment 7, four, seven and nine year olds, and a group of adults participated in 
a variety of activities, including dressing a doll and threading heads onto a piece of 
string (central items). In addition to these ohjects, the re were also a numher of items 
which were not used or referred to hy the experimenter (peripheral items). All the 
items in the study were coloured in primary hues . After a de lay of one day, recall for 
the colours of the central and pelipheral ohjects was tested. 
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Several predictions were made for Experiment 7 . First, following from previous 
results in Experiments 5 and 6. colour recall was expected to be good. Second, an 
affect of centrality on colour recall was predicted. Memory for item-colour was 
expected to differ between those used by participants (centra1 items) and those which 
were not referred to. or played with (peripheral items), with the colours of central 
items recalled better. Third. an interaction between age ami celllrality was anticipated. 
As young children have more limited metacognitive ahilities than older children and 
adults (see Hagen. 1967; Parker el ai., 1986). they may give relatively more attention 
to the peripheral items than the older participants. Therefore. the prediction was that 
the difference between recall of the colours of the central and the peripheral items 
would he smaller for the youngest children than for the other children and adults. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Eighty participants were tested, they consisted of four age groups of 2() participants 
each: four, seven and nine year olds. and adull.-;. These groups had average ages of 
4;4 (range: 4;0 to 4;10), 7;2 (range: 6;9 to 7;(), 9;.1 (range: X;9 to 9;5) ami 21;3 (range: 
20;2 to 27;8). The children all attended state-funded nursery and primary schools, and 
the adults were mainly university students. Each group included 10 males and 10 
females. 
Stimulus Materials 
Twenty-four easily recognisahle items were used in the experiment (see Tahle 7.1). 
All items were placed on the floor below a low tahle and were in plain sight 
throughout the acquisition phase of the experiment, which lasted seven minutes. The 
colours of the objects were selected on the basis of two constraints. First, their colours 
had to be identifiable by even the youngest children, and second, they had to be 
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colours which wt:!rt:! not typically assodalt:!d with th t:! itt:!ms (st:!t:! Appendix A). A child-
sized mannequin was placed on the tabk abovt:! the rt:!s t of tht:! ohjt:!c t<:; . 
Table 7.1 Colours of the central and pelipht:! ral objects used in Experime nt 7 
Object colour 
Black White Red Blue Green Yellow 
Central objects t Bucket, Belt, Coat, Ball , Beads, Paper, 
Shirt Square Wool Necklace Crayon Scarf 
Pelipheral objects+ Cup, Book, Phone, Glove, T-shirL, Box, 
Bag Helmet Stapkr Tooth- Paint- Folder 
hrush brush 
t items directly manipulated 
+ il.ems lIot directly manipulaled 
Design and Procedure 
All participants were tested individually. Pre-schoolers were tt:!s tt:!d in a small room 
next to the main nursery room, the older children in an unused classroom, and adults 
in an expelimental room in the Department of Psychology. All pre-schoolers could 
name at least six colours. 
At the start of the acquisition phase , the experimenter explained that he wanted the 
participant to carry out a variety of tasks while he timed them . Although the youngest 
group of children was used to playing games, a cover story was necessary for the 
older children and adults. After setting the ex perime nt up, the researche r took 
participants into the room and told them that he was conducting an expeliment on how 
peopk use the ir hands to do things (children), or manual dt:!x terity (adults). As part of 
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this, the experimenter said he was going to see how well and how quickly they could 
perform a variety of actions. To further this, the experimenter timed participants 
perform each sequence of events. After asking participants if they wished to proceed, 
the experimenter showed participants the mannequin and the ohjects which were 
spread around on the floor beneath it. The experimenter pointed to different ohjects 
(the central items), and asked participants to perform valiolls i.lctiv.ities with them (see 
Table 7.2). The order of these five activities was randomised. Some ohjects (the 
peripheral items) remained on the floor throughollt the event and were never referred 
to. The acquisition phase of the expeliment lasted seven minutes. 
Table 7.2 Activities used in Experiment 7t 
Activity Time (minutes) 
1. Writing 
2. Dressing mannequin 2.5 
3. Throwing ball 
4. Threading beads 
5. Making square 0.5 
t activity-oruer was frUluomised 
No. of Items 
2 
5 
2 
2 
Use of the various central objects was manipulated so that participants across the 
different ages spent the same amount of time with each item (30 seconds). Thus 
successively older age groups had to CatTY out more than each preceding age group. 
In Activity 1 participants used a green crayon to wlite text on a piece of yellow paper. 
Four year olds were just asked to write their names, however the seven and nine year 
olds and adults were asked to write out their names and increasingly larger amounts of 
the poem 'If I was John' taken from Now We Are Six (Milne, 1927). 
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A<.:tivity 2 was dressing up a <.:hild-sized shop mannl!quin which was placed on a low 
table. When it was firs t shown to the <.:hildren the mannequin was already wearing a 
plain green T-shirt. The order in which the clothing was placed on the mannequin 
(Activity 2) was fixed for all participanL<; (white belt, blue necklace, black shirt, yellow 
scarf, and then red coat) however participants from the diffe rent age groups were 
given diffe rent instructions. The pre-school parli<.:ipanls were given help to put the belt 
on the mannequin and only had to loop the necklace (l ve r the doll 's head. The pre-
schoolers were just asked to drape the remaining items of clothing (shirt, s<.:arf and 
coat) around the doll. The older children and adults were asked to fasten larger 
numbers of buttons, depending on the ir age: seven year olds had to do one or two 
buttons up (depending upon their speed). nine year (lIds were asked to fasten two or 
three buttons up, and adult participants were asked to fasten as many as they could 
while the expeIimenter kept time. 
Activity 3, throwing a blue ball into a black bucke t. required participants to throw a 
table tennis ball into a small bucket placed some distan<.:e away from thl!m. Diffi<.:ulty 
of the task was manipulated by varying the distance of the hucke t from the partic ipant 
according to age, and participants were given a minutl! III "Sl!l! how many times they 
could throw the ball into the bucket". 
In Activity 4, the bead-threading task. an increasing numher of small green heads was 
given to participants to thread on to the red string which was approximately 30cm 
long. 
In Activity 5, participants had to make a white square oul of pieces of plas tic 
construction kit. The square consisted of g different sections. however some of these 
sections were assembled for the younger participanL~ . 
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The day following the stimulus event. participants were given a surplise memory test. 
Participants were first asked a general free recallljuestion 'Can you tell me what you 
did when you came here yesterday,?,. and given neutral prompts (e.g. 'Anything 
else?', 'What happened next'?'). After free recall. colour recall was tested with a selies 
of 24 (12 central, 12 peripheral) questions which examined memory for the colour of 
each item. The colour questions were primed on separate cards which were shuflled 
after every participant. Questions took the form of ' What colour was the X'!'. After 
this recall phase. which lasted about three minutes. the experimenter asked participants 
if they had guessed the real purpose of the experiment. None of the participants 
admitted to having attempted to rememher colours. Finally. the experiment was 
explained to participants and they were thanked for the ir help. 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analysis indicated that there was no main effect or interactions with sex. 
The data were analysed with 4 (age) x 2 (type of information) mixed measures 
ANDY As. Type of information referred to whether the ohject in lluestion was central 
(i.e. had been manipulated by the participant) or pelipheral (not manipulated). 
C%ur recall data 
(i) ChanGe comparisons 
The performance of participants was examined hy comparing colour recall to chance 
levels. Chance was calculated as 1/6 (i.e. 0.1(7). hecause the ohjects lIsed in the 
experiment were coloured in anyone of six hues . This was a conservative chance 
estimate because participants were not restlicted to giving one of these six colours as a 
response. Chance comparisons revealed that the performance of all participants was 
above chance when they were asked to recall the colours of central items. None of the 
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age groups performed above chance in recall for peripheral information (Wilcoxon 
signed rank, p<!Ul5 or less; see Table 7.3). 
When omission errors were excluded from the analysis, all ages recalled more colours 
correctly than would be expected by chance, regardless of whether the items were 
centrally or peIipherally presented (Wikoxon sigmxl rank, p«l.()5 or less; see Table 
7.4). 
(ij) ANOVA results: Colour recall treming ol'llissiol1 errors responses (/s incorrect 
Age had an affect on recall for colour, F 0,76) = :tn, p<O.05. The adults (0.47) and 
seven year olds (0.46) recalled a similar amount of information. but then:~ was a 
difference in the colour recall of the four year olds (O.4l) and the nine year olds CO.54; 
Tukey HSD, p<!).O L). The type of information that participants were asked LO recall 
had an effect on performance, F (1,76) = 722.55, p<!).()O I. The colours of central 
items (0.72) were recalled better than those of peripheral items (0.21). 
Table 7.3 Colour recall score (expressed as proportion correct) in Experiment 7 by 
age group and object type, treating omission errors as incorrect 
Age Grou~ Overall Mean 
4 7 9 Adult 
Central 0.59 t (0 .1'.» o.nt (O . l~) O.79-r (0 . 1) O.79t (0 . 15) O.72t (0.17) 
Peripheral 0.22 (0.12) 0.20 (0.12) 0.28 (0 .14) 0.15 (0.13) 0.21 (0.13) 
Overall Mean 0.41 t (0.16) 0.46t (O . IS) 0.54 t (IUS) 0.47t (0.14) 0.47t (0.15) 
t significantly different from chmlCe (Wilcoxon signed rank, p<O.(5) 
There was also an interaction between age and information type. F 0, 76) = 8.45. 
pdUH. An analysis of simple effects showed that this interaction was due to the 
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perfOimance of the four year olds who recalled as mllch peripheral infonnation as the 
other age groups (pdUH), but had a poorer memory for th e centra l items, and the 
adults, who had poor colour recall of periphera I items (p« l.( 11; see Figure 7. I). 
Figure 7.1 Interaction between infonnation and type in Experiment 7 
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(iii) ANOVA results: Colour recall excluding omission errors 
When omission errors were excluded from the data, age had no affecl on colour recall, 
F (3,76) = 0.97, p>O.05, and all groups recalled the same amount or colour 
information. Type of infOimation did have an allect on the numher of colours recalled 
correctly, F (1, 76) = 27 .80, p«Ull. The colours of cenlral items (0.78) were 
recalled better than those of pClipheral ones (OJ) I ; see Tahle 7.4). 
There was an interaction between age and information tYPL\ F (~,76) = ~.<n, p<O.05. 
Recall of the colours of central objects was good, and improved with age. Memory for 
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Table 7.4 Colour recall score (expressed as proportion correct) in Experiment 7 by 
age and object type, excluding omission errors 
A~e Groul2 Overall Mean 
4 7 9 Adult 
Central O.72t (0.20) O.76t (lUX) O.X4 t (11.15 ) (I.R2t (0 . 1') O.7St (0.17) 
O.69t (0.21) O.57 t (0.32) J. (I .51 t (1IVi) O.6I t (0.31) PeIipheral (1.67 I (0 .24) 
Overall Mean 0.71 t (0 .24) O.67t (0 .27) O.76 t (0 .22) O.67 t «>.31) O.70t (0.2(,) 
t signil1cmllly t1illerenl from ch~uH.:e (Wilcoxoll siglled rallk, pdl.(5) 
peripheral items also changed with age. Colour recall of the four and nine year olds 
did not differ by ohject type, hut an analysis of simple effects showed that there was a 
decline in recall of peripheral items recalled hy adults (p«UlI) and seven year a ids 
(pdU)5). An The age differences and effects of centrality on colour reca ll are shown 
in Figure 7.2, below. 
Figure 7.2 Interaction between age and object centrality excluding omission errors 
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Comparison q(omission errors ([cross age groups 
The number of 'don't know' responses was analysed in a 4 (age) x 2 (infonnation 
type) independent groups analysis of variance on the data. Age had an effect on 
number of omission errors, F (3, 76) = 3.88, p«l.05. Seven year nlds (O.17), nine 
year olds (0.16) and adults (O. IS) all made a similar proportion of errors, however the 
nine year olds made less 'don't knows' than the four Yl!ar aids (0.22; p<O.05, Tukey 
HSD). Ohject type also had an effect on (;olollr recall, F (1, 76) = 9D.74, pd).OOl, 
with fewer 'don't knows' for the central ohjects (O.OH) than for the peripheral ohjects 
(0.33). 
Table 7.S Proportion of omission elTors hy age and objl!ct type in Experiment 7 
Age Gr()lI~ Overall Mean 
4 7 9 Adult 
Central 0.10 (0 .07 ) 0.02 (o .m) 0.02 (0.0) (Ull (0 .04) 0.04 (0.04) 
Peripheral n.34 (0.09) 0.32 (O .OX) 0.30 ((l.OX) 0.34 (OM) 0.33 «l.(I') 
Overall Mean 0.22 (0.08) O.l7 (O .Of» 0.16 (O .Of» 0.18 (0 .07) 0.19 (0.07) 
There was an interaction hetween age and object type, F (3, 76) = 3.98, pdU)5; see 
Tahle 7.5). All age groups gave fewer 'don't knows' for thl! central ohjects, however 
the difference between the error rates was smallest for thl! four Yl!ar olds, an analysis 
of simple effecs showed that this was hecause they Wl!re most likely to say they could 
not recall the colours of the central items. 
DISCUSSION 
Recall for the colour of the central items in Expl!rimcnt 7 was good, and when 
omission elTors were excluded, colour recall was also good ror the peripheral items. 
Age differences were apparent when all responsl!s Wl!re analysed, however when 
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omission em1rS were excluded. these differences disappeared. Although there was still 
an effect of object centrality on colour recall when omission errors were excluded. 
recall for the colours of peripheral items was good and exceeded 5{)% COITect for all 
ages. 
Memory for the central items in thi s study compared well with the results of 
Experiment 6, in which all the objects were presented centrally. Despite having to 
remember twice the number of items as in Experiment 6. the colour recall of 
participants in Experiment 7 was very accurate. and with the exception of the four year 
olds who made a comparatively large number of 'don't know ' responses, colour recall 
exceeded 70% for all ages. The colours of the central items were remembered hetter 
than would be expected by chance. This finding supports the idea that colour can be 
encoded without effort. at least when ohjects are presented so that attention is drawn to 
them. 
Experiment 7 also compared recall for central information to recall for peripheral 
information. Previous researche rs (e.g. Rudy & Goodman. 1991; Wilkins t't al., 
1989) who investigated centrality compared different types of information, such as 
recall for actions (central) with recall for details of an expelimental room (peripheral). 
However in the present study, the form of information to he recalled (ohject colour) 
was held constant. This was therefore a more reliahle and consistent test of the 
intluence of centrality on recall since actions and ohjects may be rememhered 
differently regardless of their relevance to an event. In Experiment 7 there was a large 
difference in recall of central and peripheral information in this study, with central 
infOlmation remembered more accurately than peripheral information. Thus the results 
of Experiment 7 supported the conclusions of prev ious resea rchers who found that 
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central information is recalled better than peripheral information (Cassel et al., 1989; 
Memon & Vartoukian, 1996; Rudy & Goodman, 1991). 
Experiment 7 also confirmed the results of Parker et al. (l9S6), in that the children 
who patticipated remembered approximately equivalent levels of central and pelipheral 
information, whereas adults recalled more central than peripheral details. These 
findings therefore supported those of Hagen (1967) who also found no evidence for 
an increase in incidental learning between middle childhood and adolescence, though 
capacity to perfOlm central tasks did improve, which led to greater attention to central 
rather than peripheral (extraneous) infOlmation. 
The interaction between age and type of information supported one of the predictions 
made above. Although the colour recall of the seven year olds, nine year olds and 
adults was better for the central than the peripheral items, the re was no diffe rence in 
recall between item types by the four year olds. Additionally, the four year olds also 
made more omission errors for central information than any of the other ages. These 
findings support the idea that young children fail to focus the ir attention only on 
information that is required to complete tasks (Hagen, 1967). The zig-zag pattern of 
recall for the peripheral items seen in Figure 7.2 may have been due to a lack of 
metacognitive control in the four year olds (hence equal attention was paid to central 
and peripheral items), and perhaps the application of some inappropriate attentional 
strategy by the nine year olds. 
The results of Experiment 7 gave little support to Yuille and Cutshall's (l9g6, p. 3(1) 
conclusion that colour of clothing appeared to he the "most difficult feature to retain by 
witnesses". When accuracy (i.e . excluding omission errors) was assessed, 
participants of all ages recalled the majority o/" colour infonnatinn colTectly irrespective 
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of object centrality. These findings thus support and extend those of Christianson and 
Loftus (1991): in the present study, recall for colour was good even when participants 
had to recall infonnation from an emotionally neutral event concerning pelipheral items 
(see Chapter 1, p. 51). The accuracy of colour recall was apparent in all age groups 
that were tested in Experiment 7. Since popular object-colour conjunctions were 
controlled for (on the basis of the results of Appendix A), typicality effects in colour 
recall can be ruled out. However the possibility, suggested hy the research of 
Campbell (1993), remains that because the items were coloured atypically, there may 
have been a corresponding increase in ohject salience. In his study, Campbell found 
improved performance in colour naming when pre-schoolers had to name an 
incorrectly-coloured picture when compared to a typically coloured one. Though 
Campbell's study was a naming task, the ohjects in the present expeliment may have 
been more salient to participants, and as such their recall for them was improved. 
However, as there was a rebtive1y large number or stimuli. none of the items had 
single colours associated with them hy more than 5()% of participants in the 
questionnaire study descIibed in Appendix A. and the faclthat all ohject colours were 
plausible (unlike, for example, blue bananas), J do not believe that what Campbell 
telTIled 'attentional magnetism', or object salience, had an effect on colour recall. 
In summary, colour was recalled accurately by participants in Experiment 7, although 
there were differences between the age groups when omission errors were .included in 
the analysis. When these omission enors were excluded, age differences disappeared. 
Whether objects were central or pelipheral also had an effect on colour recall. Colours 
of central objects were recalled better than those of peliphcral items, though again, 
when omission errors were excluded from the analysis this difference was reduced. 
There was an interaction between age and ohject type; this was attributed to 
metacognitive deficits in the four year old group which led them to recall as much 
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peripheral as central information. The facl that the colours of the central items were 
remembered at levels greater than chance hy participants of all ages was interpreted as 
supporting the incidental hypothesis of colour rl!call. Comparisons he tween 
Experiment 7 and Experiments 1-3 will be made in the final discussion (see Chapter 
9). 
A question remains unanswered by Expeliment 7. In Experiment 7, as in Experiment 
6, participants had to recall only plimary colours - hlal:k , white, red. hlue, green and 
yellow. In eyewitness experiments, witnesses regardless or their ages will have to 
recall colours drawn from a widl!r range than this. According to Berlin and Kay 
(1969) focal colours will he hetter-rememhered as thl!Y are 'semantic primitives'. 
Brown and Lenneherg (1954) also argued that primary colours should he easier to 
remember because they have a greater comll1unil:ahility. Researchl!rs have not 
examined how participants of different ages will perform if exposed to a larger array 
of colours. Although Berlin and Kay amI Brown and Lenneherg would both predict 
that the plimary colours would be remembered better, partiL:ipants.in their stuuies had 
to rememher Munsell chips, not real ohjects. nor were they given any support in their 
recall of colours. In Expeliment 8 the recall of participants for a wider range of colours 
was examined, and in addition their recall for colour was supported hy providing them 
with a colour chart, adapted from Expeliment 4. 
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CHAPTER 8 
EXPERIMENT 8 
RECALL FOR FOCAL AND NON-FOCAL COLOURS 
INTRODUCTION 
In Experiment 7 colour was recalled accurately by participants in all age groups. 
However in that study. participants only had to recall six colours: black. white. 
red. blue. green. yellow. According to Berlin and Kay (1969) these colours 
should be better-remembered as they are 'semantic primitives'. which have a 
physiological basis (Kay et ai., 1991). These results have been supported by 
several studies (Dale. 1969; Simmons. 1989). some of which have been cross-
cultural in nature (Davies et ai.. 1994; Dougherty. 1978; Sivik & Taft, 1994). 
However no developmental researchers have examined Berlin and Kay's theory. 
Although Heider (1971) proposed such an evaluation. she restricted herself to 
separate investigations of adults and pre-schoolers only. To date. no researchers 
have investigated how participants of a range of ages will perform if exposed to 
a larger aITay of colours. 
Several researchers have favoured a competing hypothesis to that of Berlin and 
Kay's (1969) theory. Reaching a similar conclusion to Brown and Lenneberg 
(1954). Davidoff (1991) suggested that colour memory may function in a way 
predicted by the Sapir-Whorl' hypothesis. anclthat recall for colour will be related 
to the ease with which the colours can be verbally communicated. For example. 
orange items will be harder to remember beyond the time span of pictorial 
memory if a language has a limited colour-name vocabulary for that range. This 
could also apply to children: if they clo not know particular colours they may be 
less likely to remember them. 
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Both Berlin and Kay (1969) and Brown and Lcnneherg (1954) predicted plimary 
colours will be better remembered (as long as participants have the colour names 
in their lexicon) than non-primary colours. With the exception of Ratner and 
McCarthy (1990), who showed their participants pictures, participants in colour 
naming studies were given Munsell chips to rememher. not real objects. and 
were tested after delays of only a few seconds. The use of Munsell chips hy 
researchers investigating colour has been criticised by Saunders (1995) because 
of their artificial nature. Better stimuli would be ones with which participants are 
familiar, and that have relevance to them (DeLoache, 1979). In addition. no 
colour studies have tested recall over a long delay. it is L1nclear whethe r recall for 
non-focal colours would decay disproportionately in comparison to focal hues. 
Finally, no-one has examined whether giving children who have only a hasic 
knowledge of colours, access to a non-verbal form of them will improve their 
ability to recall them. In Experiments 4 and 5 pre-schoolers were given a colour 
chart to help with their memory for colour. Although the colour chart had not 
been used by participants any older than pre-school age in previous experiments, 
for the sake of consistency in ExpeIiment 8, all age groups were given the chart 
and instructions on how to use it. Given the results of Leont'ev (1932) and van 
der Veer (1994), it was anticipated that the older children and adults would have 
a better knowledge of colour names and would thus be less likely to benefit from 
the colour chart, but the younger children would benefit from such provision. 
Therefore, Experiment 8 was identical to Experiment 7 in all but two respects. 
First, although the same objects were used as in Expeliment 7, a greater variety 
of colours was used. Second, all participants were given a prompt card to help 
with their colour recall. Similarly to Experiment 7, colour recall was predicted to 
be good for central items, less so for peripheral items. The main prediction in 
Experiment 8 concerned differences in recall for the focal and non-focal colours. 
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Recall for focal colours was expected to be better than for non-focal col.ours. An 
interaction between age and focality was also anticipated: as adults and older 
children have a good knowledge of all colour names re lative to pre-schoole rs, 
their recall of the non-focal colours was expected to be bette r than that of the 
four year olds. even when the ir recall was s uppon ed by a colour chart. No 
interaction between centrality and focality was anti cipated. s ince it was 
anticipated that object centrality (central or peripheral) would have a greater 
effect on the memorability of an item than that of Object co lour. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Seventy six participants were tested. they were drawn from four age groups: 20 
four year aids, 19 seven year aIds and 17 nine year olds. and a group of 20 young 
adults. These groups had average ages of 4;4 (range: 4 ;0 to 4;8). 7; I (range: 6;10 
to 7;10). 9;4 (range: 8;11 to 9;11). and 23;2 (range: J9J to 27;8). The children 
all attended local state-funded nursery and primary schools. and the adulLs were 
composed mainly of univers ity s tudents. 
Stimulus Materials 
Twenty-two easily recognisable items (see Tables 8.1 a & 8.1 b) were used in 
Experiment 8. A <.:hild-sized mannequin was also placed on a low table. All items 
were placed on the floor and were in plain sight throughout the a<.:quisiti on phase 
of the experiment. The colours of the objec ts were selected o n the bas is of the 
questionnaire described in Appendix A. Colours for items in Experiment 8 were 
only chosen if they were selec ted by less than 10% of participants. The colours 
used for the stimuli were divided into two categories, focal and non-focal. The 
focal colours were the ' primary ' colours of black. blue. green, red. ye llow and 
white . The non- focal co lours we re brown. grey, orange, pink and purple . 
Turquoise was al so used as an object colour hut s ince (i) purticipants of all ages 
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did not differentiate between turquoise and green when pointing to colours on the 
prompt card. (ii) turquoise can be perceived as part of the subset of green colours 
(unlike other non-focal colours like brown. see Berlin & Kay. 1969), and (iii) 
when 15 adults were shown one of the turquoise items and asked to say what 
colour it was. 13 said it was some fonTI of green, the turquoise data was excluded 
from the analysis. 
Table 8.1a Focal colours of the central and peripheral items from Experiment 8 
Object colour 
Black White Red Bille Green Yellow 
Central objects Bucket Belt Coat Necklace Beads Paper 
Peripheral objects Cup Helmet Stapler Tooth- T-shirt Box 
brush 
Table 8.1b Non-focal colours of the items used in Experiment R 
Object colour 
Brown Grey Orange Pink PUlpie 
Central objects Shirt Scarf Wool Ball Crayon 
PeriEheral objects Ba~ Phone Book Folder Glove 
During the recall phase of the experiment all panicipants were given a colour 
chart to help prompt recall of item colour. This chart was covered in equally-
sized circles of paint which cOlTesponded to the 12 colours used for the stimuli. 
Procedure 
The acquisition phase of Expeliment 8 was identical to that used in Experiment 7 
(see Appendix G). All participants were given a chart to facilitate colour recall. 
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RESULTS 
There was no main effect of sex on recall for colour. nor were there any 
interactions between sex and other factors. so this element was excluded from the 
analysis. The data was analysed with a series or 4 (age) x 2 (centrality) x 2 
(focality) mixed measures ANOY As. with repeated measures on the variables of 
centrality and focality. Centrality had two levels, central and peripheral , and 
focality refelTed to whether item colours werc focal (i.e. primary) or non-focal. 
Colour recall data 
(0 Chance comparisons 
The performance of parlicipants was examined by comparing colour recall to 
chance levels. Although participants in Experiment g had I I colours from which 
to choose on the colour chart. chance was calculatcd in the same way as in 
Expeliment 7, since this was a more conservative measure. that is 1/6 (i.e. 0.167) 
and permitted comparisons between the two studies. Chance comparisons 
revealed that the performance of all participants was ahove chance when they 
were asked to recall central information. regardless or the rocality of the colours. 
When recall for peripheral information was examined. no group perrormed at 
above did chance levels (Wilcoxon signed rank, pd).05; see Table 8.2). Focality 
had no effect on recall. 
When omission errors were excluded from the analysis. all participants recalled 
the colours of more central items and rocally-coloured peripheral items than 
expected by chance. In addition. both the nine year olds and adults perrormed at 
above chance levels in their recall for non-focally coloured peripheral items 
(Wilcoxon signed rank, p<0.05; see Table 8.3). 
(ij) ANOVA results: Colour recall inc/uding omission errors {IS incorrect 
Age did not have an effect on recall for colour. F (3. 72) = 2.05. p>O.()5; see 
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Table 8.2. There was a main effect of celllrality of information on colour recall, F 
(1, 72) = 302.S8, p <fl. 00 1. The colours of central items (0.62) were remembered 
better than peripheral items (0.19). Focality also had an effect on recall, F (1, 72) 
= 7S.S7, p<O.Ol. Memory for focal colours (0.47) exceeded memory for nOI1-
focal colours (0.33). 
Table 8.2 Proportiol1al colour recall scores in Experiment g by age group, 
centrality and focality, treating omission errors as incorrec t 
Overall 
A~e GraUE Mean 
4 7 9 Adult 
Central: 
Focal O.60t (0.28) 0.68t (O.2X) O.76·f (0.22) O.68t (0.15) O.68t (0.23) 
Non-Focal: 0.38t (0.27) O.58 "f (0.27) O.55T (O t7 ) O.68t (0 .29) O.55t (0.25) 
Peripheral 
Focal 0.26 (0.16) 0.28 (0. 16) 0.23 (0.16) 0.28 (0.19) 0.26 (0.17) 
Non-Focal 0.10 (0. 12) 0.11 (0.15) 0.15 (0.14) 0.10 (0.14) 0.1 2 (0.14) 
Overall 0.34 (0.2 1) 0.41 (0.22) 0.43 (O.t7 ) 0.44 (O.t9) 0.41 (0.20) 
Mean 
t significantly different from chance (Wilcoxon signed rank, p«l.05) 
There was no interaction between age and colour, F (3, 72) = 2.68, p>O.OS, age 
and focality, F (3, 72) = 1.46, p>O.OS, or colour and focality, F 0, 72) = 0.14, 
p>O.OS. There was an interaction between age, centrality and focality, F (3, 72) = 
4.1S, p<CI.OS; see Figure 8.1. An analysis of simple crfects showed that in 
general, the colours of central items were remembered beller than the colours of 
peripheral items, however adults reca lled an equal proportion of focal and nOI1-
focal colours when central information alone was considered. 
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Figure 8.1 Interaction between age, centrality and focality in Ex periment 8 
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(iii) ANOVA Results: Colour recall excluding omission errors 
When omission erro rs were excluded from the analysis, age again had no effcc t 
on recall for colour, F (3,72) = O.gS, p>O.OS. There was an effect of centrality, F 
(1. 72) = 22.29. p<O.OI, with the colours of central objects (0.66) recalled better 
than those of peripheral objects (0.49) . Focality also affected recall, F (1,72) = 
34.28, p<O.Ol. The focally-coloured items (0.66) were bettcr-remembered than 
those of non-focal colours (0.49). 
None of the two-way interactions were significant. Age and centrality, F O. 72) 
= 0.69, p>O.OS. age and [ocality, F (:1,72) = 2.27, p>O.05 and centrality and 
focality. F (1. 72) = 2.1S. p>O.OS all fell bdow significance levels. There was an 
inte raction between age. centrality and foca lity, F C~, 72) = 4. 13, pdU)S; see 
Figure 8.3. Simple effec ts showed that although rour year olds did worst, the 
scores of the nine year olds for both sets of periphera l items were inconsistent 
with the pattern of results of the other ages, with recall ror the central non-focal 
items lower than the mean, and recall for the peripheral non-focal iLems. hi gher. 
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Table 8.3 Proportional colour reca ll sco res Experiment 8 by age group. 
centrality and focali ty. excluding omission e rrors 
Age Group Overall 
Mean 
4 7 9 Adult 
Central: 
Focal 0.66t (0.25) 0.71 t (0.29) o.nt (0. 19) 0.75'1' (0.12) n.73t (0.21) 
0.47t (0.30) O.o~ t (0.2l'() 8'1 .I- O.60t (0.25) Non-Focal: 0.5 (0.15 ) 0.70 I (0.27) 
Peripheral 
0.64t (0.32) 0.08t «U I ) .1. . 1. O.oot (0.32) Focal 0.47 I (0 .30) 0.62 I «D4) 
Non-Focal 0.27 (038) 0.~6 (0.44) O.56t (O.4(i) 0.33 t (O.4(i) 0.38'1 (0.44) 
Overall 0.51 t (0.31 ) 0.60t (0 .33) n.oot (02X) 0.60'1 ({UO) O.S8'!' (0.31) 
Mean 
'I significantl y di fferent from chance (Wilcoxon signed rank , p<lUIS ) 
Figure 8.2 Interaction between age, centrali ty and I'oca lity. excluding om issions 
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(iii) ANOVA results: Analysis (~f omission errors. 
The number of 'don't know' responses partic ipants gave was analysed with a 
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mixed measures analysis of variance, with repeated measures on the variables of 
centrality and focality. 
Age had no effect on the number of omission errors, F (3, 72) = 0.60, p>0.05. 
The other main variables both led to main effe<.:ts. Centrality had an impact on 
colour recall, F (1, 72) = 961.90, p<lUH. with fewer 'don 't know' responses for 
the central (0.09) than the peripheral items (0.66). Participants also made fewer 
errors of omission for focal (0.31) than non-focal colours (0.44), F (I, 72) = 
57.46; p<O.Ol. 
Table 8.4 Proportional omission errors Experiment 8 hy age group. centrality 
and focality 
Age Group Overall 
Mean 
4 7 9 Adult 
Central: 
Focal (>.1 1 (0. 17) 0.05 (O .OX) 0.04 (O. D) (Ul8 (0.14) 0.07 (0.13) 
Non-Focal: 0.23 (0.21) (l.DS (0.10) O.OS (0.11) 0.04 (O .OX) O.lO (0.l3) 
Peripheral 
Focal 0.56 (0.24) 0.56 (0. 19) 0.56 (0.20) 0.52 (0.23) 0.55 (0.22) 
Non-Focal 0.72 (0.25) 0.77 (0. 15) 0.79 (0 .13) (l.82 (0.16) 0.76 (0.18) 
Overall 0.41 (0.22) 0.37 (0.13) 0.16 (0. 14) 0.37 (0 .15) 0.38 (0.16) 
Mean 
There was an interaction between age and centrality in the number of omission 
errors, F (3, 72) = 3.85, p<0.05: although all age groups gave the same number of 
'don't know' responses to peripheral items. the four year olds failed to respond 
with an object colour to central items more often than the other age groups. 
There was no interaction between age and focality, F (3. 72) = o.m), p>0.05 . 
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There was also an interaction between centrality and focality. F 0.72) = 40.64, 
p<O.Ol. Participants made a similar. low, number of omission errors for focally 
and non-focally coloured items when they were centrally-presented, but made a 
much higher proportion of such elTors for peripheral items. and the proportion of 
these was greater for the non-focal items There was also an inte raction between 
age. centrality and focality, F (3, 72) = 4.29, pdUll; see Table 8.4. The were few 
differences across the different groups. however simple effects showed four year 
olds made more omission errors for central non-focal items than any other group. 
DISCUSSION 
In ExpeIiment 8. colour recall was not tested solely on the hasis of centrality (as 
in Experiment 7). but also in terms of whether the objects were coloured focally 
or non-focally. In other words. participants were tested to see whether primary 
colours confelTed a memorial advantage over non-plimary colours. 
The results of ExpeIiment 8 were clear. First. the present results supported those 
of Experiment 7: central information was rememhered heller than peripheral 
information. Second. there was an advantage of focally coloured information 
over non-focally coloured information. regardless of centrality. There were no 
main effects of age in colour recall. which suggested that the effects of centrality 
and focality are, to some extent at least. present across the lifespan. These results 
were supported by the numbers of omission elTors macle by participants. There 
were more omission errors for peripheral information than central information, 
and also more omission errors for non-focally- than focally-coloured items. 
Since the methodologies of Experiments 7 and 8 were identical it was possible to 
compare recall of the focally-coloured central and peripheral items in 
Experiment 8 with the central and peripheral items in Experiment 7. as a measure 
of reliability. Scores for these items were markedly similar across the two 
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studies, which indicated that the two studies exerted the same demands on the 
recall of participants for colour. 
No researchers have examined the effect of focality in memory for the colours of 
everyday objects. Ratner and McCarthy (J 990) conducted one of the few studies 
in which participants were not asked to recall Munsell chips. In their study recall 
for picture colour was tested; they found that though the effects of focality were 
still present, they were present in a reduced form to those observt:d by Berlin and 
Kay (1969) and Heider (1971). A similar pattern of results existed in Experiment 
8. Focal colours were still better-recalled than non-focal, but this difference was 
small, especially when memory for the central items alone was examined. 
The four year olds in this study recalled as many colours as the older children 
and adults which suggests that any deficits they had in their colour knowledge 
were ameliorated by the presence of the colour chart. However as a pre-requisite 
of their being included in the study, all the pre-schoolers had to be able to name 
at least the six plimary colours. Few pre-schoolers could name the full range of 
colours used in Expeliment 8 so the facl that there were still differences in recall 
for focal and non-focal colours even when they were given the colour chart to 
use, supports the idea that there is a physiological basis for colour naming, such 
as that proposed by Berlin and Kay (1969). This result also supports other 
researchers who found differences in recall for focal :1I1c1 non-focal colours 
regardless of colour knowledge (Davies er (fl., 1994; Heickr, 1971; Heider & 
Oliver, 1972). 
So what do these results mean in terms of eyewitness testimony? What the 
results of Experiment 8 have shown is that children of all ages can recall colours 
as well as adults. The results have also shown that there is a dissociation hetween 
recall for focal and non-focal colours. This is important in terms of the accuracy 
un 
of recall as it means that the less focal the co lour, the more imprec ise me mory 
for it wiIl be, and thi s wiIl be com pounded if the informa ti on is periphera l. 
CHAPTER ') 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The experiments reported in this thesis have all heen concemed with the recognition 
and recall of colour. In particular they have com:entrated on the development of 
memory for colour from an eyewitness perspective. As pointed out in the 
introduction, despite evidence that it may he wdl-rememhered hy victims of crime 
(Christianson & HUhinette. 199~) and that it may play an import:.lnt part in the 
identification of suspects (Baddeley, 199~). no eyewitness researchers have taken 
colour memory as their primary focus. In contrast, a numher or investigators have 
looked at the automaticity of colour memory. 
In the introduction a number of aims were set out. First. to determine whether 
memory for colour is an automatic or an dfortful process. Second, to chart any 
changes in colour recall from early childhood through to adulthood. Third, how 
colour is recalled under forensically-applicable situations. In this final chapter these 
aims shall be considered in the light of (he performance of participants in the studies 
desclibed in Chapters 2-8. 
1. Automaticity (~f c%ur recall. 
Previous studies of colour memory have generated a dehate as 10 whether colour can 
be remembered without effort. However these studies have all had different 
procedures, and there has been little consistency in the type of stimuli that 
participants have had to recall. Because of this. direct comparisons across studies are 
difficult. 
Expeliments 1,2 and 3 were primarily conducted to examine whether memory for 
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colour was an automatic process under a variety of conditions. As part of this, it was 
hoped that the debate between Hatwell (I ~~5 ) Park and James (I ~X~) and Park and 
Mason (1982) could be clarified. The efrect or encoding condition, and the numher, 
colour and exposure time of the stimuli on n.:call ror co lour were all investigated. 
Encoding condition had an impact on recall ror colour in Experiments 1-3, with 
intentional encoding instructions leading to heller recall than incidental instructions. 
Stimulus exposure time did not affec t colour recall , hut increas ing the number of 
stimuli participants had to remember did have an ellect. with more stimuli leading to 
worse recall. 
These results indicated that colour memory is, at least when participants have to 
remember the colours of more than 15 pictures, an dlorlrul process. since recall was 
affected by encoding condition, and also by altering the appearance of the stimuli to 
be recalled (increasing the alTay of possihle pictun.: colours). I r colour memory was 
an automatic process, neither of these rac tors should have affected recall. 
Additionally, age differem.:es were observed; adults tended to recall more colour 
information correctly than seven and nine year olds. The refore, the results of 
Experiments 1, 2 and 3 support the idea that memory for colour is an effortful 
process (Light & Berger, 1974, 1976; Park & James. J 9X3; Park & Mas()n, 1982). 
However, when colour recall was investigated under slightly more naturalistic 
conditions, in contexts which might have been more comprehensible to children, 
such as making a birthday card or dress ing a doll, a somewhat different picture 
emerged. 
In Experiment 4, children had to sort shapes int() dirfere nt hoxes, he fore matching 
them with their correct shapes on a hoard. In Experiments 5 ,lIld 6, children helped 
make a birthday card and listened to a story ah()ut a Teddy Bear, respectively , and in 
Experiments 7 and 8, children participated in several goal-direc ted tasks. In all of 
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these expeIiments, when incidental recall ror central itl!ms was tested, colour recall 
was very good. 
Therefore, whether colour recall is considered to he an automatic or an effortful 
process is dependent upon two criteria. First, how one defines automaticity, and 
second, how one goes about testing recall [or colour. To take the last criterion first, 
in the experiments outlined above, clear dirferencl!s were ohserved in colour 
memory when the acquisition conditions werl! altered. Participants recalled colour 
far better when they had seen colours under more naturalistic (though still incidental) 
conditions (Experiments 4-8), than when their memory was tested under less 
naturalistic conditions, even when they were cued with hlack and white versions of 
the pictures they saw in the acquisition phase (Expl!riments 1-3). This is an 
important finding: such differences in recall when the stimuli are altered conllicts 
with the idea that memory for colour is an automatic process. In terms of definitions 
of automaticity, if we strictly employ Hasher and Zacks' (I <)7<)) criteria in assessing 
the automaticity of colour memory, we find that no studies actually show evidence 
of colour memory heing an automatic process. Hatwdl (J <)<)5), who is perhaps the 
strongest proponent of automaticity in memory for colour, still found that although 
some of her participants performed at ceiling levels. others were far less accurate. 
Indeed, few examples of automatic processes exist uncontested: recall fur location 
was cited as a good example of an automatic process hy H:.tsher and Zacks hut has 
come under some severe criticism (Naveh-Benjamin, 1 <)g7, l<)Xg). However if we 
apply less stringent criteria to our definition of automatic processes, such as age 
invariance (Hatwell, 1995), a reasonably high levd of performance (Park & Puglisi, 
1985), or a lack of a difference hetween incidental and intentional encoding 
(Backman et al., 1993), recall for colour can well he characterised as an automatic 
process. 
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In summary, the colour recall of children and adults can he very good when tested 
under some conditions. However colour recall did not approach ceiling levels in the 
majority of Experiments 1-8, which is suggestive of an dlnnl"ul process. Further 
findings, such as age differences and ellects of encoding l:ondition and stimuli form 
on recall in some of the experiments, are also indicative of operations which make 
demands on cognitive capacity. Nevertheless, age differences were not observed in 
all experiments, colour recall compared favourahly with memory for location in 
Experiment 6, and participants in all groups rememhered colours well. Such results 
support the conclusions of Cave et of. (I SlSl6) in that they show colour can be 
successfully encoded, at least to some degree, without any intention to do so. 
2. Colour recall and eyewitness testimony 
Few studies have assessed children's memory for dirferent colours, and none have 
directly examined colour recall with reference to eyewitness testimony. This 
omission seems strange considering the significance that rel:all of colour may have 
in legal proceedings: in a court of law, l:olnur memory may play an important role in 
eyewitness identification (Baddeley, lSl9~) and in event recall (Christianson & 
Htibinette, 1993; Loftus, 1977). 
In Experiments 4-8, when omission errors wen.~ excluded from the data, the 
performance of the children approached, and in some l:ases matched, the 
performance of adult participants. There was lillie evidence of poor memory for 
colour in Experiments 4-8, and children all recalled high proportions of object 
colours correctly. This is an important finding as it suggests that memory for colour 
is one aspect of events which young children can recall with some :.lccuracy. 
In addition, there is also evidence from Experiment 4, that recall for colour can be 
improved in pre-schoolers by the provision or a non-verhal prompt, such as a colour 
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chart. Several researchers have noted that non-verbal memory aids improve 
performance in recall tasks (Pipe l:'t (II., 199:1; Price & Goodman, 19~(); Wi Ikins et 
ai., 1989) and the colour chart that was llscd in Experiment 4 has one advantage over 
a number of other recall aids: it is not contcxt speciric. The effectiveness of the 
colour chart in improving recall was only investigated with pre-schoolers. Research 
was limited to this age group as researchers (van der Veer, 1994; Vygotsky, 1929) 
have argued that once the information is internalised, that is, participants know that 
objects of a specific hue an;: given a particular named colour lahel, any aid which 
provides this information will hecome redundanl. This is an area which requires 
more investigation. 
Experiments 5-8 improved on previous eyewitness invcstigations in three ways. 
First, recall for colour was tested within the context or a live event rather than as a 
series of slides. Second, unlike earlier studics, therc was a significant delay (of 24 
hours) between acquisition and recall. Third, the lypc or information was controlled, 
both in tenTIS of colour (not having sterentypically-colollred ohjects) and in tenns of 
the prominence of ohjects: in previous eyewitness experiments, colour recall was 
tested by asking participants ahout peripheral, not central, items. 
The present studies support the findings of some eyewitness researchers who have 
examined memory for colour. Christianson & Loftus (1991) found colour was 
recalled accurately hy participants, and even when the delay he tween acquisition and 
test was several months, witnesses have retained colour information well (Yuille & 
Cutshall, 1986). In summary, the colour memory of children appears to he reliable, 
and may prove to he a valuable source of eyewitness information. 
3. The development (~(c(}I()lIr memory 
In this final section I will address the question of how recall for colour information 
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changes over the lifespan. The range of studies in this thesis have not given a clear 
picture of how memory for colour develops. this is in part due to the qualitative 
differences in colour recall observed in Experiments 5-X. compared to Experiments 
1-3. I will discuss trends for colour recall in hoth of these tasks. hut sin<.:e the second 
part of this thesis had a more applied fm;us. 1 will concentrate on the results of these 
latter tasks. 
In Experiments 1-3 the ability of seven year olds. nine year olds and adults had to 
recall picture-colour under several different conditions. Although their recall was 
affected by encoding condition. there was a qualitative dillerem:e in the colour recall 
of the children and adults. Although no consistent patlern existed across all three 
experiments, there was a trend for participant age to affect colour recall. In general. 
adults recalled more picture colours correctly than either the seven or the nine year 
olds. 
In Experiments 5-8. the <.:olour re<.:all of parli<.:ipanls of 01/ ages for <.:entrally-
presented information was good. Participants in all age groups rememhered a large 
proportion of colour information correctly. This is an important result as these 
experiments all tested what Mandler et (/1. (1977) termed ' true incidental' memory 
(see Chapter 1. p. 49). This means that participants had to recall information for a 
memory test of which they were unaware. Mandler et (/1 . argued that this was a better 
way of testing incidental recall. as participants are givell IlO cue thatlhey would later 
be tested on their recall for any information. This approach can be contrasted with 
the methodology used by Hatwell (J 995) and Park and Mason (1982). in which 
participants were told to remember certain aspe<.:ts of stimuli which they would be 
tested on later. 
With the exception of the four year olds in the ' No prompt ' condition of Experiment 
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4 and the non-focal condition of Experiment 8, every group 01' participants in 
Experiments 4-8 got more than S()% of ohject-colours correct when objects were 
presented centrally. Although there was an increase in colour reca ll hetween four and 
six or seven years of age, there was lillk evidence or an increase in colour memory 
after this point. This age invariance from seven years onwards is an important 
tinding, as it suggests that memory for colour is a consistent aspect of recall, and one 
that may not be affected by any changes in attention or metacognitinn after middle 
childhood. These results confinTI the findings of Hagen (1')(,7), who despite finding 
an improvement in capacity to perform central tasks (cL Chapter (" Tahles (, .1. and 
6.4), also found no evidence of an increase ill inciden tal learning hetween middle 
childhood and adolescence. 
The ages of participants tested in this thesis were selected to mirror those tested by 
Davidoff and Mitchell (1991), Hatwe ll (1995), Park and James (19H1) and Park and 
Mason (1982) in their studies. However it is unclea r what harpens to the 
development of colour memory hetween to yea rs of age and adulthood. Perhaps, 
like some cognitive abilities (Hagen, 19(7), there is a dip in pe rformance at around 
12 years of age. Future research will heir clarify any changes in trends for colour 
recall across adolescence. 
The effect of object colour on recall was investigated in Ex periment X. In this study 
memory was not tested solely on the hasis of centrality (as in Expeliment 7), hut al so 
in terms of whether the objects were coloured focally or non-focally. In other words, 
participants were tested to see whether primary colours conferred a memorial 
advantage over non-primary colours in recall for everyday items. 
The results of Experiment 8 were clear: in addition to supporting the findings of 
Experiment 7, that the colours of central items were recalled he ller than those of 
195 
peripheral items. there was also an effel:t of wlour focality on memory. Recall for 
focal colours exceeded that for non-focal l:olours for all age groups. This supports 
Berlin and Kay's (1969) theory of semantic primitives in colour reca ll for real 
objects. 
In Experiment 8 the predictions of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis with respect to colour 
were not tested as this would mean correlating the colour knowledge or each 
individual child with their performance on the task. Davidoff (1991) suggested that 
memory for colours may actually be mediated in ways predicted by the Sapir-Whorl' 
hypothesis and related to the ease with which the colours can he verbally 
communicated (Brown & Lenneherg. j 954). This remains an interesting possibility 
for future research since no-one has investigated the hypothes is from a 
developmental perspective. (The idea of semantil.: primitives and the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis are to some extent mutually exc lusive since Whorf pred icted that 
individuals who do not possess a full range of wlour terms will have difficulty 
recalling the full range of colours. while Berlin and Kay suggested that some colours 
would he recalled well regardless of an individual possessing particular colour 
terms.) 
Conclusion 
In answer to the question 'Do children have a good memory for colour'!'. the 
response has to he a qualified 'Yes '. Depending upon the form of the stimuli they are 
shown. and the way in which they are tes ted, even every young children can have a 
good memory for colour. The colour recall of adults appears to he an accurate form 
of memory. However, given the existence of age differences. effects of encoding 
condition and stimuli form in several of the studies. colour reca ll cannot he 
characterised as an automatic process in the strictest sense of Hashe r and Zacks' 
(1979) cliteria. 
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These findings have practical implications in terms of the way recall for colour 
should be treated in eyewitness situations. Although recall for colour was not at 
ceiling levels, all ages remembered the majority of colour information successfully. 
Accuracy was better still when omission errors were excluded from the analysis, as 
they would be in a police investigation. Therefore. L.dlihle as witnesses may be, 
recall for the colour of salient objects may he one area in which thdr testimony can 
be treated as more likely to be accurate than not. 
We cannot separate an individual from his or her context, and personal history may 
impact upon recall in terms of particular associations hetween ohjects and their 
colours, but even given this, the experiments reported ahove have shown that when 
they are asked to remember focally-coloured, centrally-presented items, memory for 
colour can be an accurate operation for hoth children and adults. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
COLOUR STEREOTYPES: A QUESTlONNAIRE 
The type of memory involved in testimony is seen by many researchers as a 
reconstruction of the facts based on available information including inferences, 
contextual cues, past experiences and existing world knowledge (e.g . Ceci et al., 
1987a; Loftus & Davies, 1984; Zaragoza , 1987). Several investigators have 
emphasised the effect of erroneous infonnation on recall (reviewed in Ceci & Bruck, 
1993b), however the recall of eyewitnesses may he also affected by their schema 
about what happens during typically (Fivllsh et al .. 1992; Holst & Pezdek, 1992; 
Smith, 1986). 
Several researchers have observed the intrusioll of stereotypical or suggested 
information in experiments which have tested colour memory (e .g. Belli, 1989; 
Loftus & Palmer, 1974) and therefore it was important that the colours of pictures 
and objects lIsed in the present experiments should not he ones commonly associated 
with those pictures or objects. Questionnaires were distrihuted in order to find out 
what colours people normally associate with vaIious ohjects. 
One hundred first year undergraduates completed the ljuestionnaire. No control was 
made of participant age or sex, however most students were in their late teens or 
early twenties. Their were approximately even numbers of male and female students. 
Participation in the experiment was voluntary. 
AIl participants were given a copy of a questionnaire at the start of a Iahoratory class. 
Clear instructions and an example were printed at the top 01· the ljuestionnaire, and 
participants were also given verbal instructions on how to complete it. The 
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questionnaire consisted of 60 words which included the stimuli used in this thesis. 
Participants were asked to list the colour th~y associated most with each of these 
objects. The questionnaire took participants ahout 3 minutes to complete. 
Data from the questionnaires was collated and plac~d into a large table (see Table 
9.1), columns were divided into a large range of colours, rows were the object names. 
As 100 participants were tested, scores in individual cells corresponded to 
percentages. Total scores for objects of less than j()() indicate omissions. The colours 
which were associated with each item by most participants arc marked in hold. 
This colour survey was conducted to get an idea about sten.:otypical ideas of colours, 
as a resource for future experiments. The survey was conducted after Experiment J. 
The colours commonly given for each object were noted and were not incorporated 
into later experiments. 
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APPENDIX B 
EXPERIMENT 5: BIRTHDA Y CARD STUDY 
Specific Questions 
Who was the birthday card for? 
What was the birthday card in? 
Can you tell me where the pencil was? 
Do you rememher what we gave Jess for her hirthday? 
Do you remember what colour the halloon was'! 
What was the halloon hidden in? 
Can you remember where the little envelope was? 
What was the sellotape in? 
Where was the stamp? 
OK, you've done very well so far, now I'm going 10 ask you some 4uestions ahout 
the colours of things. [Child told to point to colours on prompt card if unahle to 
remember the name of the colour. Again, stressed it was fine to say 'I don't kn()w' if 
they could not recall the colour of an item] 
What colour was the bin'! 
hlick? 
(shoe) hox '! 
big envelope/ folder? 
shopping basket? 
plastic bag? 
Do you rememher what we did first? 
Do you remember what we did last, on the way out? 
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What colour was the little envelope? [folder] 
pencil? 
card? 
stamp'! 
sellotape? 
Do you remember anything else that was in the room? 
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Story Script 
APPENDIX C 
EXPERIMENT 6: ROOM STUDY 
'Teddy has just been out to town on a long shopping lIip. He ' s hought lots of things 
and is carrying them all back home in a hig hag.' 
'Shall we see what Teddy got at the shops'!' 
[Experimenter takes out the shopping, piece hy piece , placing them all in front of the 
participants hut out of their reach] 
'A telephone .. . a hat.. . .' (Items taken randomly out or hag, participants encouraged to 
name the items as they're pulled out). 
'First of all Teddy went to a clothes shop, he had a look at lots of things hefore he 
finally picked up a hig round hat. He tried it on and thought he looked wonderful in it 
so he went and bought it even though it cost a lot or money. I think that Teddy is 
going to put the hat onto the hed in his room now, Teddy thinks it looks very good on 
the bed. 
Next Teddy went to the library to look for a hig hook out ahout hirds. It took him a 
long time to find the one he wanted, hut when he did he was very pleased. Teddy is 
going to put the book onto his cooker, though he's made very sure that the cooker 
isn't switched on. 
It was Teddy's friend's birthday so he bought her a nice hirthday card. The hirthday 
card has got a flower on the front and a numher five, hecause it's her fifth birthday. 
Teddy's going to put it on the cOllch. He's pUlling it un tIll: couch so that everyone 
can see how nice it is. 
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Teddy's also got himself a new washing up bowl. He always has a lot of fri ends 
round for tea so there is often a lot of washing up to do. Teddy puts the washing up 
bowl on the top of a cupboard. Luckily the cuphoard is ljuite low so he can easily 
reach the top of it to do the washing up. 
Teddy bought the telephone so that he can still talk to his friends if they move away. 
Teddy makes sure that the telephone is properly on the shelf of the bookL:ase, because 
he wouldn't like it to fall out of the bookcase and onto the 1100r as it might hreak and 
then he wouldn't be able to talk to them any more. 
The last thing that Teddy bought in town was a hig hall. The hall is to take to the 
seaside when he goes with his friends so that they can play on the heach and in the 
water. Teddy is going to put it Oil the table, hut he'll have to make sure it doesn't roll 
off onto the tloor as the table is on a bit of a slope. 
Teddy takes a step back and has a good look rollnd the room, he's had a long day out 
shopping and he came straight back home and unpacked everything; he ' s very 
pleased with himself because he is ljuite tidy for a tedlly hear after all isn 't he'!' 
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Objects 
1. hat 
2. wash bowl 
3. book 
4. telephone 
5. birthday card 
6. ball 
APPENDIX 0 
EXPERIMENT 6: OBJECT PLACEMENTS 
Furniture 
#1 #2 #3 
bed hookt:ase lahk 
cupboard t:out:h hed 
cooker tahle t:uphoard 
bookcase cup hoard couch 
couch bed t:ooker 
table l'lHlker huokcase 
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Questions 
APPENDIX E 
EXPERIMENT 6 
1. Do you remember what Teddy bought at the shops? 
2. Can remember what furniture Teddy had in his room? 
3. What colour was the ball? 
telephone? 
hat'! 
washing up howl? 
book'! 
hirthday card? (6) 
There were several orders of questions, participants were asked about the colours of 
the items mentioned by the participants first, followed hy the rest, randomly. NB 
questions 2 and 1 were counterbalanced. 
4. Room reconstruction with furniture: 'Can you put the furniture hack in the room 
like Teddy had it before'! ' (6) 
5. Object matching between the items of shopping and the furniture: 'Can you 
remember where Teddy put his shopping on the furniture'! ' (6) 
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APPENDIX F 
EXPERIMENT 6: RECALL SCORES FOR INDIVIDUAL 
OBJECTS, BY AGE 
Age Group 
4 n X Adult 
Table OA5 OA5 O .~5 (U~y 
Bed 0.65 0.70 O.X5 O.8Y 
Bookcase 0.25 0.90 0.70 1.00 
Couch 0.30 0.70 O.S5 (1.95 
Cooker 0.70 (UO 1.00 1.00 
Cupboard 0.25 0.65 0.55 1.00 
Phone 0.50 (um (1.('';5 ().94 
Hat 0.70 0.75 0.95 0.94 
Bowl 0.20 (U5 0.50 0.74 
Book 0.80 0.85 o. YO 0.94 
Card 0.60 O.RO 0.90 0.79 
Ball 0.75 0 .90 0.95 1.00 
Overall 
Mean 0.51 0.7 I O.XO 0.93 
Overall 
Mean 
0.69 
0.77 
0.71 
0.63 
O.X5 
O.n J 
0.77 
0.84 
0.45 
0.87 
0.77 
0.90 
0.74 
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APPENDIX G 
EXPERIMENTS 7 AND 8: OUTLINE OF PROCEDURE 
Hello I'm Jonathan 
I'm looking at how people use their hands in differe nt ways - so I'd like you to do a 
few things with your hands - like putting together a toy or dressing this doll, do you 
mind helping me wjth this'! 
I've got a clock so that I can time how long it takes you to do these things, .is that OK'! 
1. Writing 
Please can you use this crayon to wlite your first name (4 year olds) 
Please can you use this crayon to write your name. and the first two lines of this poem 
(7 and 9 year olds) 
Please can you use thi s crayon to write your name and copy this tex t (adults) 
2. Dressing doll 
Please can you put shirt on (and fasten X huttons) 
Please can you put scarf on and fast en it 
Please can you put the belt on (children given help) 
Please could you put coat necklace on and fasten it (children loop necklace over head, 
adults fasten it). 
Please can you put on coat (and fasten X buttons) 
3. Throwing ball 
1 minute (Two colours) 
Please can you throw it into the hin - then get it (Jut and try again twice ll1ure 
(vary distance of bucket for different ages) 
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4. Pu.tting beads on string 
1 minute (Two colours) 
Please can you thread thislthese beads onto thi s woo l (adjust no. or heads) 
5. Making shape 
30 seconds (One colour) 
Please can you make a shape the same as the one I hav~ h~r~ 
(number of pieces to make shape varied for diller~ nt ag~s) . 
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